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The Extent and Limits of the Right to Arbitrate Among Religious and
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Abstract
Arbitration is a private mechanism that offers people an alternative means of resolving
disputes outside of the state courts; thus, it allows for some measure of self-government. This
dissertation focuses on “community arbitration” and investigates the background of the
“community” concept and why certain communities rely on arbitration. It also examines the legal
concepts that affect the extent to which community groups have the right to arbitrate disputes in
their own courts. This dissertation discusses when and how the right to arbitrate should be
respected, and when that right may legitimately be limited to two community types: religious or
cultural communities. As well as investigating these larger issues, this dissertation also considers
numerous sub-questions, including: (1) how are communities defined; (2) what rights do such
communities members have; (3) what is the relationship between community autonomy and legal
pluralism; and (4) to what extent should religious and minority communities be protected
through arbitration from potential abuse that may occur during an arbitration proceeding?
People’s religious commitments and considerations often oblige them to resolve conflicts
according to their own religious laws. Some communities attempt to resolve disputes without
resorting to official state courts. For example, religious communities—specifically Jewish,
Christian and Muslim communities—in the U.S., Canada and the UK are often obligated to
resolve conflicts according to religious laws and/or before religious tribunals.
Certain cultural communities, on the other hand, due to certain social commitments and
cultural considerations, are obliged to resolve conflicts according to their own unique ethnic
laws. This thesis examines the theme of cultural arbitration; namely, peacemaking methods
based on culture. This thesis focuses on the Sulha (reconciliation) as “Bedouin Arbitration,” cultural mechanism that provides for amicable dispute resolution -and considers Bedouin
communities in Palestine and Jordan, as well as communities involved in military conflicts or
living in war zones, as its case studies. This paper also highlights the legal challenges
encountered by Palestinian communities operating under the jurisdiction of an arbitration center
located in Jerusalem.
Sometimes, the autonomy allows arbitration to comes into conflict with official state
political objectives. Other challenges may come to light when judicial awards are enforced.
Hence, religious commitments and social power may impose a new type of mechanism for the
implementation of arbitration awards.
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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

BDA:

Beth Din of America

FAA:

Federal Arbitration Act

ICC:

Institute for Christian Conciliation

IICJ:

Islamic Institute of Civil Justice

IT:

Islamic Tribunal

JAC:

Jerusalem Arbitration Center

MAT:

Muslim Arbitration Tribunal

MCA:

Muslim Court of Arbitration

UAA:

Uniform Arbitration Act
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GLOSSARY
Al-haq Al’am: Public Interest (the individual does not have the right to drop the case, because it
is a significant criminal case with a major criminal charges)
Al-haq Al-khas: Personal Rights (the individual has the right to drop the case, because it is case
with minor criminal charges)
Atwa: The act of securing a truce for the perpetrator’s family
Baear Alnoum: An amount paid to the victim for the purpose of returning families to their homes
after the Jalwah (Jalwah is defined below)
Beth Din: Jewish house of Judgment.
Dhimmahs: the people of book are Jews and Christians in Islam.
Diyaa: Compensation that the perpetrator’s family pays to the victim’s family
Fatwa: An Islamic scholar’s opinions about a situation presented to him
Fiqh: Islamic schools of thoughts or Islamic jurisprudence.
Get: husband declined divorce to his wife in Jewish law.
Gurbet: Diaspora
Hadith: Any statement, action, or report issued by the Prophet Muhammad
Halacha: rules of Jewish law
Hamula: Clan, relative
Hudna: Truce
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Imam: Islamic ruler or leader.
Jaha: Committee of the Sulha
Jalwah: The family or tribe of the offender is displaced from the area of their residence/s to
another area
Kafel Dafa: Third party that is designated to ensure the fulfillment of the judgment that is handed
down to the perpetrator’s family
Kafel Waffa: Third party that is designated to guarantee the fulfillment of the judgment that is
handed down to the perpetrator’s family
Khul: woman ability to divorce her husband in Islam after giving up her financial right.
Mahr: agreement between a Muslim couple that stipulates an amount of property that is promised
by the husband to the bride as a dowry.
Meda: Blood money
Mosalaha: Reconciliation
P’shara krova l’din: Jewish law principles.
Qadah: Judgment
Qadi: Judge or Arbitrator in the Sulha Process
Rabbi: scholar or teacher in the religion of Judaism.
Rizket Al Qadi: Sulha fees for the Judge
Salaam: Peace
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Seruv: Sanction that issued by Beth Din which a manuscript is stating that the individual
mentioned must be shunned for choosing to present his or her issue to a secular court
Sh’tar birurim: arbitration clause in the agreement Jewish arbitration.
Sharaf: Honor
Sheikh: An elder male with high social value
Sulha, Sulh: Alternative form of resolution dispute in the Middle East that involves negotiation,
mediation, and arbitration
Sunnah: The practice of Prophet Muhammad by his talk, act or conforming his companions’ act.
Sunnah: The way of the Prophet Muhammad’s life that Muslims should follow
Tabyeed Wijih: Social compensation
Tafweed: Power of attorney and authorization given by the parties to the Jaha to resolve a
dispute
Tahkim: Arbitration
Waqf: inalienable donation for religious proposes Islamic property or gift.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem Statement
1. The concept of community is not easily defined. Communities have a high degree of
diversity in terms of individuals’ interests, values, projects and commitments. Therefore,
the study of communities has been addressed by scholars from many different fields, the
most important of which comprise legal, social, and political science studies. Scholars
have diverse opinions regarding the meaning of community; however, the concept of
community is usually interpreted from the perspective of legal theory. Some researchers
rely on the theories of state and society that have been developed over time by influential
sociologists.
2. Cultures are often misinterpreted as being monolithic entities within a community; this
means that a researcher may adopt a flawed methodological approach that may lead to a
range of false conclusions. Two factors in particular may cause such confusion. First,
there may be “a danger in using the concept of culture in a way that assumes an
inevitable similarity between people who are different in important ways.” 1 Also, there is
a danger in assuming that people from one community are so different from those of the
another community that it would be impossible to have porous cultures, i.e., cultures that
are “open to cross-influence, mutual learning, recognition of commonalities, and intergroup translation of experience, beliefs, aspirations and attachments.” 2 Therefore, the

1

Roger Cotterrell, Living Law, Studies in Legal and Social Theory: Culture, Comparison, Community, 2 INT’L J.L.
1, 6 (2006).

IN CONTEXT
2

Id. See Also in general, Anthony Cohen, “Editor’s Foreword,” in THE SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY 8
(Peter Hamilton ed., London/New York: Routledge, 2001).
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source of the issue is misinterpreting the concept of difference as it pertains to people and
culture.
3. Understanding the types and forms of societies is not. For example, some communities
are merged, but not by choice. In such cases, a person’s emotional attachments to a
particular community may play a more instrumental role than geographical factors.
4. Understanding the relationship between arbitration and group political autonomy requires
understanding the political issues of a community’s autonomy and laws. The theory of
the laws of any given community must explain all fundamental concepts related to legal
pluralism and community, in the context of the opposition between individual autonomy
and group commitment, which is an important point that will be discussed in this thesis.
Developing and studying theories of voluntary communities in order to examine
community autonomy and legal intervention is complicated. Legal scholarship does not
offer a detailed study of social groups. Still, certain normative parameters can help
identify group autonomy and group rights as being different from individual autonomy
and individual rights.
5. Islamophobia and the fear of Islamic arbitration: legal pluralism and the Shari’a. Due to
the current “clash of civilizations” (the opposition between the East and the West), many
North American and European societies have rejected the Shari’a on the grounds of state
sovereignty.3 The biggest problem with the Shari’a and other systems of religious
arbitration courts is identifying what body or bodies will enforce it.

3

Bryan S. Turner and Berna Zengin Arslan, Shari’a and Legal Pluralism in the West, 14(2) EUR. J. SOC. THEORY
145 (2011).
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6. The researcher of this thesis was unable to count the number of the communities around
the world that use cultural arbitration or religious arbitration. There are many examples of
the use of such a mechanism to resolve issues, such as the traditional conflict resolution
mechanism that continues to serve portions of the populations of Pashtun and Baloch in
Pakistan and Afghanistan, certain Kurdish communities, and the use of the Sulha among
many Bedouin communities of the Middle East.
7. The problem with religious arbitration is that courts might enforce religious arbitration
awards even though the agreement was reached under communal pressure; certain rules
that are established may be unfair and certain procedures may be unjust. Secular courts
often have difficulty establishing that a tribunal’s decision was inequitable or was made
under undue pressure from the parties involved.
8. The Sulha is a cultural way of resolving certain issues, and is similar to arbitration. This
paper discusses a process of framing reconciliation (Sulha) and introduces it into a new
concept of arbitration. Cultural arbitration has its own way of resolving issues, and it
involves a specific method of social enforcement. The method of Sulha is complex and
difficult to investigate, due to a lack of sources; most of the information about disputes
settled by Sulha occurs during oral transmission between generations. 4
9. Religious commitments and social power impose a new type of mechanism for the
implementation of binding arbitration awards. Usually, the only way to enforce ordinary
arbitration is through the national courts. However, it is possible to consider religious
commitments and social power as a way to enforce arbitral awards.

4

ELIAS JABBOUR, SULHA: PALESTINIAN TRADITIONAL PEACEMAKING PROCESS 16 (House of Hope Publications
1996) (hereinafter “Jabbour”).
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1.2 Objectives of the Study
1. Considering the relationship among communities, legal pluralism, autonomy and
arbitration can pave the way for studying how arbitration is practiced between a single
community that is applying its own law.
2. Communities can create their own laws based in the tenets of their church, or they can
create laws of their own. The main objective of law is to regulate the social relationships
upon which each community is founded.
3. This study aims to point out certain objective and subjective conditions that a group
needs to meet in order to be realized as a community within a society.
4. Understanding what a community is (or means) can vary among the community’s
members, and the legal implications of members’ attachment to their community can also
vary. These differences create complexities that are reflected in the (sometimes volatile)
relationship between the community and its members.
5. Answering the question of whether norms and traditional law can be considered as
“official” law in terms of legal pluralism and multiculturalism.
6. Communities should not have “[A] strong form of legal autonomy” 5 and a community’s
legal autonomy should be controlled through a “complete prohibition of judicial review”
as well minimal consistency regarding the internal objectives of community. 6

5

By this phrase the author refers to “the power of groups to govern their affairs with minimal interference from the
legal system—that is, a largely non-interventionist resolution to what might be called the ‘inside-outside’ problem.”
Id. at 3.
6
Gregory S. Alexander, “Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community,” Cornell Law
Faculty Publications, Paper 466, 60 (1989).
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7. A community as a regulatory ideal cannot be realized entirely, but should nevertheless be
pursued to achieve and maintain this.
8. Cases of arbitration within communities must recognize the sovereign law of the state, in
spite of community-specific laws. This poses problems in the face of legal pluralism,
which is “couched in terms of freedom of religion and liberty of conscience.” 7
9. This paper aims to contribute to the study of the importance of, and relationship among:
(1) individual autonomy within a community; (2) community and autonomous activities;
(3) law and a community’s autonomy; (4) individual autonomy and a community’s
autonomy; (5) communities’ right to autonomy; ad (6) communities’ autonomy and the
state.
10. An examination of why arbitration is important for a community’s religious and cultural
values.
11. This paper argues that legal and constitution protection for the right to arbitrate should be
promote for communities.
12. This paper argues for the right to arbitrate within religious communities, specifically
focusing on three major religions: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Members of these
religions practice their own methods of resolving conflicts in accordance with their faith.
This work provides examples of Islamic arbitration in the UK, Canada, and the US. This
paper also examines examples of arbitration that occurs in Christian (Catholic and
Lutheran) and Mormon communities, and in Jewish communities in the UK and the US.

7

Turner, supra note 3, at 151.
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13. Understanding that the Sulha as mechanism represents a unique way of revolving issues
among the Bedouin communities of the Middle East. This chapter focuses on the use of
the Sulha in Palestine and Jordan as an example of cultural arbitration.
1.3 Significance of the Study
1. How a community shares geographical and anthropological characteristic, such as a
territory marked by legal and geographical borders, language, tradition, and other cultural
and historical traits, and religious, political and emotional attachments, plays an essential
role in the enforcement of arbitration. Also, legal regulations are important as a basic
characteristic of a community. Attachments can be emotional and cultural and are often
related to social heritage and communal endeavors. Still, economic reasons may be
among the most important factors as attachments that also, plays a role in the
enforcement of arbitration.
2. Modern liberal society often takes for granted the legal enforcement of promises. Hence,
contracts are used to create long-lasting relationships. It is possible to avoid legal
enforcements and use transactional arrangements instead, but these are not as efficient.
In other words, the idea that attachments are formed due to legal enforcement may seem
misleading; however, withholding enforcement would make it difficult for a society to
recognize and reinforce individual moral commitments. Therefore, the question still
remains to what lengths legal regulations should go to enforce long-term relationships
that limit future choices.
3. There is an inextricable link between a community and the law. Contemporary
multicultural societies typically include many different communities that conflict in their
interpretation of the same law/s. Community and legal policies, principles, and rules form
21
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a complex network that underlies the life of community members and the legal system of
their community.
4. Multiculturalism and legal pluralism are different principles; multiculturalism refers to
various peoples, their personalities, way of life, attachment to community, etc., while
legal pluralism refers to a variety of laws, norms and regulations. What multiculturalism
and legal pluralism have in common is diversity.
5. Legal plurality is one of the defining characteristics of a postmodern community. The
increasing number of communities, and their relationship to the nation state and legal
plurality causes concern for the executive members of the state.
6. Understanding “legal pluralism” alone is difficult, since many scholars from various
fields (sociology, law theory, anthropology) and with various purposes use this term.
Such different interpretations of legal pluralism had blurred the concept of law, making it
all the more difficult to talk about legal pluralism on a global level. New examinations of
the relationship among community, law, and state are needed.
7. The social order and rules in a community. Individual behavior within a community is
subject to rules.8 Therefore, rules are the essential factor when it comes to establishing
stable community relations.9 Mutual interaction and relationships among community
members reflect the maintenance of rules. Community members’ behavior that is
regulated as such is called “social behavior” and is closely connected to legal pluralism.
Members regulate their own behavior in accordance with community laws, and they are
also able to settle conflicts by means of arbitration. In addition, members who are

8
9

Cf. EDWARD A. ROSS, SOCIAL CONTROL: A STUDY OF THE FOUNDATION OF ORDER, (New York: Macmillan, 1901).
Id.
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familiar with the community’s rules and laws can preside over arbitration processes to
ensure a fair outcome.
8. As to the question of individuals’ autonomy within a community, the concept of
autonomy should be examined at the level of an individual and the level of a community
that is understood as a bounded whole. Community here implies all autonomous
individual activities within it. The concept of autonomy is complex, especially in view of
legal pluralism and multiculturalism.
9. Can communities have legal autonomy, and, if so, to what degree does this autonomy
apply in relation to the nation-state’s legal system? The main role of law is to “protect
community and to express or support conditions for it.”10 Defining community autonomy
is complex, as groups are largely absent from the legal discourse. Broadly speaking,
community autonomy “is a right for the group to decide its own affairs, determined by
reference to the nature of the group within society.”11
10. Balancing effective arbitration and autonomy is complex, due to the opposing
implications of these concepts. Arbitration entails enforcement of contracts, which
requires a certain degree of autonomy for both sides of the conflict.
11. The level of the autonomy enjoyed by disputing parties usually varies, but it may be
classified by means of “four facets: participation, cultural, financial and arbitration .” 12
this thesis is adding a new facet that works as correspondingly as participation, cultural,

10

Roger Cotterrell, Community as a Legal Concept? Some Use of a Law-and-Community Approach in Legal
Theory, 2 NOFO 20 (2006).
11
Geoff Gilbert, Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law, 35(2) CORNELL INT’L L.J. 314
(2002).
12
Id. at 342, as quoted from ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS & NATIONALISM 118-19 (1983).
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financial which is the arbitration. These facets represent the essential needs of each
community within the state.
12. The most important and central question contemplated by this thesis is how arbitration
has become an effective, self-regulating method of resolving minor conflicts within
communities. Community autonomy, like party autonomy, is the predominant factor
when the main principles select the laws that should apply to their arbitration process.
13. Courts are already drawing the boundaries around communal autonomy in cases
regarding claims of First Amendment speech, religion, and communal rights.
14. This thesis provides comprehensive reasons behind the rise of religious arbitration.
Religious arbitration offers certain advantages. Resolving a dispute based on religious
beliefs is, in many ways, an expression of faith and an homage to the importance and
primacy of a person’s religion. It is also an active exercise of the precept of the freedom
of expression and religion.
15. Enforcing religious law in a secular court has always been at the crux of this complicated
relationship between courts and religious law. This relationship is made more complex in
the United States by the church autonomy doctrine, which gives religious bodies the right
to certain levels of self-government
16. The use of the Sulha in Palestinian societies is of the utmost importance socially,
politically and legally, as this use takes multiple forms that benefit Palestinians and also
provides a unique model that societies across the world should study. The first form is the
possibility of applying peace mechanisms to achieve peace between two parties that are
internationally and politically disparate. The second form-despite the longstanding
international disagreements between Israelis and Palestinians—is that the commercial
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and social relations between these two peoples are at a very high level and cannot be
ignored. These relationships exist in the field of trade and at the social level; their
differences must be understood in order to resolve them. One proposed venue for
resolution is the Jerusalem Arbitration Center (JAC). The third form is the need of the
Palestinians as a people living under occupation to resolve their internal disputes.
17. The implementation of the Sulha decision is important for two fundamental frameworks.
The first is the legal framework, considering that the parties to a Sulha conclude a
contract to resolve the dispute or agreement between them and accept the settlement
through the Sulha. It thus becomes binding and is considered by the national court to be a
condition for full reconciliation or a mitigation of the sentence. The second is the social
framework, which is the implementation of the Sulha by social force through people’s
commitment to customs and traditions that require respect for the decision of
reconciliation and are socially binding.
18. For American Muslims to successfully support the use of Islamic law in the United
States, Islamic arbitration must become more professional and organized, and it must be
demonstrated that it can be exercised in alignment with the US legal system. American
Muslim scholars could support this development by establishing a code of laws and
procedures for Islamic arbitration in the US; currently, no such code exists. Any such
rules and procedures must exist within the context of US law and public policy.
19. Community arbitration could be final and binding, just like any other form of arbitration.
However, community arbitration is unique in terms of “binding”—the ease of enforcing
community arbitration depends on religious enforcement by the religious community or
social enforcement by the ethnic community.
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20. This thesis argues that arbitration is an expression of community autonomy, just as party
autonomy is indorsed by arbitration agreements “arbitration is an expression of party
autonomy.”13 This role is one of the most important reasons that disputing parties wish to
use arbitration to resolve their disputes. To encourage the use of arbitration to resolve
disputes, some countries have adopted international instruments and legislation in support
of arbitration14. Similarly, community autonomy promotes arbitration and helps parties
from same community resolve their own issues under the auspices of the state and its
laws.
1.4 Methodology
From the cultural anthropological perspective, this research explores how people in different
communities live and interact with the world around them and with each other. The author of this
research takes it to observe all voices and viewpoints in order to understand how societies vary,
what they have in common, and how they each have a need for autonomy and arbitration.
From the anthropological angle, the notion of communities and their autonomy is of fundamental
importance to any society.
From a sociological perspective, this thesis focuses on the systematic study of the development,
structure, interaction, and collective behavior of organized subcommunities while also analyzing
the social institution as a functioning whole as it relates to the rest of society.
From the political science perspective, this research focuses on the theory and practice of
government and politics at the local, state, and national levels. This paper is dedicated to
developing an understanding of institutions and the practice of arbitration against the background

13
14

Gary B. Born, Keynote Address: Arbitration and the Freedom to Associate, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7 (2009).
Id.
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of political autonomy, studying how political sub communities fight to have their own governor.
This thesis examines the relationship among law, social relations, and community.
This study presents an analysis of issues related to community arbitration that are relevant to
both religion and culture. Therefore, the methodology adopted focuses on religious law and
customary law, the Shari’a, the US courts, and the practice of arbitration in the US, the UK,
Canada, Jordan and Palestine
This research is descriptive and analytical in nature. Therefore, the provisions of religious law
and customary law considered by this thesis are explained and analyzed.
A case study is a research methodology that uses a descriptive and exploratory analysis of the
Sulha mechanism, and in-person interviews were conducted for this thesis.
Data collection methods
This research draws on two kinds of sources: primary and secondary.
1. Primary Sources
The Law of Arbitration in the US, the UK, and Canada.
The Islamic Shari’a; the Jordanian constitution, and the Jordanian Penal Code.
These primary sources provide a foundation for a comprehensive picture of the issues raised
herein.
2. Secondary Sources
Library sources, including electronic sources in the form of databases and web pages, together
with recent journal articles, books, and legal reports, news reports, and telephone interview make
up the secondary data sources for this study.

27

The Extent and Limits of the Right to Arbitrate Among Religious
and Cultural Communities (Sulha as a case study)
1.5 Literature Review
The researcher did not find any sources that directly addressed a community’s right to arbitrate
in a way that was relevant to the concerns of investors, whether domestic or foreign.
Therefore, according to the researcher’s extensive reading, the present research is the first
comprehensive study to consider this matter. The researcher designed this study to be useful
to many states around the world that contain subcommunities that practice community
arbitration. The researcher did, however, locate some articles written in English that consider the
right to arbitrate in terms of autonomy, community, legal pluralism, religious arbitration and the
use of the Sulha based on cultural considerations.
The following books and articles that focus on five matters (autonomy, community, legal
pluralism, religious arbitration and the Sulha) were of great assistance to this study:
1. In terms of the concept of community, the researcher relied in large part on Cotterrell’s
contributions to this field.
Roger Cotterrell, “A Legal Concept of Community,” Canadian Journal of Law and Society 12
(1997)
Roger Cotterrell, “Community as a Legal Concept? Some Use of a Law-and-Community
Approach in Legal Theory,” NoFo 2 (2006)
Roger Cotterrell, “Culture, Comparison, Community,” International Journal of Law in Context 2,
(2006)
Roger Cotterrell, “The Struggle for Law: Some Dilemmas for Cultural Legality,” International
Journal of Law in Context 4, 4 (2008)
Roger Cotterrell, “Theory and Values in Socio-Legal Studies,” Journal of Law and Society 44
(2017).
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Roger Cotterrell, Law, culture and society: Legal ideas in the mirror of social theory, 34 J.L. &
Soc’y 633 (2007).
2. In terms of the concept of autonomy, the researcher relied in large part on several
different sources.
Alexander S. Gregory, “Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and
Community,” Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Paper 466 (1989).
Farrah Ahmed and Senwung Luk, “How Religious Arbitration Could Enhance Personal
Autonomy,” Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 1 (2012)
Farrah Ahmed, “Personal Autonomy and the Option of Religious Law,” International Journal of
Law, Policy and the Family 24 (2010)
Geoff Gilbert, “Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law,” Cornell
International Law Journal 35, no. 2 (2002)
Levi Onyeisi, “Party Autonomy and Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements and Awards as the
Basis of Arbitration,” Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 49.
Fritz W. Scharpf, “Community and Autonomy: Multi-Level Policy Making in the European
Union,” Journal of European Public Policy 1, no. 2 (1994)
3. In terms of the concept of pluralism, this paper relied on many different sources.
Paul Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?” Journal of Legal Pluralism 1, no. 24 (1986).
Paul S. Berman, “Global Legal Pluralism,” Cadernos da Escola de Direito e Relações
Internacionais 1, no. 12 (2006)
Brian Z. Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global,” Sydney
Law Review 30 (2008)
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Turner and Arslan’s article on “Shari’a and Legal Pluralism in the West,” in which the scholars
examined the general relationship between community laws (particularly those of religious
institutions) and centralized state laws.15
4. In terms of the concept of religious arbitration, this paper referred to various sources.
Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal
Orders, 86 N.Y.U.L. REV., p. 1254-1288 (2011).
Helfand, Michael A, Litigating Religion, 92 B.U. L. REV., pp. 498 (2013).
Michael A. Helfand Introduction: Religious Law In the 21st Century, 41 Pepp. L. Rev., p. 991
(2013).
Helfand, Michael A., Between Law and Religion: Procedural Challenges to Religious Arbitration
Awards (May 12, 2014)., p. 90. Chicago-Kent Law Review 141 (2015).
Michael C. Grossman Is This Arbitration? Religious Tribunals, Judicial Review, and Due
Process, 107 COLUM. L. REV., pp. 169, 208 (2007).
Choksi, Bilal M. "Religious Arbitration in Ontario-Making the Case Based on the British
Example of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal." U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 33 (2012).
5. In terms of the concept of the Sulha, this paper refers to a limited number of different
sources.
Doron Pely, “Where East not Always Meets West: Comparing the Sulha Process to Western‐
Style Mediation and Arbitration." Conflict Resolution Quarterly 28, no. 4, 427-440 (2011).
Doron Pely, “Honor: The Sulha’s Main Dispute Resolution Tool,” Conflict Resolution Quarterly,
28, 1 (2010)

15

Turner and Arslan, supra note 3, at 143
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Doron Pely, “Resolving Clan-Based Disputes Using the Sulha, the Traditional Dispute
Resolution Process of the Middle East,” Disp. Res. J. November 2008-January 2009
Jabbour, E., Sulha: Palestinian Traditional Peacemaking Process (House of Hope Publications
1996)
Ann Furr and Muwafaq Al-Serhan, “Tribal Customary Law in Jordan,” South Carolina Journal
of International Law and Business, (4)2, (2008).
1.6 Limitations and Difficulties of the study
1. One of the main obstacles to completing this research has been the lack of available secondary
sources in English and Arabic related to the focus of the study.
2. Also, it has been challenging to mix and integrate the mechanisms of societies and their
fundamental natures against the background of the concept of sociology and legal studies.
3. This paper engages in a conversation with the study of societies and their desire for autonomy,
and their relationship to arbitration, in cases in which such integration of legal and political
sciences poses a major challenge
4. In the study of cultural arbitration, the researcher faced a challenge because there are so many
examples of this phenomenon across the world. Resolving disputes based on culture depends on
whether or not the litigants are of the same ethnicity, and whether their cultures differ
significantly in terms of procedures and content.
5. Regarding the Sulha: there are not enough references to this practice in Arabic or English to
conduct a robust study. There is no written law for the tribal judiciary of Sulha practice, and
there is no uniform law, written or unwritten. Further, the researcher hoped to do more
interviews to glean more information about the practice of the Sulha, but due to the lack of
cooperation and availability of some Jordanian leaders, the researcher could not achieve that.
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1.7 Structure of the Study
Chapter 1 summarizes this paper. This chapter begins by defining the principal problems to be
addressed and proceeds according to the following sequence: (1) the problem statement; (2) the
objectives of the study; (3) the significance of the study; (4) the methodology used; (5) the
literature review; and (6) the limitations and difficulties of this research. This Chapter concludes
by presenting the structure of the study.
Chapter 2 examines the concept of community, its symbolic meaning, its types, and its relation to
state law. The discussion in Chapter 2 also analyzes the importance of arbitration within
communities and its link to community autonomy. Chapter 2 explores community autonomy and
legal pluralism, as well as a community’s relationship with its state. This chapter examines
community arbitration and how its norms and regulations relate to state law, discusses the need
that a community may have to arbitrate, and contemplates how this right may be legally
protected.
Chapter 3 focuses on religious arbitration. Chapter One provided a definition and overview of
the term ‘religious arbitration’ that notes the history of religious arbitration as it has been
practiced by certain religious groups. Chapter Three discusses in detail the various ways that
religious arbitration is practiced in communities that adhere to (variously) Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam. This chapter also delves into the reasons why certain religious arbitration practices are
more developed than others. The final section of this chapter will discuss the judicial review of
religious arbitration agreements and awards, noting how and why the religious awards are
enforced by secular courts.
Chapter 4 focuses on the methods of arbitration used by cultural communities to resolve
conflicts. It also outlines how national courts deal with these resolutions and recognize awards. It
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then discusses the criticism that has surrounded cultural arbitration. The first section of this
chapter provides a definition and overview of the term ‘cultural arbitration’ while noting the
history of the use of the Sulha in Jordan and Palestine. This chapter discusses the different ways
that different communities have used the Sulha, including the use of the Sulha by Palestinian
groups under Israeli occupation in Gaza and the West Bank, by the Jerusalem Arbitration Center
(JAC), and instances of the Sulha being invoked in environmental cases. This Chapter discusses
the difference between Tahkim, Arbitration, Sulha and the legal basis of tribal reform. Finally,
this chapter discusses the enforcement mechanism of the social enforcement of the Sulha.
Chapter 5 provides a conclusion of all other chapters. Chapter 5 focuses on working
toward community arbitration, with an emphasis how the social order and communal religion are
vital to enforcing arbitration. This concluding chapter also stresses the importance of arbitration
for preserving community autonomy.
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Chapter Two: The Relationship Among Communities, Legal Pluralism,
Autonomy and Arbitration
2.1. Introduction
2.1.1. Definition and overview of communities
2.1.1.1. Types of communities and their meanings
2.1.1.1.1. Types of minority communities
2.1.1.1.2. Scholarly thought on different types of communities
2.1.1.2. Factors that form communities
2.1.1.2.1. Communitarians and public choice theorists
2.1.1.2.2. Basic community features
2.1.1.2.3. Members’ attachment to their communities
2.1.1.2.3.1. Emotional attachment to community
2.1.1.2.3.2.Culture and communities
2.1.2.
The legal principle of communities
2.1.2.1.The relationship between legal theory and sociology
2.1.2.2. Concerns for legal theory and its methodology
2.1.2.3.The orientation of legal theory in regulating communities
2.1.2.4. Community as a regulative ideal
2.2.
Community and legal pluralism: concerns and anxieties
2.2.1. Multiculturalism and legal pluralism
2.2.2. Global legal pluralism
2.2.3. Criticism of (global) legal pluralism and multiculturalism
2.2.4. Legal pluralism and Shari’a
2.2.5. Social order, social controls and rules in community
2.2.6. Multiple arbitration norms and law
2.2.7. Communities’ arbitration and multiculturalism
2.3. Community and Autonomy
2.3.1. The concept of autonomy for individuals and communities
2.3.1.1. Individual autonomy within community
2.3.1.2. Community and autonomous activities
2.3.1.3. Law and community autonomy
2.3.1.4. Individual autonomy and community’s autonomy
2.3.1.5. A community’s right to autonomy
2.3.1.6. Community autonomy and the state
2.3.2. Community arbitration and autonomy
2.3.2.1. Arbitration as self-regulation within a normative community
2.3.2.2. Communal autonomy
2.3.2.3. Autonomy and its elements
2.3.2.4. Arbitration agreement promotes autonomy
2.4. The importance of arbitration for communities
2.4.1. Community identity and adjudication
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2.4.2. The need for arbitration
2.4.3. Legal protection to the right to arbitrate.
2.5. Conclusion

2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the concept of community: its symbolic meaning, different types,
and its relation to the national law. By analyzing the importance of arbitration within communities
and arbitration’s link to a community’s autonomy, this chapter explores community autonomy and
legal pluralism, as well as the relationship of the community to the state. In addition, this chapter
examines community arbitration and how its norms and regulations relate to the state law.
2.1.1 Definition and overview of communities
The concept of community is not easily defined, especially in the postmodern age. The idea
of a “community” is often portrayed as a “vast, endlessly shifting diversity of interests, values,
projects and commitments of individuals, expressed and pursued through multiple, transient
memberships of collectivities of many different kinds.”16 Based on their various areas of study,
scholars have diverse opinions regarding the meaning of community. To understand the essentials
of this concept in legal theory, certain important definitions of community that have been
expressed by prominent scholars must be considered.
Roger Cotterrell provided one of the most well-known definitions of community. He
defined it as “the existence of relatively stable social relations, where this stability comes from
mutual interpersonal trust between those involved in such relations.” 17 In his interpretation of a

16

Roger Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory, 34 J.L. & SOC’Y 633
(2007).
17
Cotterrell argued that communities share a common ground comprising (1) “joint interests or convergent
projects”, (2) “mutual beliefs” and fundamental values, (3) strong ties and “loyalties”, and (4) “shared ethnicities,
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community, Cotterrell relied on Weber’s 18 understanding of society and its relationships. Weber,
the famous German scholar, believed that four essential types of social action underlie all social
patterns, institutions, and structures. These four actions are rational, value rational, affectual, and
traditional.19
Other scholars have also emphasized human relations when examining communities. For
instance, Peter Hamilton maintained that “community is a web of understandings about the nature
of social relations,” adding that people “manifestly believe” in community, either as an idea or
reality.20
Community also “provides a sense of identity for members within a bounded whole.” 21
That community is not easy to define even in sociological terms is reflected in the different
understandings of this concept of Cotterrell and Hamilton. Cotterrell, leaning toward a sociological
and anthropological understanding of the concept, pointed out social relations, stability, and
interpersonal trust, whereas Hamilton observed community in abstract terms, as an idea founded
upon belief.22 In spite of these differences, both scholars assume that the idea of community implies
a certain type of whole.
Defining community in a legal context is even more complex than defining it in a
sociological context. Difficulties arise due to the multiplicity of communities themselves, for “each
community may have its own subjective legal understanding and appear as an object in the legal

surroundings or past experiences.” Roger Cotterrell, Transnational Communities and the Concept of Law, 21 RATIO
JURIS 12 (2008).
18
Cotterrell, Id.
19
Id.; Cotterrell, supra note 1, at 6.
20
Cohen, supra note 2, at 8.
21
Cotterrell, supra note 1 at 78.
22
Id. at 79.
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understanding of other communities.”23 Therefore, the link between community and law should
not be knowledge due to the many different forms of legal consciousnesses, and of sites and
contexts of legal interpretation, as well as the likelihood that several different forms of law may
coexist in the same social space.24 Therefore, the difficulties one may encounter in attempting to
provide a legal, scientific definition of community have to do with the “ideal regulatory
requirements” of each collective involvement.25 With regard to these difficulties, researchers
should observe the relationship of national law with individual communities in order to understand
the nature of both community and state, as well as their respective norms and laws.
Despite the advent of legal pluralism, i.e., various forms of legalities coexisting within a
state, national law still dominates the legal structures of each community 26 within that State. It acts
as a coordinating power, which is why state law is often regarded as the single legal authority of
significance within a State.27 Without firm control of its central legal institutions, a state is
considered “legally trivial.”28 This implies that the legal apparatus of state communities must be
related to that national’s law which should supersede community rules and regulations. 29 Insistence
on the primacy of their own legal arenas would raise complex issues for communities, because
they still experience the effect of the state law. Legal plurality could create chaotic situations that
would undoubtedly have political, economic, and social consequences.

23

Id.
Id.
25
Id. at 88.
26
As example, the community of Rajneeshpuram in the (American) state of Oregon. See Glen O. Robinson,
Communities, 83 VA. L. REV. 269, 295, 296 (1997).
27
Cotterrell, supra note 1, at 88.
28
Id.
29
This research avoids using the phrase “community law” lest it create conceptual confusion caused by the question
“what is law?” This issue will be elaborated further in this research.
24
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Gad Barzilai has provided a more comprehensive definition of community. He argues that
communities are:
“collectivities that share common ontological characteristics; a common perception of the
collective good, joint histories; collective memories; distinct practices and organizations;
bounded spaces of politics, power, and culture; common identities and consciousness;
knowledge boundaries that separate it from other collectivities.” 30
However, Barzilai’s definition is problematic, because it contemplates multiple complex
relationships with all of their attendant aspects.
Francesco Capotorti has defined communities as groups that are “numerically inferior to
the rest of the population of a state.” His definition indicates that a community’s members possess
“ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and
[they] show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture,
religion or language.”31 Capotorti’s definition is more succinct than Barzilai’s, but it may not apply
in all cases due to the vast diversity of communities. For example, not all communities differ from
the state in ethnic, religious, or linguistic terms.
Broadly speaking, the definitions considered above indicate that a community is a group
of people who share certain intangible and tangible aspects in common. These could be land,
culture, language, faith, ethnicity, etc. This broad definition is the understanding of community
that will be employed in this research. This conceptualization does not designate a randomly
selected group of people who happen to live on the same place as a community. In this research,
community is understood to include having strong ties to the human needs and spirit 32 This paper

30

GAD BARZILAI, COMMUNITIES AND LAW: POLITICS AND CULTURES OF LEGAL IDENTITIES 28 (Michigan: Univ.
Michigan Press, 2003).
31
Francesco Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1977).
32
The word “spirit” here is used in order to avoid the narrowness implied by words such as “mind” or “emotions.”
In this context, “spirit” is a designation for a man in all his or her constitutive aspects, such as rational, emotional,
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argues that it would be misleading to make a distinction, as some authors do, between “voluntary”
and “involuntary” communities—the example of latter being prisoners. 33 Random groups of
people that have been put somewhere against their will has nothing to do with the true meaning of
community, which is deeply symbolic in nature.
As mentioned, communities usually share religious, ethnic, traditional, and political
characteristics. A single characteristic on its own cannot designate a community. For instance, it
is not enough to say that a group of people with a shared habitat represents a community. However,
religious and historical and/or cultural factors carry more weight in most cases than geographical
factors when it comes to emotional bonds between people. For example, members of the Islamic
community may not share a common territory, language, or ethnic features, but they are still
referred to as community in an exclusively religious sense. Still, whether it is justified to call them
a community solely on the basis of religious factors is highly questionable. Conversely,
communities such as the Arab community may share the same history, language, territory, and
cultural heritage, yet some of their members may practice different religions. This interplay of
characteristics shows that a community should not necessarily be interpreted as an ideal image of
human society. Yet, the fundamental goal of a community is to improve itself and legal theory was
created to support a community in that goal.
2.1.1.1 Types of communities and their meaning
To examine community types, it will beneficial to mention some of the differences between
communities and societies. Tönnies’ famous distinction between the two concepts is reflected in

and voluntary. Some define the “Communal groups embody” as “the shared spirit of the [members] whose
communal existence is an expression of who they really are.” See Drucilla L. Cornell, Book Review, In Union: A
Critical Review of Toward a Perfected State, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1101 (1987)
33
Alexander, supra note 6.
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the German words “Gemeinschaft” (fellowship or community) and “Gesellschaft” (society). 34 The
difference between these two constructs is reflected their interpretation. Gemeinschaft would seem
to imply a more intimate bond between the members of a community, who are not necessarily tied
by laws as much as they are bound by a mutual feeling of togetherness. 35 On the other hand, the
term Gesellschaft has a relatively modern ring to it, implying that such a community (or ‘society’)
has legal foundations.36 The importance to communities of these essential values persists; many
communities, especially religious ones, still coalesce around them. Such communities depend on
intimate emotional relationships, usually manifested in religious creeds or “ethnic kinships”. 37 In
addition, their members share a different type of attachment to each other and to their community
than do the members of communities established for “commercial and political” purposes. 38
Consider, for example, the utopias and communes that were examined by Rosabeth Kanter
in her sociological study.39 She identified three primary motivations for the creation of these
groups. The first is having a life that is governed by spiritual and religious values. The second is
implementing a societal reform by resolving certain political and economic problems. Finally, the
third is a willingness to foster the individual’s “psychosocial growth.” 40
Legal theorists should not abandon the distinction between community and society. In view
of legal pluralism, there are numerous examples of communities existing within larger societies or
34

As quoted in Alexander, supra note 6, at 24.
Id.
36
This difference would seem to highlight an opposition between an older understanding of a community as a group
that values humanistic ideals that came into focus during the 18th century Enlightenment in Europe—well before (in
most cases) the foundation of societies as we know them today. See also Alexander, supra note 6, at 275.
37
THOMAS BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 2000); ROBERT A.
NISBET, THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION 47-106 (New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers, 1966); Robinson,
supra note 25.
38
Id.
39
Rosabeth Moss Kanter, “Commitment and Community: Communes and Utopias in Sociological Perspective” 8
(1972), as quoted in Robinson, supra note 25, at 278.
40
Id.
35
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nation-states. This raises the question of the nature of communities and their autonomy, which is
discussed further in this chapter.
2.1.1.1.1

Types of minority communities

When speaking of communities in a modern context, one often hears the concept of
minorities, especially in a political discourse. According to Schuerkens, minorities can be properly
understood only in their opposition to majorities.41 Schuerkens lists five characteristics that define
minorities, which were established by anthropologists Charles Wagley and Marvin Harris in 1958.
These characteristics are as follows: minorities’ relative powerlessness in comparison to
majorities, distinct cultural and/or physical characteristics, self-consciousness, transmittance of
membership by descent rules, and inter-marriage.42 The defining characteristic of minorities is
powerlessness, which can be the result of complex historical events. For example, the black
population living under South Africa’s apartheid regime was a majority but had less power than
the white population, who were a minority. 43 Therefore, the distinction between minorities and
majorities—i.e., their share or lack of power—is not always reflected in numerical terms.
Viewed from a sociological angle, minorities and majorities may include distinct religious,
racial, and ethnic groups. This means that minority groups can be characterized by several different
traits. An example would be a person who is at the same time black, Senegalese, and Muslim. 44
This example shows that it would be difficult to speak of a community as defined by a single trait,
such as race, ethnicity or religion.
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Ulrike Schuerkens, “Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Minorities,” in Religion, Culture and Sustainable Development,
Vol. 1 52 (Roberto B. Pimentel et al., eds., Oxford, UK: EOLSS Publishers/UNESCO, 2010).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 52–53.
44
Id. at 53.
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Ethnic minorities are groups living in “multi-ethnic” communities that are often excluded
and discriminated against by the ethnic majorities that dominate within the ethnic stratification. 45
The power of such majorities is reflected in their dominance over political autonomy, government,
position within society, material possessions, etc. Below is a typology of minorities developed by
the German sociologist Heckmann.
1. National minorities46
The concept of national minorities is associated with the rise of the nation-state, the main
objective of which was to create a homogenous society. So, any alien group 47 found within the
territory of the state would automatically become an ethnic minority. 48 Ethnic minorities were
prevalent in Europe during the 19th and 20th centuries. Conflicts arose occasionally between the
nation-state and various minority groups over the use of minority languages in schools and over
the political rights of minorities. Unlike the situation with groups of economic migrants, the social
structure of national minorities is normally similar to the structure of the entire society.
2. Regional minorities49
Regional minorities are similar to national minorities with regard to their social structure.
They differ from them slightly in terms of political perspective, as regional minorities tend to seek
political self-government with an aim to preserve traditions that existed prior to the creation of the
nation-state. These minorities may clash with the nation-state in terms of culture, ethnic identity,
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and tradition. Examples of these groups include the Scots, Welsh, and Basques in Europe; the
Berbers in Algeria; and the Kurds in Iraq/Kurdistan.
3. Migration and ethnic minorities50
These groups develop when people from underdeveloped countries migrated to developed
countries for economic reasons, or (similarly) when people from overpopulated areas with fewer
employment opportunities and a lack of economic stability migrate to areas with greater economic
growth. Such groups usually settle together and develop their own systems of institutions that
typically are similar to the those of their home countries. Migration settlements can be based on
religious groups, as in the case of Mennonites who migrated from Russia to Canada, where they
established a social system that was virtually identical to what they had left in their home country
and tried to resist assimilation into the system of their new home.
Another type of economic migration was caused by indentured servitude, which took the
place of slavery in colonial systems, such as that of England. Some of these economic migrants
migrate temporarily, while others do so on a permanent basis, including bringing their families
with them. Similar to ethnic minorities, these migrants also tend to develop immigrant
communities that are similar in structure to the systems they had in their home countries.
4. Colonialism and minorities51
Due to colonization, Scholarly literature describes certain features of these structures as
being ethnic minorities. Included in this group are the Aborigines in Australia and the Native
Americans in North America. Those peoples are remnants of the original inhabitants of the
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colonized lands before colonialization. Their culture and way of life were destroyed by the
colonizing forces, forcing them to live as minorities in poor conditions.
2.1.1.1.2

Scholarly thought on different types of communities

There are countless divisions of communities. To avoid listing too many of them, this work
will focus on the three largest: cultural, belief-based, and political communities. 52 After a brief
explanation of the each, this research will focus on the classification of communities.
1. Cultural communities: usually defined as a forum for mere co-existence in the same shared
environment – sharing language, traditions, history, and sometimes even the same religion.
2. Belief communities: based on shared religions and identical values; founded on shared
fundamental beliefs (for example, religious beliefs) or ultimate values.
3. Political communities: emerged as a result of certain political circumstances. Typically,
such communities claim the right to self-determination. They wish to regain their selfdetermination and tend to separate themselves from the larger nation state.
The concept of community is usually interpreted from the perspective of legal theory. Some
researchers rely on various theories of state and society provided by influential sociologists, such
as Weber, Durkheim, and Marx. Those researchers assume a pluralistic view of law, according to
which law is not limited to the code created by centralized agencies. 53 This means that other
influential institutions, such as the church, can create laws of their own. The main objective of law
is to regulate social relations, upon which each community is founded. 54 Thus, the aim of the theory
of law is to examine the relationships between law, social relations, and community in general, for
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each of these entities is dependent upon the other. The most feasible methodological approach to
such a challenging task is the one formulated by Max Weber, with his four ideal types that underlie
all social relations.55 Therefore, one could speak about four ideal types of community: instrumental
community, traditional community, affective community, and community of belief and values. 56
1.

An instrumental community is formed when people share a common project or work

together on convergent projects. 57
2.

A traditional community is formed by people who share the same environment, and they

also usually share the same locality, language, tradition, past experiences, etc. 58 Sociologists
usually refer to this type as a “local community," indicating that the shared geographical space
connects the people living in such a community.59 Further, people in this community usually share
the same language, which, in combination with the common geographical space, develops a
stronger attachment.
3.

An affective community is based purely on emotional ties and affective relationships, such

as love and friendship.60 By contrast, it can be based on shared feelings of dislike or even hatred
of those who do not belong to the same community. 61
4.

A community of beliefs and values is founded on shared essential beliefs, such as those of

religion or essential values (beliefs held purely out of personal conviction, not simply adhered to
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for purposeful or political reasons).62 This type of community almost never exists in a pure form
in actual social reality
Alexander Gregory describes a kind of group that he calls “intentional communities”. 63
They are usually initiated by individuals who share the same vision and willingly associate with
one another. These individuals have a sense of belonging to its community and voluntarily
participate in community life. It could be that these communities began on a contractual basis;
however, contracts did not keep them together. Rather, their mutual objectives and desires bound
them together and formed their identities and characteristics. 64 However, this understanding of
community does not take into account the spiritual aspect emphasized in this research.
Gregory also differentiates between communities and voluntary associations, but he also
states that these are not simple categorizations. 65 Groups of people usually share features of both
and may change over time.66 A group which begins as a voluntary association may grow into a
community.67 Therefore, it is important that associations of people within the group are built on
mutual understanding, not just utilitarian purposes. 68
2.1.1.2 Factors that form communities
There are certain objective and subjective conditions that a group needs to meet in order to
be realized as a community within society.69 These conditions also make up some of the
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community’s essential characteristics. In the objective sense, a community must display stability,
continued collaboration among its members, attachments between the members, and/or
attachments to the cultural and political aspects of the community. 70 Further, a community requires
some degree of shared apprehension and participation among its members. Also, a stable emotional
connection among community members is an important characteristic that gives the community
its distinguishable identity.71
There is no specific measurement that can be used to evaluate the value and type of
objective factors that form communities. However, geographical zone, shared language, history,
and tradition are some of the most crucial aspects of a community. 72 Still, these factors can be so
diverse that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to devise complex systems of
measurement that would give them an objective value.
One of the most important factors that helps identify a community is that of “convergent
interests.”73 These are mutual interests of the community members that refer to collective activities
that improve the overall community. An example of such interests could be a business or
professional community in which the members interact on a regular basis to deal with outsiders
through “collective lobbying.”74
The foundation of most communities’ rests on shared values and beliefs. One of the
community members’ objectives is to reach out to outsiders who share similar beliefs and invite
them into the community, but also to communicate with those who do not share their beliefs. 75
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Thus, some of the most well-known religious communities around the world (Christian, Jewish,
and Muslim) that have massive followings conduct certain ‘awareness’ activities. Such activities
enable them to communicate with others who do not share their values and beliefs, and to attract
them into their community.
The focus has shifted to the value of communal relationships within groups rather than
resting on the regional characteristics of the community. 76 In other words, communal relations now
play a more important role than regional environment. These relationships are based on mutual
sympathy and understanding among the members. The feelings that community members share
give them a sense of belonging and distinguish communities from other formal groups. 77
2.1.1.2.1

Communitarians and public choice theorists

Communities and voluntary associations are the two different groups identified by theorists
called “communitarians.”78 For communitarian theorists, voluntary associations are regulated on
a contractual basis.79 on the other hand “public choice theorists,” talk about intentional and nonintentional groups.80 They emphasize two factors: affiliation and a focus on the character and value
of relationships among the communities’ members. 81 These individuals come together with a sense
of belonging and choose to voluntarily participate in group life. Even if a contract signifies the
start of such communities, that document is not what keeps the members together; rather, they
remain in the group because of their mutual feelings and the compatibility of their personalities. 82
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Public choice theorists describe voluntary associations and communities as deliberate and
non-deliberate groups, respectively.83 Communitarian theorists disagree that these two forms of
groups can be defined that way; however, they acknowledge that there is a certain lack of choice
in communities; for instance, individuals do not get to choose the family they will be born into. 84
communitarians observe whether community associations are built on mutual
understanding or whether they coalesce simply based on individual personal needs. 85 Therefore,
In reality, groups tend to share the features of both and may change with time. 86 A group that starts
off as a voluntary association may progress into a community and vice versa. 87

2.1.1.2.2 Basic community features
A community requires secure and sustained collaboration between its members, who are
bound by the feelings of “attachment”88 or “belonging”89 to their community.90 Each community
entails a certain degree of emotional connection among its members. This emotional connection is
what gives a community its identity.91
Thus, we can speak of emotional attachment as the foremost characteristic of community.
This phrase includes, although is not limited to, mutual feelings of love, trust, tolerance,
understanding, and respect between community members. 92 Obviously, this interpretation of
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community is founded on essential human values, instead of on rigid or formal legal conceptions
of communities. This view is supported by Cotterrell, who claimed that social relationships within
communities are constituted by bonds between people.93 They can be common projects, shared
fundamental values and beliefs, emotional bonds, customs, traditions, or historical experiences. 94
Certainly, any legal theorist would be justified in objecting to the idea that emotional
attachment is the only defining characteristic of a community. We cannot discuss communities
seriously without situating them in a legal context, especially when we have in mind that
contemporary communities are inherently multicultural. In other words, social groups within
communities that share religious beliefs and cultural traditions usually require specific regulatory
ambition “reflecting the nature of their particular social relations of community.” 95 Therefore,
legal regulation is the second basic characteristic of community. More to the point, various
communities within a nation-state display the necessity of multiple legal regulations; thus, one can
agree with Cotterrell that legal plurality is one of the defining characteristics of the “modern”
community.96
Abstract features are not the only ones that are reflected in a community. Each community
shares certain geographical and anthropological characteristics, such as a territory marked by legal
and geographical borders, language, tradition, and other cultural and historical traits. 97 Unlike
emotional attachment, most of these geographical and anthropological characteristics are tangible.
However, they cannot be detached from people’s emotional well-being, as both emotional and
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physical elements form a concept. For example, community or state borders are not just physical
or legally regulated entities that mark a certain territory; they also form people’s emotional bonds
with the place in which they live and affect their relationship to their sense of identity and
belonging.
None of these basic characteristics of a community should be examined in separation. The
active interrelationships among all of these characteristics within a community form its identity,
although one could still talk about a sense of belonging to a community despite, for instance, being
geographically distant from the community. 98
2.1.1.2.3

Members’ attachment to their communities

The reasons for members’ attachment to their communities can vary. This section will
touch on some of the most frequent. Based on Weber’s thinking, these reasons can be
psychological, religious, and economic. Attachments can also be emotional and cultural, i.e.,
related to social heritage and communal endeavors. Still, economic reasons may be among the
most important.99
Contracts for economic or social reasons are used to create long lasting status
relationships.100 Hence, In most of today society, takes for granted the legal implementation of
promises.101 It is possible to avoid legal enforcement and use transactional arrangements instead,
but the latter are not as efficient.102 In other words, the idea that attachments are formed due to
legal enforcement may seem misleading; however, withholding such enforcement would prevent
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the society from recognizing and reinforcing moral individual commitment. 103 Therefore, the
question still remains: to what lengths should legal regulations go to enforce long-term
relationships in a manner that may limit future choices? 104
Some individual cases are helpful examples of community members’ attachments and how
they were formed in the past. Certain 19th century communities, such as Oneida, Harmony, Zoar,
and Shaker, had a contractual basis. 105 These communities established strict economic
relationships among their members and did not put much emphasis on religious or moral factors.
For example, the U.S court in the case of Burt v. Oneida Community 106 stated that moral and
religious teachings, which were important in forming the community, would not be considered in
that particular case. Rather, the court’s main concern was the status of the case as “a business
compact” in which members’ relationships and rights would be determined with regard to the
contracts.107 In this case, the court relied on contractual autonomy, which represents a classic
liberal perspective employed to justify communism.108 Naturally, communities like Oneida were
quite different from those that we encounter today, including “privatopias,” which have more
ephemeral and superficial bonds than their 19th century counterparts. 109 Nowadays, the typical
homeowner community has lifestyle at its center, instead of spirituality. Nevertheless, some
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characteristics remain the same, such as members who seek to take more control of the
environment in which they live.110
2.1.1.2.3.1 Emotional attachment to community
Emotional attachment as a basic characteristic of community has already been outlined in
this chapter. This paper will now turn to discussing a deeper meaning of this attachment and its
implications for matters of legal theory. Interpreting the idea of community, Anthony Cohen put a
strong emphasis on the symbolic aspect of community.111 He stated that understanding the
community as a symbol has little to do with what the word “community” implies. Rather, the
symbolic element of community concerns the deep spiritual context of each individual that is
rooted in the emotional, rational, and volitional aspects of his or her personality. 112 This implies
that even the identification of community as a “mental construct” 113 focuses on the rational part of
the human mind and thereby disregard other vital aspects of his or her being. In other words, the
concept of community, and therefore its members’ attachment to it, entails a holistic view of
human beings. Thus, strong emotional attachments to community can only be properly interpreted
if they are examined from this viewpoint.
Again, this analysis points toward the emotional aspect of community, even though
‘emotional’ is a narrow concept here. Although Cohen emphasized the subjective dimension of
community, he still underscored its objective manifestations, such as locality or ethnicity. 114 Also,
he indicated that a community possesses a type of inherent flexibility, stating that the character of
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a community is “sufficiently malleable that it can accommodate all of its members’ selves without
them feeling their individuality to be overly compromised.” 115
The attachments that community members form is abstract; therefore, their understanding
of and relationship to the community are likewise abstract. This does not mean that each member
has a clear image, let alone the same image, of his or her community. Cohen clarified this context
by comparing language and symbols: “learning words” gives you the capacity to communicate
with other people, but does not tell you what to communicate. 116 Such is the case with culture as
well. Culture is instituted by symbols, but not in such a way that these symbols cause people to
have the same sense of the world.117 Even if people share the same symbols, their understanding
of—and therefore their attachment to—their community may not be the same. 118
Since the understanding of communities can vary among their own members, legal
implications of people’s attachment to a community also vary. 119 These differences create
complexities that are reflected in the sometimes-volatile relationships that exist between the
community and its members. One manifestation of such a relationship is the various forms of
community laws within a state, such as indigenous law, common law, state law, etc. 120 In the past,
such plurality of laws generally referred to the relationship between a colonizing, imperial force
and those that it colonized.121 But now, legal pluralism comprises “relations between dominant
groups and subordinate groups, such as religious, ethnic, or cultural minorities, immigrant groups,
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and unofficial forms of ordering located in social networks or institutions.” 122 Members’
attachment to their community can lead to firm adherence to their community law. Therefore, it is
vital to abandon a centralized view of law und understand it in pluralistic terms. The pluralistic
view advocated by Cotterrell and Engle Merry enables a more objective understanding of how
community law interacts with the state law. 123
2.1.1.2.3.2 Culture and communities
Culture represents the basic fabric of each community and each modern nation-state society
that encompasses various communities. Every culture is composed of beliefs and values, traditions,
and affective aspects. Regulating social relationships within communities means regulating the
entire cultural setting.
An aspect that most scholars tend to overlook is the inherent diversity in the culture of each
community. Many researchers mistakenly assume that the “complex communal ways of life” that
they label as ‘cultures’ are monolithic and uniform.124 Misinterpreting cultures as monolithic
entities within a community means that a researcher may have adopted a flawed methodological
approach, which may lead to a range of false conclusions. On the one hand, “there is a danger in
using the concept of culture in a way that assumes an inevitable similarity between people who are
different in important ways.”125 Also, there is a danger in assuming that people from one
community are substantially different from those of another community, rendering impossible the
existence of porous cultures, i.e., a culture that is “open to cross-influence, mutual learning,
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recognition of commonalities, and inter-group translation of experience, beliefs, aspirations and
attachments.”126 Therefore, the flawed methodological approach referred to above results from the
misinterpretation of the concept of difference in relation to people and culture.
Culture is not simply an aspect of our lives that coexists with other aspects, such as
tradition, language, and history. It is more accurate to say that culture encompasses all these
dimensions of human life and binds people together. Culture is embedded in us to such an extent
that while it “forms us and makes us who we are, we are not conscious of it.” 127 Therefore, legal
theorists should not observe culture through a positivistic lens, as an individual entity, a thing in
and of itself that is, in a way, separate from community.128 In the Western positivistic approach to
legal theory, law has long been seen as self-standing and autonomous. 129 However, more and more
legal theorists and even lawyers have begun to observe culture in the context of its numerous
relationships with the nation-state and with various communities. 130 This approach has enabled
them to move the emphasis from the pervading positivistic outlook toward a more comprehensive
approach.
How can legal theorists develop a more sophisticated understanding of the relationships
among community, law, and culture? By realizing that culture is the foundation and fabric of the
community, and understanding that they should analyze the internal complexities of culture,
including human interrelationships and the legal regulations that govern them. 131 This idea
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originates from the view that culture may be used as a valuable tool for understanding the rapid
changes that consistently occur within the legal plurality of numerous communities. 132 Legal
theorists are already aware of this idea and often speak of “legal culture” to refer to the manner in
which laws operate in various communities, instead of comparing the rules of one legal system
versus another.133
2.1.2

The legal principle of communities
Communities cannot exist and prosper (at least not for a long) without legal principles that

govern human relationships. Thus, there is an inextricable link between a community and the law
whether nation law or community law. Contemporary multicultural societies usually include many
communities that conflict in their interpretation of the same law. 134
2.1.2.1 The relationship between legal theory and sociology
By observing the relationship between the community and the law, one may conclude that
community and its legal concepts (rules, norms, principles, thoughts that been practice by lawyers
and analyzed by jurists) are likewise interrelated. 135 If we understand these doctrines to be the
policies, principles, and rules that underlie the life of community members and the legal system of
their community, the complexity of such relations becomes obvious.
The most appropriate view of the relationship between community and law cannot be
adopted unless one views this relationship in all its complexity.. 136 Rather than remaining within
the confines of its own specialism, legal theory should acknowledge its sociological
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roots.137Further, legal theory often neglects the consideration of ethics, morals, and history. 138 All
of these issues indicate that the contemporary theory of law is often unable to properly contemplate
multicultural communities and their norms.
In view of these issues, a framework for studying law that is focused on interpreting legal
ideas and law, rather than just observing and describing them in a specific social context, has been
proposed.139 Legal communities should be examined from the inside (as their members experience
them) and from the outside (from the standpoint of a detached observer). 140 Such an approach will
enable researchers to adopt a broad view of the relational complexity within any community.
Sociologists often fail to appreciate the social along with the legal elements of communities. Their
discussions primarily concern engineering (shaping and steering) the social realm, instead of
exploring it in its diversity.141
2.1.2.2 Concerns for legal theory and its methodology
Legal theory has given little attention to law that is not jurisdictionally bound by the nation
state and has thus failed to grasp the concept of legal pluralism. Likewise, sociology has taken an
instrumentalist approach and become entangled in ‘gap’ questions such as “how far does law
constitute the social?”142
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As this paper argues previously, law and its relation to society should not be studied in an
isolated context, in which law is observed as one subject and society as another. 143 The issue is not
“law’s relation to something apart from law (the social); the issue is how a certain side or part of
the social takes the form of law.”144 Law provides a structure of social relationships within a
community.145 Therefore, any gap between law and society has little to do with law as it relates to
society, but rather occurs because various types of social relationships might be in conflict. 146
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The main disconnect in contemporary legal theory is that it has not absorbed lessons from the
influential scholars from the past, such as Weber and Durkheim, who examined society in all of
its diverse aspects.
2.1.2.3 The orientation of legal theory in regulating communities
In order to examine the community relations outlined in the previous sections of this
chapter, sociology and legal theory have to work collaboratively. Sociology needs to encourage
“enquiries about social relations of community and their regulatory problems, whereas theory of
law has to ensure juristic enquiries about the forms that law can and should take in expressing
these relations.”147
Legal theory should employ a “law-and-community approach” that “sees regulatory
problems as rooted in the very nature of community life – in all its variety.” 148 Conflicts and
contradictory regulatory problems are bound to arise, but they are an unavoidable aspect of
community life.149 The point of regulations is not to eliminate all instances of conflict; rather, it is
to manage them by balancing the opposition between the conflicting sides. The ultimate aim of
legal theory, however, should be to help create a sustained equilibrium among the social
relationships that exist within communities. Regardless of the nature of the relationships being
interpreted, a law-and-community approach is concerned with moral, legal, and political factors.
147

Id. at 23.
Adoption of a law-and-community approach is still in its early stages, but its main goals are clear. First, it
attempts to correct “instrumentalist overemphasis of sociology of law, and directs attention to law’s complex
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149
Cotterrell, supra note 132, at 23
148

60

The Extent and Limits of the Right to Arbitrate Among Religious
and Cultural Communities (Sulha as a case study)
A law-and-community approach particularly emphasizes law’s intimate relationship with
ethics and morals, even though these may take different forms in various communities. 150 The
morality of community members enables the existence of interpersonal trust, whereas ethics is
concerned with individual responsibilities.151 Likewise, empathy and concern for others are
ethically important factors in a community of beliefs and values, while fair dealings and honesty
are morally important to instrumental community. 152
Moral principles may seem difficult to regulate, in fact often not regulated However, their
numerous aspects are reflected in law, which opens the possibility of using law as the regulatory
tool for these complex relations. However, since human values cannot be clearly articulated in a
legal context, law (at least in the form of principles and rules) merely approximates the overall
moral direction of a community.153 Still, legal theorists could understand legal doctrine better if
they observe it as a vital component of community, instead of as a ‘mere technicality.’ 154
2.1.2.4 “Community as a regulative ideal”155
The rise of nation-states has created entities that comprise multiple internal communities.
Western democratic society has emphasized the autonomy and equality of both individuals and
groups. Thus, communities have begun to recognize themselves as legal entities, demanding legal
regulations of their own. This in turn has led to a plurality of laws, a situation that imposes various
challenges in regulating the different communities within a nation-state.
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Some authors, such as Gregory Alexander156 and James Boyle,157 have suggested that a
solution to the issue of multiple communities and legal pluralism should be sought in the
communities themselves. They claim that community should be understood as “a source of
aspirational stories through which we can explain our own local moral and political struggles.” 158
The idea of community as a regulatory ideal is worth striving for, even though such community
cannot be created in toto.159
The author of this paper argues that communities should not have “a strong form of legal
autonomy”160 and that communities’ legal autonomy ought to be controlled through a “complete
prohibition of judicial review” as well minimal consistency regarding the internal objectives of the
community.161 However, this view should not be taken to mean that communities are jeopardized;
on the contrary, this researcher believes that community life has to be preserved in any society as
a right to their members.162Be that as it may, denying communities a strong form of legal autonomy
may disrupt the nation-state, since communities form its cultural and political foundations. On the
other hand, allowing communities to have a strong form of legal government may give them too
much control and autonomy, which would ultimately separate them from the nation-state.
Therefore, while community as a regulatory ideal cannot be realized entirely, it should nevertheless
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James Boyle, Modernist Social Theory: Roberto Unger’s Passion, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1082 (1985). Also quoted in
Alexander, supra note 6.
158
James Boyle, Modernist Social Theory: Roberto Unger’s Passion, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1082 (1985). Also quoted in
Alexander, supra note 6, at 4.
159
Alexander, supra note 6, at 1.
160
By this phrase the author refers to “the power of groups to govern their affairs with minimal interference from the
legal system—that is, a largely non-interventionist resolution to what might be called the ‘inside-outside’ problem.”
Id. at 3.
161
Id. at 60.
162
Id.
157

62

The Extent and Limits of the Right to Arbitrate Among Religious
and Cultural Communities (Sulha as a case study)
be pursued. This viewpoint is similar to Cotterrell’s observation that community relations cannot
be made perfect, since conflicts are a natural part of human relations.
In order to examine the effective ways of community regulation, some scholars have
analyzed the nature of the relationships that exist within communities. They have discussed the
conception of community that is based on the social experience instead of on the territorial
environment. Legal theorists who support this view of community, such as Bender and Veysey,
suggest that “community is a network of social relations marked by mutuality and reciprocity.” 163
Public choice theorists interpret the difference between voluntary associations and communities
as the difference between deliberate and non-deliberate groups, respectively. 164 Communitarian
theorists disagree that these two groups can be classified as such, even though they acknowledge
that a “dimension of choice lessness” within communities exists to a certain extent. 165.
The problem may rise when individual forced to be member of the community or they are
not able to exit the community due to the social or religious commitments. For example, A
monastery community.”166 Some folks who entered monasteries claimed that joining the order was
not a matter of choice; they were compelled to join. The ties that drew together those individuals
were affective, yet their choice still played an important role in creating and maintaining those
ties.167
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2.2 Community and legal pluralism: concerns and anxieties
The increasing number of communities and their relationship to the nation state and legal
plurality cause concern for the executive members of the state. Legal theory should urgently deal
with these concepts so that they do not become an insurmountable obstacle for legal theorists,
jurists, politicians, and anyone concerned with matters of community, the law, and the state.
The main cause for concern is the advent of legal pluralism. Virtually all communities
today are legally pluralistic. Legal pluralism is broadly defined as “a situation in which two or
more legal systems coexist in the same social field.”168 The concept has also been defined as “the
system of courts and judges supported by the state as well as nonlegal forms of normative
ordering.”169 Thus, a pluralistic legal system can create numerous complex legal questions, such
as “when a subcommunity’s law applies to a particular transaction or conflict, to what community
particular individuals belong, how a person can change which law is applicable to him or her?” 170
Further, it is often difficult to identify the rules of the subcommunity , especially if those rules
belong to a unwritten tradition.171
All of these complexities can give rise to a range of political issues, such as community
autonomy, community law within the nation state, the question of freedom and its limits, etc. In
order to handle these issues, the theory of law needs to explain all fundamental concepts related to
legal pluralism, community, and the law. With the help of these explanations, jurists will be able
to come up with more effective solutions to frequently recurring societal conflicts. The combined
effort of researchers and practitioners is necessary to overcome the largest obstacles.
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One important issue concern recognizing the authority of a community over its members. 172
This means that each community requires clearly stated laws and regulations, to which the
members should adhere. Nation-states must ensure they have an effective mechanism for
organizing communities and maintaining individual autonomy. The focus here is on the balance
between the core “Enlightenment ideals of progressive individualism” and “liberal beliefs.” 173
Things could get even more complicated with individuals that have different liberal beliefs yet
share the same community interests. Such opposition may create a conflict of identity and weaken
the individual sense of belonging to the community.
The community authority vis-à-vis its followers is regulated by contracts which “involves
personal services, but it may impose economic penalties.” 174 The main issue pertaining to such
contracts is their fairness with respect to the community members’ autonomy. 175 Robinson
interpreted this issue in the context of the opposition between individual autonomy and group
commitment, which is at the center of the debate between liberals and communitarians. 176 He
claimed that one strand of such problems is related to contracts that resemble personal servitude
and, as such, are not enforceable.177 Further, there is the issue of community members being unable
to adapt to long-term group commitment, 178 thus raising the question of the community’s integrity.
Therefore, we must ask ourselves: does it make sense to speak of community if its members are
not faithful to it? The answer to this question would entail a detailed examination of the
relationship between the community and its members.
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The second strand of problems that Robinson discusses deals with the effects of community
behavior on strangers.179 Even though he has not developed this idea fully, Robinson claims that
such problems are “self-limiting,” because true communities, such as monasteries, keep to
themselves. This raises the question of their existence within a hostile environment. 180 Robinson
concluded that, understood in a broader perspective, communities threaten the general society in
which they exist, because they raise doubts regarding the compatibility of individual communities
within the society to which they belong.181 This issue “expose[s] the inherent contradictions in our
conceptions of communitarianism and liberalism.”182 This claim implies that our conceptions of
complex legal and political ideas, such as community, autonomy, communitarianism, liberalism,
etc., are idealistic in nature. This means that in reality, conflicts and issues that contradict the
principles of these ideas are bound to appear.
Some scholars183discuss from an economic standpoint how individuals choose between
communities “based on their respective collections of local public goods.” 184 However, these
authors do not recognize that people’s choice of a community does not depend only on public
goods, but also hinges on people’s relationships and preferred lifestyles. 185 Many people’s choices
are based on how well they adapt to the groups to which they belong and on individual preferences
that are sometimes influenced by others.186 Therefore, choosing a community is a complex issue
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involving a variety of different questions. Members’ attachment to their communities, and the
ways in which they form these attachments, are among the most obvious issues.
2.2.1

Multiculturalism and legal pluralism
First, we should identify that the concept of multiculturalism was formed because not

allowing “cooperation and coexistence between different sectors of society” 187The initial parts of
this section emphasized the inseparability of culture and communities. Equally inseparable are
multiculturalism and legal pluralism; however, an important distinction should be made. The basic
meanings of both concepts have already been introduced in this research. The principal difference
between multiculturalism and legal pluralism is that the former refers to various peoples, their
personalities, way of life, attachment to community, etc., while the latter refers to a variety of laws,
norms, and regulations. What multiculturalism and legal pluralism have in common is diversity,
which is at the root of both phenomena.
In fact, due to global labor market migrations, many modern societies have become
multicultural; i.e., numerous minority communities constitute them. 188 From an historical
perspective, most societies have long been influenced by diverse cultures; therefore, the
occurrence of contemporary multiculturalism is a question of degree. 189 Multiculturalism should
then be observed as a norm for celebrating differences, rather than as a problem. 190 For instance, in
writing about China, Leibniz claimed that the international commerce of goods should be joined
by a “commerce of light” that would enable the free flow of values and ideas. 191
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Charles Koch examined multiculturalism and legal pluralism in a judicial context. 192 He
maintained that an administrative legal scholar should not be surprised by having to deal with a
variety of legal “cultures,” each claiming its own legitimacy and superiority. 193One could discuss
cases of decentralization brought about by legal pluralism, but there is an opportunity to establish
a dialogue between, in this case, the conventional and administrative courts. Such a dialogue would
enable the invaluable exchange of views and insights about the main principles of global culturallegal diversity.194
In view of Koch’s thoughts on multicultural legal pluralism in a judicial context, it could
be stated that growing global legal pluralism is not a threat that will endanger states and their laws.
Quite the opposite, adjusting to diverse legal environments would allow legal theorists and jurists
to come up with more effective ways of dealing with whatever challenges are in fact created by
(global) legal pluralism. This viewpoint indicates that legal theorists should not reject the notions
of multiculturalism and legal pluralism. In fact, international cases suggest the necessity of
“openness to multiculturalism and to the value of full participation by all legal cultures in the
evolution of a global legal culture.” 195
The U.S. legal system is not exempt from multicultural diversity. Still, the U.S. Supreme
Court has safeguarded the sovereignty of the states, even while acknowledging the need for
practicing the traditional norms.196 Again, this does not imply that the current state of the U.S.
judicial regime – or that of any other county – is threatened in any way. Much knowledge may be
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acquired through the exchange of different experiences; eclecticism and flexibility are crucial for
a healthy legal culture. Legal theorists should understand that the “evolution of a legal regime” 197
is underway, which is why many countries depend on judicial and other legal exchanges. But these
exchanges require sensitivity to all of the different cultures involved; i.e., a true embracing of
multiculturalism.198
The optimistic standpoint of a flexible legal eclecticism assumes that legal theory should
abandon the Enlightenment’s ideal of worldwide principles that rest on the theory of natural rights
that should dictate how the law functions.199 This would mean a compromise between the reality
of legal pluralism and the notion of an overarching universal and centralized state law. Persistently
holding on to a single universal tradition prevents a country’s legal system from interacting with a
variety of other legal traditions and their cultures. 200
2.2.2

Global legal pluralism
Until recently, legal pluralism has mostly been the domain of jurists’ interest; however, it

has become a subject of interest for legal anthropologists.201 Globalization is the main cause for
this shift. global legal pluralism encompasses the main principles of legal pluralism on a global
scale, such as the plurality of the mutual existence of legal orders and state law. 202 This view of
legal pluralism has promoted at least one scholar, Michaels, to explore the new meaning of this
concept in a global context.203
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In principle, global legal pluralism has had both positive and negative effects on various
states’ central legal systems.204 Neither the centralized legal system of the state nor the reality of
legal pluralism is more valid than the other. However, global legal pluralism is certainly “a superior
representation of legal reality,”205 even though legal theory has yet to explore the effects of this
phenomenon on contemporary nation-states and the communities within them.
Paul Berman applied “a pluralist framework to the global arena” to examine global legal
pluralism.206 He indicated that communities that seek more autonomy have created a space of legal
hybridity in which communities overlap and apply their norms to a single act or actor. 207 This does
not mean that states have lost all legal power over their communities; however, the legal matters
of communities should still be explored in terms of their interrelationships with the state.
A wave of legal pluralism appeared at the end of the 20th century as the result of various
manifestations of ‘globalization’. 208 Globalization is responsible for many states’ loss of power. 209
For instance, in the EU, states abandoned a large portion of their sovereign power to a higher

in legal theory, with a focus on legal pluralism and a global view of law. Therefore, the concepts of legal pluralism
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organizational power that controls certain aspects of their legal, political, and economic systems. 210
Also, some states broke up into communities of mutual uniqueness, as was the case with the
previous Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and certain communities in Scotland, Kurdistan, and
other regions of the world have agitated for greater autonomy Due to these geopolitical separatist
movements and political growths.211
Globalization has affected all elements of society in almost every country, and legal
pluralism is no exception. Understanding legal pluralism alone is difficult, since many scholars
from various fields (sociology, law theory, anthropology) use the term for various purposes. Such
different interpretations of legal pluralism had blurred the concept of law, making it all the more
difficult to talk about legal pluralism on a global level. 212 However, one thing is certain: the
Enlightenment ideal of a uniform and monopolistic law is obsolete. 213 Law has already assumed
pluralistic forms, and people’s interstate and intercontinental migrations, as well as the expansion
of capitalism have increased heterogeneity in virtually every major country. 214 This has given rise
to global legal pluralism, which requires a new examination of the relationship among community,
law, and state. In order to gain a thorough understanding of these concepts, legal theorists should
focus on how the normative systems exist and interact with each other, and on how strategic actors
respond and relate to global legal pluralism.215

210

Id.
Id.
212
Id. at 390–91.
213
Id. at 409.
214
Id.
215
Id. at 410.
211

71

The Extent and Limits of the Right to Arbitrate Among Religious
and Cultural Communities (Sulha as a case study)
2.2.3

Criticism of (global) legal pluralism and multiculturalism
One could use plenty of arguments to criticize legal pluralism and multiculturalism. First,

it could be argued that these are merely concepts that represent ideas that do not have much value
for legal theory. Further, it could be stated that centralized legal systems are at stake, and that
without them, the existence of states as we know them is endangered. Finally, it could be claimed
that uniformity is the only effective way to regulate communities.
Legal pluralism is a threat to legal centralism; i.e., the ideology that law is “the law of the
state, uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state
institutions.”216 Therefore, “lesser normative orderings,” including the family, the church,
economic organizations, and voluntary associations should be “hierarchically subordinate to the
law and institutions of the state.”217 Legal pluralism’s main objective is to dispel the illusion that
law is uniform, hierarchical, and represents an exclusive normative ordering that is controlled by
the state.218
Despite citing Griffiths with approval, Brian Tamanaha claimed that the mere concept of
legal pluralism causes a great deal of confusion among legal theorists and anthropologists. One of
the reasons for this is that scholars who examined legal pluralism usually come from different
fields of study and therefore use different approaches to this subject. For instance, a legal
anthropologist would paint a markedly different picture of legal pluralism than would an
international lawyer.219 Different people use the concept for various purposes; critical theorists
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may seek to decentralize state law, socio-legal theorists will attempt to develop an analytical
approach to modern legal forms, and social scientists would be interested in creating a social
scientific approach to the topic.220 Similarly, the concept of legal pluralism can be found broadly
in literature on postmodernism, feminist approaches to law, international trade, human rights,
etc.221 All of this indicates that confusion and miscommunication are common when it comes to
scholars’ and practitioners’ discussions of legal pluralism. 222
Similarly, the scholar von Benda-Beckmann has emphasized the conceptual confusion of
legal pluralism.223 The notion of legal pluralism is difficult to accept by the States because most
practicing lawyers, religious authorities, judges, etc. are accustomed to applying the concept of
law as it is defined in their own normative logic and discourses. 224 In other words, if various
professions force their practitioners to deal with a single notion of law, then how can they
implement a variety of legal forms into their specific profession?
Bryan Turner and Berna Arslan criticized legal pluralism on the grounds that a plurality of
laws and norms cannot be effectively managed without a uniform, central regulatory body, because
people would not know which laws they should adhere to. 225 In other words, “legal pluralism is
deeply problematic without a common framework of secular citizenship and state sovereignty.”226
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Finally, Berry supports the view of legal centralism, believing that the values of liberty and
equality should be the same in all times and societies. 227 Brian Berry wrote a large monograph in
which he criticized the notion of multiculturalism as having an adverse effect on the ideals of
uniformity and equality, which form the very pillars of democracy. 228 Such authors usually find it
difficult to reconcile multiculturalism and the (global) pluralism that now exists in contemporary
society with their uniform views.
2.2.4

Legal pluralism and Shari’a
Due to the “clash of civilizations” between the East and the West, many North American

and European societies have rejected Shari’a law on the grounds of state sovereignty. 229 Thus, in
some countries, attempts have been made to institute Shari’a law through the use of arbitration
courts.230 The reception of Islamic Shari’a law in Western countries is an important example of
how legal pluralism functions in practice.
However, there is an unresolved dispute as to whether Shari’a arbitration courts should be
considered true courts of law, even though in some countries (such as England), Shari’a courts had
been operating since 2007.231 This implementation of Shari’a courts indicates that legal pluralism
is accepted in the West to a certain degree. Religious courts been recognized in England, and they
are referred to as religious courts, not as examples of “Islamic arbitration.” 232 Accordingly, in
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England, the 1996 Arbitration Law enforce the awards of Shari’a arbitration through the High
Court or county courts.233
The issue with Shari’a and legal pluralism is one of adaptability. How can a radically
different system of laws and norms effectively operate in a pluralistic setting that includes many
and various laws? The incorporation of the Islamic mindset and Shari’a law began in the
postcolonial period with an aim to modernize the legal setting. 234 The outcome of that attempt was
legal pluralism, which is evident in, for example, Malaysia, “where Shari’a competes with English
common law, tribal codes and human rights legislation.” 235 Here, Shari’a law is on the same legal
stage as global corporate law, common law tradition, human rights conventions, and international
law.236
The biggest issue facing the implementation of Shari’a law and other systems of religious
arbitration courts is answering the question of who will enforce this law/these arbitral decisions?
Especially when it comes to human rights, the nation state takes the enforcement role when global
governance is missing. In such a case, any kind of normative order requires interference from the
state.237 This, however, seems to exacerbate the question of which body is the ultimate enforcer,
because communities will have to admit the state’s sovereignty.
2.2.5

Social order, social controls, and rules in community
For the purpose of sociological theory, law is best conceived of as a different form of social

control.238 Social control is a necessary prerequisite for social order, as it regulates the behavior of
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community members. That is why “constraints of individual freedom of choice is a precondition
for coordinated behavior that constitutes social life.” 239 Individual behavior within a community
is subjugated by rules.240 Therefore, rules are the essential factors when it comes to establishing
stable community relations.241 The mutual interaction and relationships of community members
reflect the maintenance of rules. Community members’ behavior that is regulated as such is called
“social behavior.”242
The idea of social order is closely connected to legal pluralism. For instance, in a
community’s own judicial system, customary and religious laws are used in arbitration; therefore,
they have to be treated as law (i.e., a form of legal pluralism), because they have legal influence
and power.243 Therefore, social and religious order within communities must be considered when
examining the notion of legal pluralism and its role in society.
Institutions develop and maintain rules; however, daily interaction represents the most
basic form of social control. Our own experiences enable us to understand and follow rules, as
each day we are told what they represent and how to use them to influence the behavior of others. 244
Moore argued that rules are created, learned, and followed within groups. 245 For instance, states
are groups whose rules are known as “law,” which is an elaborate form of social control. 246 By
understanding, applying, and following community rules and regulations, members regulate their
own behavior in accordance with the community’s laws, and they are also able to settle their
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conflicts by way of arbitration. In addition, members who are familiar with the community’s rules
and laws can preside over arbitration processes to ensure a fair outcome. This is how social control
can be beneficial for community arbitration. The more familiar the community members are with
the rules, the fewer arbitration processes there will be. Fewer processes means more stable
community relations. This is why rules of behavior are “fundamental to the sociology of law” and
they can be established empirically as fact. 247 Legal theorists should spend less time arguing
whether the existence of rules is justified and turn their attention to how rules affect communal
relationships.
2.2.6

Multiple arbitration norms and law
Among the diverse manifestations of legal pluralism are religious tribunals with their own

regulatory norms. Designating these norms as laws would blur the line between the state’s legal
norms (i.e., law) and a community’s non-legal norms. As Tamanaha recognized, “when understood
in these terms, just about every form of norm governed social interaction is law. Hence, we are
swimming, or drowning, in legal pluralism.”248
Considering norm governed social interaction is law, raises the objection that only specific
types of normative ordering can be considered law. However, it could also be considered that any
normative ordering is a type of ‘law’. 249 Legal theorists may suspect that legal pluralism is just
another name for “the old idea that society is filled with a multiplicity of normative orders or
regulatory orders.”250 If that is the case, why should this be called legal pluralism instead of
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regulatory or normative pluralism?251 Boaventura de Sousa Santos asked a similar question, and
his answer came in the form of another question – why not? Calling this plurality of normative or
regulatory orders “legal pluralism” may be more intuitive and commonsensical. 252 Again,
answering the question of whether the normative orders of various communities and institutions
are laws brings the analysis back to the question – what is law? The concept of legal pluralism is
undeniable, even though it creates conceptual confusion. Law cannot be formulated as a scientific
category because “law is a ‘folk concept’”; i.e., it is “what people within social groups have come
to see and label as ‘law.’”253 Still, state law will remain as the paradigm of “what law is,” 254 even
though people have begun to recognize various other types of laws, such as religious and
community laws, customary law, international law, etc.255 But such different concepts of law do
not have the same fundamental features, apart from representing a normative authority that is
legitimate. In other words, “they cannot be reduced to a single set of elements for social scientific
purposes.”256
2.2.7

Communities’ arbitration and multiculturalism
The context of arbitration within communities brings us to the issue of different

interpretations of law, legal pluralism, and multiculturalism. These interpretations require
identifying the implications of multiculturalism in a community’s arbitration process. In addition,
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we may ask whether norms and traditional laws should be considered “law” in light of legal
pluralism and multiculturalism. This section of this paper relies on Turner and Arslan’s article on
“Shari’a and Legal Pluralism in the West,” in which these scholars examine the general
relationship between community laws (particularly those of religious institutions) and centralized
state laws.257
Contemporary modernization in post-colonial countries that introduced an Islamic legal
mindset into various communities gave rise to legal pluralism. Legal plurality involves competing
bodies of law that exist within a sovereign territory, with a state having the ultimate jurisdiction
over legal matters.258 In practice, this means that cases of arbitration within communities must
recognize the sovereign law of the state, (sometimes) in spite of their community-specific laws.
But in the face of legal pluralism, which is “couched in terms of freedom of religion and liberty of
conscience,”259 it is not easy to implement the state law regulation. For state law and community
norms to co-exist effectively, Turner and Arslan argue that some conditions must be fulfilled: the
state must be neutral toward any religious norms, all religious courts must be considered on “a
level playing field”, a single authority must be identified as the final arbiter, individual rights must
be defended and finally liberal values must be respected. 260
Meeting these conditions is extremely difficult. Therefore, states have to maintain their
secular status (neutrality) in their relationships with different religious Arbitrations. Secularization
would establish a space in which customary laws and those of religious institutions could be
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accommodated alongside liberal democracies. 261 This would allow for a process in which
recognized state laws would dictate the ultimate jurisdiction. This standpoint indicates that
customary or other forms of legal norms could be recognized as laws in their own regard, insofar
they perfectly correspond with the state laws. Again, in keeping with Tamanaha’s views, even in
this case, it would still be impossible to provide a scientific definition of law, because laws must
contemplate the myriad infinitely complex and volatile relationships that occur among people,
communities, institutions, and the state. These relationships cannot be limited by universal laws.
The task of legal theory is to explore these relationships and suggest more effective ways of
balancing legal pluralism and a given state’s centralized legal structure.

2.3 Community and Autonomy
2.3.1 The concept of autonomy for individuals and communities
There are many controversies regarding how communities and its members activities
should be regulated. The heart of the debate among legal scholars revolves around the autonomy
of choice; i.e., should private choices be publicly controlled judicially. 262 Primary line of thinking
is the traditional liberal assumption that among people who do not have an overriding “social
purpose, private choices” will prevail. 263 Acknowledging that state legal control is necessary to
protect overall societal interests is one thing; however, arguing that the state embodies community
norms is another.264 It follows that judicial or other governmental oversight does not oppose the
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rights of the community and the individual.265 Rather, legal theorists are employing one concept
of community instead of another. In most cases, smaller communities have been better
representatives of communitarian values than larger communities have. 266 Therefore, overriding
individual choice in such cases does not mean that communitarian values are promoted. 267 On the
contrary, private choices represent a choice of communitarian values. 268
As an overall suggestion, the liberal justification for social control within a community that
would affect members of other communities is not complex. 269 Despite the regulations and virtues
of a community, membership should not be enforced. 270 In addition, if an individual refuse to
become or remain a member of the community, the community norms should not be forced upon
him or her.271
Since the group perspective is usually not the subject of legal discourse, developing and
studying theories about voluntary communities in order to examine community autonomy and
legal intervention is complicated. Legal scholarship does not offer a detailed study of social
groups. Still, normative reasoning can help recognize group autonomy and group rights as different
from individual autonomy and individual rights. 272
The notion of group autonomy could justify restrictions imposed on community members
in the use of their property, such as the transferability of owner property restraints 273. Legal
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scholarship that focuses on groups has not yet developed alternative conceptions of groups. The
claim that groups should respect their own communality means that they should have the power to
organize themselves in order to preserve and maintain their own existence. 274
2.3.1.1 Individual autonomy within a community
Postmodernity has brought countless debates about individual autonomy. Theories about
individual, racial, and ethnic rights have overshadowed communities and their autonomy.
However, a community’s autonomy is of great importance, as it represents not only the autonomy
of a grouping of multiple members understood as a community, but also that of each individual
member.275 In broad terms, community autonomy can be defined as legal recognition of a
community’s capacity and right to shape the collective fate of its members by means of its own
policies.276 The nature of such policies may vary depending upon the community’s direction and
the needs of its members. For instance, the state may impose measures that would allow the
community it to regulate private consensual arrangements. 277
Before discussing community autonomy, however, it is necessary to first introduce the
concept of autonomy. To this point, academic circles have had a very difficult time accurately
defining the concepts of both community and autonomy, especially in legal terms, due to the
complexity of the ideas behind them.
From the anthropological angle, the notions of communities and their autonomy are of
fundamental importance to any society. Ever since the age of Aristotle teaching, the human being
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has been considered a fundamental constituent of a community. Every step that humans took
toward creating and advancing civilization was the outcome of a collective autonomous effort
within some form of community.278 Inasmuch as humans belong to a community, their relationship
to that community entails a legal foundation. 279 However, establishing such foundation should not
threaten the essential human values that make up the integrity of human beings. 280 The question,
then, is how to introduce legal regulations that are consistent with human needs and values? In
tackling this issue, Cotterrell, relying on Emile Durkheim’s 281 understanding of legal matters and
anthropology, stated that “a strong commitment to a value system of moral individualism” is
necessary, and such commitment must be “consistent with the needs of integration in complex
modern societies.”282 That value system of moral individualism implies a “humanistic insistence
on the universal worth of each and every individual” by virtue of each individual’s equality and
autonomy in comparison to all others.283 Thus, a strong insistence on autonomous moral
individualism is required for the effective coordination and integration of social life in each legally
regulated community.
The concept of autonomy is also difficult to define clearly. Autonomy implies selfgovernance and acting according to one own’s rationality, but this formulation requires defining
‘the self’ and ‘one’s own’.284 The self has the power to alter and refashion the human character,
and ‘character’ means “one’s system of acceptances and preferences.” 285 ‘One’s own’ indicates
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that an individual has particular desires with which he or she has identified, making these desires
the individual’s “autonomous preference.” 286 In the context of communities, this scheme implies
that each member of the community possesses his or her own autonomous preferences, which
constitutes the basis of individual autonomy within the community. As this subchapter
contemplates the question of individual autonomy within a community, the concept of autonomy
should be examined at the level of the individual and at the level of the community, and it should
be understood that individual and community autonomy together form a bounded whole.
Community here implies all autonomous individual activities within it.
2.3.1.2 Community and autonomous activities
Communities should not seek absolute autonomy. Rather, community actions should be
actively reviewed by courts that have experience adjudicating matters related to communitarian
norms; i.e., courts that support the idea that communities are integral parts of the state. 287 However,
this suggestion appears to create an opposition between communitarian norms and individual
autonomy, which can lead to a potentially perilous situation with confusing outcomes. Generally
speaking, any community must be subject to legal control by the state’s regulating body; however,
it would be an extra mile to suppose that the state itself is embodied in community norms. Even
the questionable assumption that the government may claim that “communitarian” values allow it
to intervene in private choices, one cannot agree that the state represents the only communitarian
interests worthy of recognition.288 Therefore, judicial or other oversight of the government is not
an issue of the community versus the individual; rather, it is a question of which concepts people
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use to define community. In most cases, size is an important defining factor, as smaller
communities often claim to be the more objective representatives of communitarian values than
their larger counterparts, possibly due to a stronger sense of attachment and belonging. 289
However, it is not only individual choices that promote communitarian values. 290 Such choices
should be the outcome of a certain degree of autonomy; nevertheless, the state’s regulatory body
has to maintain its fundamental function – to implement policies and measures for the benefit of
the community.291 Every member of the community should have the same clear understanding of
the idea behind the concept of community.
2.3.1.3 Law and community autonomy
Community must be understood in abstract, symbolic terms, because it reflects people’s
interpretation of their environment and of their relationships with others. 292 People’s idea of the
community should be reflected in its regulatory policies.293 With all the confusion surrounding the
concept of community and its autonomy, one thing is certain: a community cannot exist without
its members. Community members are not just any group of people occupying a geographical area
or just a group of people in familiarity. They have their own representations and interpretations of
the community they form. Moreover, they are attached to the (idea of) community, and this
attachment is obvious in their understanding of the community as (in Cohen’s words) an “entity,
a reality, invested with all the sentiment attached to kinship, friendship, neighboring rivalry,
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familiarity, and jealousy.”294 What Cohen has in mind here chiefly pertains to the emotional,
humanistic aspect of community.
But what about its jurisdictional aspect, which includes governmental regulations, policies,
rules, and laws? Certainly, every rational member of a community understands that their
community must have, in addition to humanistic underpinnings, certain legal foundations.
According to the German jurist Rudolf von Jhering, “citizens owe a moral duty to themselves and
their society to assert legal rights vigorously.”295 The aim of establishing an effective law is not to
make the community subservient to members conflicting interests but to invigorate it. 296 In other
words, laws and any theories revolving around them should represent a cultural unity. This implies
a holistic interpretation of the law; i.e., that law needs to respond to citizens’ claims and feelings.297
Citizens’ subjective perception of the role of law is of secondary importance to the present
discussion. However, one could state that a community is “the arena in which people acquire their
most fundamental and most substantial experience of social life.” 298 Any theory of law should
make it perfectly clear that such an arena would not exist without the law that governs the
relationships of its individual. The law should be devoid of any measures of coercive control and
should allow community members a considerable degree of autonomy, even if they leave the
community willingly and the community suffers minor economic losses as a result.
Perhaps, by observation we can conclude a successful and prosperous community is an
autonomous community. But, as noted earlier, the concept of autonomy is complex, especially in
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view of legal pluralism and multiculturalism. The phrase ‘legal pluralism’ designates the existence
of many different kinds of law within a nation-state. 299 Apparently, the law of a nation-state (as
the law that regulate the country as whole) supersedes those of the communities within it, which
brings community autonomy into question. Can communities have legal autonomy and to what
degree, in relation to the nation-state’s legal system? This relationship does not necessarily imply
opposition. One must always keep in mind that one of the principle roles of law is to “protect
community and to express or support conditions for it.”300 This view would imply that a nationstate’s law and its fundamental propositions, including its doctrines, principles, and rules, should
be revised in case of any incompatibilities with the law of the communities that are included in
that nation-state. For this reason, a liberal state “grants spaces of freedom” to its communities,
“including the freedom to set non-state norms.”301 Those non-state norms can be classified as nonlegal or they can be subordinated to the nation-state’s law; they are “defined by the state, with
relation to the state. They are, in other words, ‘re-stated.’” 302
Still, legal pluralism must be discussed in terms of its relationship to multiculturalism.
Unlike legal pluralism, multiculturalism comprises “various social groups that have shared
religious or other beliefs or cultural traditions.” 303 These religious beliefs and cultural traditions
can inspire communities to demand the establishment of “an official legal pluralism within the
nation state” as well as “more diverse and flexible approaches to legal regulation reflecting the
cultural mix of multicultural society.”304 There is a profound difference between legal pluralism
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and multiculturalism, but the two aspects are nevertheless related and should be interpreted on the
basis of this relationship. On the other hand, the relationship between legal pluralism and
multiculturalism raises certain practical jurisdictional questions. For instance, how does a state
allow communities to practice arbitration under the umbrella of multiculturalism? Law regulates
countless kinds of social relations.305 Multicultural communities within a state may be allowed to
practice arbitration under their own legal terms. Nevertheless, there are myriad types of social
relationships, and state law cannot deal with all of them. 306 Therefore, strong community legal
systems that regulate different types of arbitrations related to social relationships are required.
The plurality of laws in the context of multiculturalism raises an important question of
community autonomy. In particular, why should communities have autonomy, especially political
autonomy, to arbitrate matters that arise among their multicultural members? Simply put, each
liberal state should allow its communities the freedom to establish its own legal and non-legal
norms. But as stated before, state law needs to have supremacy over these legal norms in cases of
complex arbitration. Community-established legal norms should be ‘restated’ in relation to the
state and its legal system.307 Still, a liberal state has to balance its power to preside over a
community’s legal system on the one hand, and that community’s political autonomy on the other.
Formulating and justifying the principles that regulate social relationships presents a major
challenge for a nation state and for the general theory of law. The state should ensure that
communities do not enforce membership upon anyone. Likewise, a community should preserve
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community outsider autonomy by refraining from enforcing its norms upon them. Groups and
individuals should foster essential humanistic principles, such as respect, understanding, and
kindness toward all of their neighbors.
2.3.1.4 Individual autonomy and community autonomy
As argued at the start of this section, community autonomy (also referred to as “group
autonomy”) is related to individual autonomy, in that one cannot exist without the other. Individual
autonomy is part of a human being’s freedom to act in accordance with his or her desires.
Individuals form the community, which grows to become a nation constituted by multiple
communities. Therefore, individual autonomy is the foundation of any other kind of communityrelated autonomy.
Defining community autonomy is complex, as groups are largely absent from the legal
discourse. Broadly speaking, community autonomy “is a right for the group to decide its own
affairs, determined by reference to the nature of the group within society.” 308 Still, legal
scholarship has not yet provided a rich conceptual study of social groups. 309 Some writers have
used normative arguments to argue that group rights and group autonomy are distinct from
individual rights and individual autonomy. 310 For example, Garet argued that “groups have a
fundamental right to respect their communality, just as persons have a fundamental right to respect
their personhood.”311 Apart from supporting the view that community autonomy cannot be
separated from individual autonomy, this author argues that groups should have the power to
organize themselves by enacting and enforcing whatever internal rules are necessary for their
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existence.312 Such interpretation of community

autonomy might justify imposing various

restrictions on group members in (for example) the use and disposition of property, including
restraints on the transferability of property.313
Various scholarship in the fields of economics, social theory, political science, and
philosophy, however, have particularly strong relevance to legal thought and practice regarding
groups.314 When it comes to dealing with the individual and his or her relationship to community,
researchers have divided opinions, which may be broadly characterized in terms of two theories.
Alexander discussed these two theories: the pluralist theory and the communitarian
theory.315 The former argues for individual autonomy, whereas the latter is more concerned with
group autonomy.316 Pluralist theory is particularly focused on individual autonomy, but it also
supports the view that groups should have autonomy as well. Communitarian theory places a
strong emphasis on “the desirability of group forms of life.” 317 The main difference between the
two theories is in their understanding of group activity and individuality. Communitarian theory
interprets these two aspects of social life as being simultaneously present in the human personality,
whereas pluralist theory separates individuality from group activity. 318 Such viewpoints imply the
existence of a dualism between the person as an individual and the person as part of a group. The
complex question of duality and its implications for community should not hinge on radical
opposition between these two sides of the same coin. Such opposition would create further
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divisions that would complicate relationships and create conceptual confusion; both outcomes
would be further reflected in confusing laws and policies. Instead, legal theory needs to embrace
the fundamental interrelationships among individual, community, law, and state. Legal regulation
should be analyzed in terms of its relationship to the individual and the community. 319
Scholars have shown interest in community on two levels: idealistic and institutional. This
interest substantially increased during the 1980s. Communitarian theories have developed two
levels.320 First, researchers in moral and normative political theory have indicated that community
should be observed as a regulative ideal, while public choice theorists prioritize individual
autonomy over the conception of community.321 The second level at which modern writers discuss
community is social theory. “At this level, scholars focus on community as an institution rather
than as a concept or ideal.” This focus raises questions about the “conditions under which
community as a norm can be realized as a set of concrete social practices and experiences.” 322
2.3.1.5 A community’s right to autonomy
Autonomy has been the focus of the research of many anthropologists, philosophers, and
theorists from various disciplines, with an emphasis on individual autonomy. In the context of
legal theory, however, the autonomy of a community is equally important.
As a legal concept, autonomy is usually “granted to groups, defined territorially or by some
characteristic” within a state323 The interplay between the groups and state is what forms the
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implementation of autonomy in practice.324 Therefore, autonomy is not just a philosophically
abstract term for human freedom. Rather, it is the legal foundation of all nations and states.
Autonomy represents the right of a community to plan its own affairs, as conducted in accordance
with the community’s nature.325 Due to the lack of any sort of minority rights treaty that would
grant the autonomy to minorities (i.e., communities), some authors have wondered whether
minorities could gain autonomy on the basis of the right to self-determination. 326 In his study on
self-determination, Gros Espiell claimed that self-determination was actually the right of a
colonized people to win autonomy through secession. 327 Numerous UN resolutions and other
documents have established the right to self-determination. 328 In the present context, selfdetermination can be interpreted as the necessary prerequisite for community autonomy. However,
communities do not have to seek self-determination through secession, because self-determination
can also be obtained in the union with the nation state. 329
2.3.1.6 Community autonomy and the state
The relationship between a community’s autonomy and the state has been on shaky ground
throughout history. Perhaps one of the most important reasons for increasing the sense of identity
and the call for Autonomy or independence is the cases of genocide throughout history of some
minorities.330 However, the more that a community’s identity is promoted, the more aggressively
that community will seek to become independent and try to form its own state through secession. 331
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In addition, there are groups within the state called “minorities”; i.e., nations that are not dominant
within the state but which desire autonomy, which could threaten the state. 332 Thus, autonomy can
be seen as a continuous process of activism by those groups that desire a higher degree of political
autonomy, versus other groups that desire no more than to preserve their culture within the state. 333
Autonomy is therefore a concept that must be carefully examined, lest it spiral out of control. If
jurists impose limitations on autonomy, they should do so within the realm of political autonomy.
Even though the supporters of pluralist theory would object, giving autonomy to communities
should not reach such extreme levels that it threatens the state.
2.3.2

Community arbitration and autonomy
The manner in which cases of arbitration are regulated within a community reflects how

the community is governed. Failure to promote effective arbitration within communities may lead
to the escalation of individual cases, which may in turn cripple the constitutional and legal
foundations of the state and encourage communities to seek more autonomy or even agitate for
secession.334 However, balancing between effective arbitration and autonomy is complex, due to
the opposing implications of these concepts. Arbitration entails enforcement of contracts, yet a
certain degree of autonomy for both sides of the conflict must exist.335
Arbitration has become an effective method of resolving minor conflicts within
communities. Ware stated that there are two types of community arbitration: community or (intragroup) Arbitration and ordinary arbitration.336 Intra-group-community- arbitration is suitable for
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members of the same group because, easy access for the members. 337 ordinary arbitration, on the
other hand, involves member who do not belong to any group and is administered by Arbitration
law of the country, for example, the American Arbitration Association or its contending rivals in
the U.S.338 Also, unlike in community arbitration, ordinary arbitration involves lawyers even the
arbitrator is not a lawyer.339
Conflicts within the member of communities could be resolved through either community
arbitration (intra-group) or ordinary arbitration. 340 However, the public courts may prefer not to
deal with such cases. Arbitration is a useful tool even in complex cases involving different groups,
because arbitration “allows parties to privatize law.” 341 In other words, both parties understand and
respect the customs and norms involved in the field of their conflict, where a judge in a public
court may not.342 The main principle of arbitration is that two parties that voluntarily enter into an
arbitration agreement should face as few restrictions on their autonomy as possible and should be
able to freely state their own needs. 343 This could be achieved if the parties involved in the dispute
were from the one community. The community could create written rules and codify customs and
norms that would be enforced as privately created statutes, enabling an efficient process while
respecting the autonomy of the actors involved. 344
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In the U.S., arbitrations are processed through the freedom of contract, with minimal state
interference.345 Agreements are rigorously enforced, which has caused some to label them “super
contracts.”346 The American system has the so-called “autonomy thesis,” which refers to the
freedom of parties “to develop a stunning diversity of procedures designed to meet the unique
challenges of a variety of different disputing contexts.”347 Enforcing arbitration allows the state to
create space for the parties to pursue the resolutions they think will best resolve the dispute, which
is similar to the process that Ware discussed. 348 However, state regulation of such agreements may
restrict autonomy “because it risks imposing external values about adjudication on the parties—
values that they did not necessarily choose.349 Thus, legal theorists must question whether the
autonomy thesis is a sufficiently firm foundation for the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
They need to understand that the concept of autonomy is not in accordance with the law’s rigorous
enforcement of arbitration agreements. Other policies will need to be implemented in order to
support arbitration agreements.350
2.3.2.1 Arbitration as self-regulation within a normative community
Defining a Self-Regulating Community
Tackling the issue of the collective waiver of public norms and whether they should be
permitted, as well as the question of which public norms can be amended to the status of a
collective waiver, is not easy. These questions imply the more complex issue of voluntary
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associations in a community, and the role of such associations. 351 A heated debate has been
growing regarding which groups should be granted self-regulatory rights. 352
Some authors claim that communities are “political perfectionists” seeking to form “subfederal sovereigns,”353 but others have argued that granting religious communities a considerable
degree of autonomy would not be constitutional.354 In the same sense, FAA, which has entered
into judicially enforceable arbitration agreements, is designed to facilitate arbitration among
members of commercial associations (community) to promote the vision of self-regulation within
the communities of business and commercial. 355
These questions are made even more complex by the claim that many members of modern
societies take part in multiple self-regulating communities.356 For instance, countless U.S. citizens
belong to homeowners’ associations or other civic associations and also attend mosque or
church.357 Since the associative ties among these communities tend to overlapping ,becomes even
more complex, since the number of cases that involve opposing claims to self-governance increase
dramatically.358
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Given that most people take part in multiple associations, it is important to note that these
groups differ when it comes to their allegiance requirements and their role in the lives of their
members.359 On the one hand, we have associations such as sport clubs and the American Express
Company that refers to its patrons as “members,” though there is barely any contact between the
association and its members.360 While on the other hand, we have “totalistic” religious
communities, such as the Church of Scientology and the Rajneesh, which are often referred to as
“political perfectionists”: these communities usually require their members to live together and
conform to a semi-governmental system of norms that embodies the community’s values for each
aspect of the members’ lives.361 There are also communities that establish affective ties, including
political parties, trade unions and associations, and so on. 362 Some communities seem less
encompassing regarding their control over their members’ lives. However, unlike those that aspire
to political perfectionism, membership in voluntary community does not forbid participation in
other communities.363
The extent of arbitration in each of these communities involves the question of
autonomy.364 When it comes to members of minimalist associations, arbitration takes the form of
insider-outsider cases, in which the individual member is in the same position as (for example)
would be a consumer confronting a large company. 365 In totalistic communities, the issue of
estimating the amount of deference that should be given to the community’s own conflict
resolution process should not arise, because attempts by a member to use a state court to resolve
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a dispute would turn that member into an outsider. 366 In other words, the definition of
membership includes requiring members to use the community’s own judicial system to solve
internal conflicts.367
How do communities approach this issue? Answering this question would expand the
body of law on how communal rights affect the determination of which issues should (or should
not) be susceptible to the community’s internal judicial system. 368 For example, U.S Courts are
already drawing out the boundaries of communal autonomy in cases regarding First Amendment
claims related to speech, religion, and communal rights. 369 The U.S Courts have formulated
doctrines that enable them to determine whether communities should be subjected to external
regulation.370 Yet, the U.S court held that religious communities are subject to generally
applicable criminal laws if such laws do not target religion and its practices. 371 In addition, court
has held that private clubs are subject to the claims of equal protection established in 1983 if
such subjection “does not require the clubs to abandon or alter” any of their basic goals or
activities and does not abridge the communal rights of the members. 372
The issue of when to allow communities to replace arbitration procedures with court
proceedings is not the same as the question of when to allow communities to avoid regulation;
however, a similar methodology may be used to analyze this (the former) question. 373 Challenging
an arbitral award before the court on the grounds that the award violated an external law would
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have to decide whether the publicly avowed values embodied in a specific external law exceed the
self-regulating community’s law.374 Courts would have to define the scope of the communal rights
in question, and the scope of the self-regulated norms, in the process of identifying the interface
between public and private norms.375 Therefore, redefining the standard of arbitrational judicial
review, and permitting judicial review of arbitral awards by the courts based on questions of
applicable law “would initiate reasoned discussion of the issue.” 376
2.3.2.2 Communal autonomy
Communal autonomy gives community members the freedom to establish the organization
they want, and to enact whatever internal laws are required to support the existence of their
communal organization.377 This implies questions about human nature and the self, and what these
concepts mean in the context of community.
Individualist and communitarian theories have relatively different understandings of the
concept of the self. This difference has caused them to establish the conditions under which
community members may live fulfilling lives in different ways. 378 Whether because of human
nature or because of contingent cultural conditions, an individual can live a fulfilling life only if
he or she is given complete autonomy, including the freedom to pursue his or her own ideas of
what constitutes a fulfilling life.379 Communitarians, however, claim that community members
must live under specific conditions in order to develop their personalities; namely,
communitarianism would argue that a person’s sociability is acknowledged and fostered. 380
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Different communities view communal autonomy with a degree of ambivalence. 381 One of
the main questions of community concerns the relationship between the group and the rest of
society; this is known as ‘the paradox of exclusion’.382 By their very nature, communities are
exclusive entities. Since they are formed by mutual commitments to a certain good, they are often
required to exclude some of their members due to a breach of regulations, as was the case in Burt
v. Oneida Community.383 However, by excluding others, communities reduce their capacity to
develop sympathy for others, thus contradicting their communitarian humanistic ideals. In other
words, a community has to respect its shared values in order to justify its exclusiveness. 384
Communitarians hold the ideal of community as the basis for resolving the self-other issue, which
is how they reconcile individuality with sociability. 385
Communal autonomy indicates that members of community groups have the freedom to
pursue the life they consider fulfilling. However, there are restrictions on some specific forms of
behavior, such as which religious or sexual practices are acceptable, what kinds of books are
allowed, type of activities the members are allowed to practice, whether alcohol and tobacco
consumption is permissible. Such restrictions create boundaries in the internal consciousness of
the community, which is understood as a single body.386 Even though community members may
interpret the restrictions differently, the community cannot allow its members to freely opt out
from all restrictions.387

381

Id.
Id.
383
Id. at 285.
384
Id. See also Iris Marion Young, “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship,”
in Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, 219–38, 250-53 (Derek Matravers & Jon Pike
eds., New York/London: Routledge, 2003).
385
Alexander, supra note 6.
386
Id.
387
Iris Marion Young, supra note 369, at 219–38.
382

100

The Extent and Limits of the Right to Arbitrate Among Religious
and Cultural Communities (Sulha as a case study)
Communitarians’ emphasis on individuality may require that a community may not force
its members to choose between participating in the group and following its rules, or having the
freedom to behave in accordance with personal interpretation of the community’s identity.388
According to Albert Hirschman, the choice between group loyalty and leaving the group must
include a third option, which is the voice.389 Individual and group diversity within communities
have to be protected, so that community life and autonomy may allow community members to
realize their individuality and their sociability.390
Communitarian theory emphasizes two types of communal autonomy: limited communal
autonomy and open-ended autonomy.391 A community with limited communal autonomy runs the
risk of becoming oppressive, while open-ended autonomy attempts to reconcile sociability and
individuality, and diversity and unity. It also seeks to resolve the paradox of group cohesion and
exclusion.392 Implementing a norm in an open-ended autonomy requires state interference. States
should strive to maintain legal pluralism among communitarian groups. Communitarian and
pluralist theories agree about this.393 However, while the pluralist theory does not recognize
community as a normative ideal, communitarian theory emphasizes group diversity and pluralism
that would protect individuality without sacrificing community. 394 Communitarians argue that the
politics of pluralism do not necessitate the politics of moral relativism and fear, but rather promote

388

See generally Alexander, supra note 6.
Cf. Albert O. Hirschman, supra note 147.
390
See generally Alexander, supra note 6.
391
Id.
392
Id.
393
Id.
394
Id.
389

101

The Extent and Limits of the Right to Arbitrate Among Religious
and Cultural Communities (Sulha as a case study)
progressive reformulation. Unger termed such politics as the “spiral of domination and
community.”395
Nearly all communal organizations share a set of ideals that cuts across secular and
religious purposes. Such utopian “idealizations” could be summarized as follows. 396 1) The
perfected human – this is the belief that common society has corrupted human beings, but they
may still reach “perfection through participation in communal life.” 2) Communal order – this is
defined as avoiding activities that do not have purpose by means of living an ordered life. 3)
Communal brotherhood – this is defined as work, responsibilities, and the sharing of property. 4)
Communal harmony – this is defined as balancing one’s life between “body and spirit.” 5)
Communal experimentation – this is defined as a community’s decision to experiment in terms of
its operations. 6) Communal coherence – this is defined as awareness that the group differs from
other groups or from the state.397
2.3.2.3 Autonomy and its elements398
Conflicts and disputes may be resolved efficiently if the parties involved are allowed to
exercise autonomy. The level of the autonomy enjoyed by disputing parties usually varies, but it
may be classified by means of “four facets: participation, cultural, financial and arbitration .” 399
this thesis is adding a new facet that works as correspondingly as contribution, cultural, financial
which is the arbitration. These facets represent the essential needs of each community within the
state. Balancing among them will enable the state to strengthen its internal structure. Taken
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together, they allow communities to have self-determination and enable community rights to exist
within the structure of the state.400
A. Participatory (contribution) autonomy401
Participation assumes that power within the state should be shared among its communities.
This can be exercised through allowing communities to have their own governments (if the
community is in majority in the region) or through a “political process” that would enable
communities to “run their own affairs”.402 If the state refuses to share its political and military
power with its communities, it will encourage the communities to seek separation from the state.
B. Cultural autonomy403
In a broad sense, culture encompasses all aspects of community life. Cultural autonomy
includes educating the children of all community groups in the history of all communities that exist
within the state. Most importantly, the community must be allowed to use its own language, history
and norms or traditional because it otherwise would not be able to preserve its cultural identity. 404
This identity cannot be promoted unless the community members are allowed to regulate their own
cultural and heritage affairs. This is why cultural autonomy is among the most important facets of
a community’s autonomy within a nation.405
C. Financial autonomy406
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Financial autonomy is the most difficult for a community to achieve. It is a prerequisite of
the former two types of autonomies.407 Without financial autonomy, communities would not be
able to thrive and would eventually dissemble. Gilbert references numerous acts and statements
that demonstrate that states acknowledge and respect the financial autonomy of their communities.
The country that the community part of are aware that their communities should equally participate
in the state’s wealth in addition to exercising their social and economic rights. 408
2.3.2.4 Arbitration agreement promotes autonomy
In most communities, the process of arbitration, along with its standards and legal
applications, requires the agreement of the parties involved.409 In other words, the tribunal of
arbitration is selected on the basis of the parties’ agreement to resolve their disputes. 410 The parties
themselves possess this authority.411 In most arbitral processes, a contractual agreement is
sufficient to determine the dispute’s outcome, since the contract regulates the responsibilities and
obligations of the parties. The parties are responsible if the process fails and an outcome is not
reached.412
Though, the parties may be responsible for the proceedings and have the right in full
capacity to administer the arbitral proceedings within the context of the country’s legal
framework.413 Accordingly, the parties have the right to create and agree on the procedural law of
arbitration, and remain this agreement separate from the law of the state as long as the parties agree
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and do not violate the effective laws of the state. Hence, the arbitrators are empowered to act by
virtue of the authority vested in them by the parties’ submission to arbitration. Arbitrators are
expected to determine the dispute in a contractual way; this means determining the dispute based
on the arbitration agreement.414
Since arbitration represents a private adjudication system, the parties control the
arbitrators’ responsibilities and power. The arbitration award is final and binding that ends the
dispute of the parties. State courts may interfere to support the agreement of the arbitration, or, if
necessary, to govern the process of arbitration and give more authority to the final judgement if
the parties refuse to comply.415 These elements apply at both the international and domestic levels,
and they are present in all types of arbitration, including disputes relating to industrial,
professional, labor, and commercial issues. 416
Many countries possess legal means for regulating arbitration, which determine the parties’
right to initiate arbitration and formulate the rules of conduct. Moreover, these legal means
determine the types of disputes that may be subject to arbitration. Some countries possess
additional legislative provisions that are connected to certain arbitration types such as labor
arbitration.417 Some have statutory arbitration rules that deal with the disputes of certain kinds. 418
In most contemporary arbitration norms and laws, the parties are granted the maximum
degree of autonomy in structuring their tribunals, running the cases, organizing awards, and
dealing with minor arbitration matters.419 The parties have the freedom to choose the procedure,

414

Id.
Id. at 55.
416
Id.
417
Id.
418
Id. at 55–56.
419
Id. at 78.
415

105

The Extent and Limits of the Right to Arbitrate Among Religious
and Cultural Communities (Sulha as a case study)
the arbitrators, the law/s under which the arbitration will be judged, and everything else related to
the dispute process. In addition, they can choose if they want to engage in arbitration or not. They
cannot be compelled to arbitration.420 The parties’ autonomy to structure the tribunal and the
process of arbitration is significant, but it does have limits. The importance of freedom in
arbitration is that the autonomy of the disputing parties is a considerable advantage of
arbitration.421
The autonomy of parties refers to their freedom to choose the norms, the usages and
custom, the general principles, the public international legal principles, 422 the arbitration
agreements, and the legal principles that will regulate arbitration process. 423 These features
comprise autonomy in the following areas: 1) formulating the arbitration’s rules and procedures;
2) deciding on the arbitration costs; 3) choosing an arbitrator; (4) choosing the number of
arbitrators; 5) choosing the language in which the arbitration will be conducted, 6) choosing the
location of the arbitration; 7) choosing the time; 8) choosing whether to engage in institutional
arbitration; 9) and stipulating the qualifications of the arbitrator/s. 424
The parties’ autonomy is the predominant factor that applies when parties choose the
applicable laws for an arbitration. Among the main principles at play is the parties’ autonomy to
select the laws that will apply to their arbitration processes. 425 In each case, the tribunal of
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arbitration reaches a decision that accords with the contract terms and takes into consideration how
the trade is applied to the transaction.426 The autonomy in choosing a law allows the parties to
avoid regulating the contract with ambiguous law.427 That might stop the parties from claiming
that the court or tribunal employed inappropriate law in their dispute, as the law chosen expresses
the will of all parties.428 Principally, the parties may select the arbitrators through agreement and
determine how many arbitrators will be appointed.429
2.4 The importance of arbitration for communities
Despite the effects of globalization, the uniformity of modern societies is being upheld by
communities that constitute them. When scholars such as Griffiths and Tamanaha state that legal
pluralism is the reality of our present day, they also imply that various communities are the
necessary constituents of modern states.
In such pluralistic environment of contemporary states, the main task of legal theorists is
to suggest efficient ways of regulating and balancing the relationship between communities and
the state. Community arbitrations are one way to maintain a stable relationship; however, this
requires the careful parsing of laws and norms. Specifically, legal theorists need to ponder whether
(and how) state laws should affect community arbitrations, as well as if state laws should have any
authority (and if so, to what extent), in arbitral processes. Following Weber’s political sociology,
the present research supports the view that the state that claims territorial sovereignty should
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ultimately also have the final jurisdiction in community arbitrations. 430 However, further
elaboration is required here.
In every legal pluralistic society, there are tensions among the normative systems of the
state and its communities. Commonly, the state assumes a neutral stance with regard to various
communities and religions, allowing them a share of autonomy. 431 Communities aspire to uphold
a certain degree of independence and autonomy, which gives them identity. Without identity,
communities would not exist as such. This also means that communities often seek to create a
judicial system of their own, implementing various rules, norms, and regulations to resolve
conflicts. However, they usually require the state to interfere when they need to enforce their
decisions. This is among the main reasons why community arbitration – as a crucial aspect of a
community’s identity – is central to the relationship between communities and the state.
However, can communities and the state preserve and maintain efficient arbitration, which
would remove the burden of handling the community cases from the state’s courts? This means
that can communities establish efficient judicial systems, and that their systems can cover the most
important areas of human relations in which conflicts occur, including the fields of business,
commerce, and the economy.
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By implementing an effective arbitration system, a community

would substantially boost its autonomy. In addition, such a system would enhance individual
autonomy, since community members are closely familiar with the rules and norms of their
community. Having a clear idea of their rights, individuals would have more freedom to conduct
activities for their own benefit and that of their community.
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Some may argue that community arbitration is not without its share of shortcomings: the
arbitrators are often unqualified, administration is uneven, , enforcement is complex, and the
process often encounters delay that increases costs.433Nevertheless, legal pluralism – in this case,
the use of arbitral courts alongside state courts – should not be harshly criticized on the grounds
of its occasional ineffectiveness. In addition to promoting community autonomy and identity,
arbitration also promotes brief resolution times, efficient processes, cost savings, and
confidentiality and privacy.434 Thus, arbitration is quite different from litigation, which is the
reason that businesses tend to prefer the former over the latter.435 Therefore, arbitrations have been
used in various types of contracts, making the process a popular replacement for civil trial. 436
This thesis argues for the importance of community and its members autonomy. The
arbitration parties of religious and traditional communities could initially voluntarily choose to
join a community. Accordingly, they could choose their own religious or customary law and
religious or social arbitrator. For example, a member of a Jewish community could resolve a
conflict before Jewish tribunal so called Beth Din that chosen by the members of the Jewish
community.437 Similarly, the Bedouin in Jordan may choose to have arbitration under the
Sulha and its customary law instead of taking a case court and apply Jordanian national law
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system due to social pressure from other members and/or because of a religious commitment. For
example, Jewish members are required by their religious law to have their conflicts resolved by
their own Rabbi.439 Similarly, the Kurdish community requires their members to use the
community’s own arbitration, which is called the “peace committee.” 440
While community members may be pressed to use their community’s arbitration system,
they must have the right to exit the community and not be subject to this coercive measure; i.e.,
that the community’s judicial system may attempt to enforce arbitration upon its members.
However, some communities allow their members the freedom to select either the national court
or use the community’s private arbitration system. For example, the Christian community in U.S
allows its members to consult with a peacemaker institute that may provide an arbitrator to help
resolve a conflict.441
Some communities, particularly the minority communities, have one goal and mission – to
have financial, administrative, judicial and political independence. All of these types of autonomy
are the corner stones of creating a state. Therefore, the first step toward political autonomy is
establishing a private judicial system to resolve conflicts among community members. For
example, the Kurdish people in the north of Iraq have relative political autonomy and use their
own committees to resolve all conflicts within their community. Certainly, the Kurdish
communities around the world were formed on the basis of ethnicity, but they have an ultimate
goal of creating a state.442
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States have political reasons to use arbitration or other judicial methods of resolution,
because settling conflicts among citizens is among their primary objectives. In countries, such as
Jordan, that use the sulha mechanism443 to resolve issues among the Bedouins, the Bedouins feel
obligated to submit to the sulha’s decision. The Bedouins were living in eastern Jordan before the
state of Jordan was founded in 1921.444 They used to live as tribes under customary law.445 Ever
since its foundation, the state of Jordan has attempted to respect that law and give the Bedouins
and, in some cases, all Jordanian citizens, the freedom to use the sulha as alternative resolution
mechanism. The state does this out of respect for the tribes and the customary law that existed
before its foundation.
However, there are arguments against the use of the sulha and customary law in those parts
of the country446 that apply customary law. Allegedly, this law does not promote stability in the
societies because, in some cases, there are conflicts between the state law and the community laws.
The customary law sometimes violates basic rights, especially women’s rights. Further, the people
who apply the customary law are often more loyal to their tribes and heritage than to the state. 447
While there are strong arguments against the use arbitration that is based on ethnicity,
arbitration has been a standard judicial practice worldwide. Thus, some scholars have argued,
correctly, that communal arbitration is a form of legal pluralism. 448 People should have the
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freedom to form communities and organize their lives as they please, including creating their own
methods to resolve conflicts. For example, the people of Gaza and West bank still rely on
arbitration and mediation, even though they are under occupation. 449 The dispute between the
Palestinians and the Israelis is the best example to use here.
In those disputes, Israelis can bring claims in Israeli courts, and Palestinians can bring
claims in Palestinian courts. But neither party wants (or in some instances is able) to
participate in proceedings in the courts of the other party’s jurisdiction. Moreover, in both
directions, enforcement can be difficult, if not impossible. 450
This example shows that some occupied peoples will refuse to use the courts of the occupying
government, because they do not want to recognize a foreign judicial system. This could be also
understood as a form of resistance and an expression of self-determination. In addition, the
occupied people or other state minorities may feel a strong need to create their own methods of
resolving their conflicts.
2.4.1 Community identity and adjudication
Some communities have inherited their values, traditions, and customs from their
ancestors. Most nations try hard to hold on to the ancestral cultural ties that identify them and their
communities on both the individual and the group level. This particular feature usually overlaps
with other geographical or religious factors. For example, the Amish communities in the United
States and Canada have their own specific communal features that are related to their religious
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background. They feel that their religion is the true source of their identity, which makes them feel
very proud of their own culture and heritage.451
Typically, most of these communities feel uncomfortable using the national courts and
laws. This is likely due to a lack of trust in a non-community judicial system. This mistrust
originates from the feeling that the national law cannot be applied effectively to individual
communities. Secondly, the national legal system is often plagued with instances of corruption,
which hinders the judicial or procedural system, especially in Third World countries.
In addition, a community often prefers to resolve its own conflicts in a discrete and
confidential manner, keeping the issues within the community. A community member may feel
ashamed if the dispute leaks out of the community, and thus community members often prefer that
conflicts are resolved within their community. Further, community members who use the national
court to sue a fellow community member may be seen to be acting against the community’s norms
and values. Keeping the community strong by fostering relationships among the members is
important to those community members who wish to remain within the community. Accordingly,
the community leaders and its members have the same goal of maintaining solid relationships
within the community.
Some cases of conflict are particular to certain communities, whereas they would go
unnoticed in the rest of society. For example, the Arab Bedouin’s culture requires a certain level
of respect for older people and hospitality for guests. If these norms are infringed in any way, the
defendant may be brought in front of the Sheikh, and compensation for social damage may be
demanded. Also, some communities may forbid their members to use the national courts as a
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condition of being allowed to remain part of the community. Those members would have to use
the community’s judicial system if they wanted to resolve an issue. In this case, the factor of
commitment influences the choice of judicial system. However, some members would find it
personally unethical to use another method for resolving issues within the community.
Geography may prevent community members from visiting a national court as well; the
national court may be located a long distance away from the community, and it may be expensive
and time-consuming to make the trip. Solving a conflict locally would be much cheaper and
logistically simpler. Indeed, in some countries, poor financial conditions prevent people from
having access to court facilities. For example, non-Bedouins mostly live in deserts that are far
away from the cities that would provide them with national court facilities and judges.
2.4.2

The need for arbitration
In general, conflicting parties prefer to use arbitration because it is faster and more cost-

effective in comparison with the standard of court-based judicial system. 452 In addition, arbitrators
are selected from the general public and can be virtually anyone with skills in resolving conflicts.
The process of arbitration is usually private: its proceedings, records, and transcripts are
confidential, and a simple court order enforces the awards. Therefore, a majority of people prefers
to rely on an arbitral tribunal resolve their personal and commercial conflicts instead of resolving
them in public courts.453
There are other advantages of religious or cultural arbitration. Having a conflict settled on
the basis of religious norms is a display of one’s belief. It is also a sign of respect for ones religious
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beliefs. Religious arbitration allows the conflicting sides to arrange the dispute such that it
conforms with their own moral and personal values and beliefs. 454 This range of options pertains
to Jews, Christians, and Muslims. For instance, “in Shari’a councils in England, Muslims believe
that the framework of dispute resolution is ‘culture- and religion-friendly’, while on other hand,
the secular court, when compared with religious arbitration, appears unfriendly and incapable of
considering cultural and religious factors.” 455
Religious arbitration could help to establish “religious legal communities,” whose
members would be aware of their community’s values and legal standards. 456 The essential
religious duties of the community members would be to understand and respect such standards.
The standards agreed upon by the community are not simple religious duties, but legal obligations
as well.457 Moreover, as indicated, utilizing religious arbitration to resolve conflicts could be
observed as a form of religious practice. For instance, according to the Qur’an, Muslims cannot
refer to themselves as Muslim unless they adhere to the "guidelines, counsel, and principles related
to them through the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad.”458 Similarly, a majority of Christian
communities believe that they obey St. Paul’s order to solve disputes among them when they settle
them in a Christian court.459 Likewise, according to New York law CPLR §75, the Jewish courts
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of Beth Din in America demand that conflicting sides sign binding contracts that contain the
arbitration clause known as sh’tar birurim.460
Religious and cultural arbitration plays an important role in uniting and establishing
communities.461 Members of religious communities require safe places to worship. These places
are necessary, so that groups that follow a certain cultural or religious organization may gather to
discuss disputes. Tribunals of religious arbitration may support cohesiveness among the religious
group.462
Sometimes, the members of a religious group fear the public courts. They believe that
secular laws do not conform with their religious beliefs, or that they will face discrimination due
to their religion.463 According to some authors, religious arbitration processes could be more
conciliatory than public court arbitration processes. There are those who think that the arbitrators
of religious courts would settle their disputes based on morals and ethics rather than on the state
laws.464 Further, some may prefer to have their conflicts settled by a religious arbitrator who shares
the same beliefs and convictions.465 For example, the majority of Muslim community members
prefer to settle family legal conflicts, such as khul’ and divorce, in front of an Imam, as Imams are
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believed to possess particular religious knowledge of these matters. Therefore, utilizing religious
arbitration instills a “sense of togetherness and unity in the community.” 466
Occasionally, religious community members are required to utilize religious arbitration lest
they suffer cultural and religious penalties.467 For instance, in Judaism, if a member decides to use
a secular court to settle a conflict, he or she may be issued a seruv from a Beth Din. This is a
document that states that the individual in question is to be shunned for bringing the issue to a
public court.468 In addition, arbitration could be forced upon community members by means of
various penalties for refusing to use it, including disownment or excommunication. 469
Religious community members who belong to minorities within their respective locations,
particularly in the U. S., have faced the negative effects of “judicial refusal” during conflicts that
concerned religious issues. Thus, such religious communities have formed specific entities that
look into and solve these conflicts. 470 An example of judicial refusal in the U.S would be when a
court refuses to enforce a contract of Islamic marriage (the Mahr contract between Muslim couples
that stipulates a property that the husband promises to the bride as a dowry). 471
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Public courts do not “litigate religion” due to the “church autonomy doctrine.” 472 This
doctrine grants deference to religious communities whenever “the questions of discipline or of
faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by church judicatories.” 473 Helfand
criticized the wisdom of a doctrine that does not allow judicial action on religious claims or issues
and automatically defers them to the authority of religious institutions. His arguments pertain to
cases that are not susceptible to a religious institution that could settle them. 474
Confidentiality is among the benefits of arbitration, particularly religious arbitration. The
proceedings of civil or public secular courts can be found in public record. Most religious groups,
such as the Mormons, prefer to keep potentially embarrassing facts about their disputes hidden
from the public and from fellow members of their community. Secular court proceedings could
damage the “appearance and reality of Mormon solidarity” if certain cases were open to public
knowledge and scrutiny.475
One of the most well-known advantages of religious arbitration is its support of
autonomy.476 An individual’s ability to decide according to his or her will and to be a “part-author
of [his/her] own life” is called “personal autonomy.”477 Since individuals can choose among many
ways of solving a conflict, they are free to select the one that is most appropriate to their needs. 478
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Whenever a public court interferes in religious matters, the character of the judgment may
change, and the culture of the religious community may be inhibited. 479 Therefore, religious
arbitration is especially significant and appreciated within a culturally diverse society that fosters
religious tolerance as well as cultural and legal pluralism. 480 The primary aim of cultural and legal
pluralism is establishing a legal system that enables individuals to freely act upon and express their
religious convictions.481
Most, if not all, communities that utilize arbitration to settle disputes among their members
begin by discussing the method of mediation, and most eventually resort to arbitration. For
instance, the Imams of Muslim communities in Canada use mediation in their local mosques.
Religious communities emphasize the need for arbitration, and public courts rarely interfere, so
the relationship between society and community largely depends upon arbitration. But such
arbitrations often show the influence of the cultures in which they are situated. For instance, when
observing Islam and its effect on traditional communities, we find different religious leaders in
different communities: the sulha among the Bedouins, the Jirga among the Afghanis, the sulha
among the Yemenis in the U.S. One can see that arbitration in these communities is affected by
the cultures in which they exist, even though they all share the same religion (Islam). Some group
of Chinse who live in the U.S have their own mechanism to resolve issue which consider based on
culture and traditional.482
Islam originated with the idea of safekeeping the human good conduct and reminding them
to practice these good values within their community. In the hadith, the prophet Muhammad said
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“I was sent to perfect good character.” 483 Accordingly, reconciliation within Islamic communities
had been occurring in Arab society before Islam became widespread. Islam requires that
reconciliation is practiced, even if doing so means instituting additional penalties or waiving
existing penalties that do not accord with the rules and norms of Islam. Islam grants the arbitrator
certain freedom to determine penalties according to the degree of the wrong action or crime as
long as such crime is one Hudud484 that Allah describe in Quran. By comparison, arbitrators within
the Islamic communities have a limited degree of freedom when resolving conflicts that are within
the scope of Islam, and in choosing rulings that may go against the obligatory role of Islam or
Hudud.
However, community leaders as a tribe leaders sometime devise and apply rules that are
not Islamic. For example, the sulha process is an Islamic principle among the Bedouins, but they
still use “Jalwah” as a form of punishment; this punishment requires the close relatives of a
convicted criminal to leave their homes and move far away from the convict.
2.4.3

Legal protection to the right to arbitrate.
The need for arbitration in most local legal systems has been established; arbitration

provides a mechanism for the settlement of various forms of disputes in the areas of commerce,
construction, insurance, marine activities, commodities, and ethnic and religious issues. It is also
widely agreed that the right to arbitrate is supported constitutionally and by the rule of law right in

483

Book 47, Hadith 8, cf.
https://sunnah.com/search/?q=%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AB%D8%AA+%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AA%D9%85%
D9%85+%D9%85%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%85+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D8
%A7%D9%82 (last visited Aug, 2018).
484
Hudud are criminal acts or action that stated in the Qoran in a specific manner and have a specific charges such
as murder or adultery.

120

The Extent and Limits of the Right to Arbitrate Among Religious
and Cultural Communities (Sulha as a case study)
different jurisdictions.485 On the other hand, undoubtedly, arbitration faces some challenges,
including the explicit rejection of arbitration agreements, and formal and informal obstacles to the
enforcement of arbitration awards486
The right to arbitration is as important as the freedoms of contracting and setting up
relevant associations. The citizens of any free and developed country have the fundamental right
to decide how conflicts arising from their relationships are resolved. This right does not obviate
the traditional and important role of the State to organize the structure of the lives of its citizens. 487
The fundamental importance of the right to arbitration can be expressed in two important
principles: the rule of law and individual freedom. The recognition of courts and legislative bodies
in individual countries around the world imposes this importance in a protective manner. 488
Courts and tribunals from around the globe have repeatedly recognized the central importance
of the right to arbitrate to the rule of law. That right has properly been founded on
constitutionally-protected liberties – freedom of contract, freedom of association and other
individual rights.489
There some examples of jurisdictions that guarantee the right to arbitrate in their
constitutions or courts. The French National assembly is the first clear example of this protection;
it indicated that citizens have the right to arbitrate and resolve their conflicts by their own free
choice.490 Germany is another example of this principle; German laws and courts “guarantee[s]
personal freedom and private autonomy.” The right of arbitration essentially requires that the
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parties commit to a voluntary agreement to resolve their dispute, and they waive their right of
recourse to the national courts. In the U.S., the courts have recognized the right to arbitrate as a
constitutional right491; this recognizes the autonomy of the parties and the right to the freedom of
contract.492 The court states:
In general, parties may contract as they wish, and courts will enforce their
agreements without passing on their substance. The principle of freedom of contract
is itself rooted in the notion that it is in the public interest to recognize that
individuals have broad powers to order their own affairs by making legally
enforceable promises.493
In many Arab constitutions, the citation is a bit different, but the outcome is the same. Arab
constitutions do not mention directly and clearly the right to arbitrate, but this right been protected
under principles of the protection of general personal freedom. For example, Article 7 of the
Jordanian constitution states: “Personal freedom shall be guaranteed.” 494 Jordanian civil law
recognizes the freedom of contract and the parties’ autonomy to enter into a contract. Consider the
example of the sulha in Jordan. Jordanian have the right to conclude any legitimate contract in
Jordan. The contract could be civil, commercial, or any other type of contract that includes an
arbitration agreement.
As such, the right to resort to arbitration must be protected in any form, whether for
individuals, communities, or associations. This research argues that the right of communities to
resort to arbitration to settle disputes among its members should be protected. The right to arbitrate
should be given to all communities based on religion or race in any existing legal system. In order
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to achieve this goal, these communities and their members must actively call for this right, and the
state must find legal or constitutional mechanisms to ensure it, in line with the modern concept of
multiculturalism.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the researcher referred to the studies and opinions of scholars related to the
concept of “community” and the legal value of this concept. The research focused on the selfgovernment of the community, community autonomy within the state, and how arbitration helps
to promote these concepts in the light of legal pluralism.
The concept of community is not easily defined. The term involves the consideration of
the endless diversity of individuals’ interests, values, projects, and commitments. Scholars from
many different disciplines—legal studies, sociology, and political science—have tried to define
“community.” Based on their area of study, scholars have diverse opinions regarding the meaning
of community, but they all typically approach the subject from the perspective of legal theory.
Some researchers rely on various theories of state and society provided by influential sociologists.
Most would agree that a community typically shares geographical and anthropological
characteristics, such as a territory marked by legal and geographical borders; a common language;
shared traditions; other cultural, historical, religious, and political traits; and a sense of emotional
attachment. All of these factors play a role in the success of arbitration and its enforcement. Also,
most scholars would agree on the importance of legal regulation as a basic characteristic of
community. It was necessary for the researcher to listen to voices from many different fields, which
posed a significant challenge.
Clarifying the misinterpretation of cultures as monolithic entities within a community was
not an easy task, and some scholars have adopted flawed methodological approaches that led to a
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range of false conclusions. The source of this issue is the misinterpretation of the concept of
difference in relation to peoples and cultures.
The issue of attachments to the community was important to discuss, because the acts of
joining and exiting a community is not always a matter of choice for an individual. Choice is a
vital factor in the creation of (voluntary) communities, as it directly affects the establishment of
emotional attachment, which plays a more instrumental role in the cohesion and identity of a
community than geographical factors do.
The matter of autonomy is equally important. It involves the political issues of a
community’s autonomy, its degree, community law within a nation state, the question of freedom
and its limits, etc. In order to properly consider all of these aspects, the theory of law needs to
explain all fundamental concepts related to legal pluralism, community, and the law. Another issue
that must be taken into account that the center of debate between scholars is the opposition between
individual autonomy and group commitment. Developing and studying theories of voluntary
communities in order to examine community autonomy and legal intervention is complicated.
Legal scholarship does not offer a detailed study of social groups. Still, normative reasoning can
help establish an understanding of group autonomy and group rights as different from individual
autonomy and individual rights.
This chapter also discusses the importance of multiculturalism and legal pluralism and
explains the principal difference between these two concepts. What multiculturalism and legal
pluralism have in common is diversity, which is at the root of both phenomena.
Social order, social controls and rules are vital to the existence and health of a community.
Mutual interactions and the relationships of community members reflect the maintenance of rules.
Community member behavior that is regulated as such is called “social behavior,” and the idea of
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social order is closely connected to legal pluralism. Community members regulate their own
behavior in accordance with the community’s laws, and they are also able to settle their conflicts
by way of arbitration. In addition, members who are familiar with the community’s rules and laws
can preside over arbitration processes to ensure a fair outcome.
An important topic that has received much attention recently is the relationship between
legal pluralism and the Shari’a. Due to the current “clash of civilizations” (the opposition between
the East and the West), many North American and European societies have rejected Shari’a on the
grounds of state sovereignty. The biggest problem in countries that observe Shari’a law and other
systems of religious arbitral courts is who will enforce the decisions of these courts. In practice,
this means that cases of arbitration within communities would have to recognize the sovereign law
of the state, in spite of the communities’ own community-specific laws. Nonetheless, in the light
of legal pluralism, which has emerged from the womb of freedom of religion and freedom of
conscience, Islamic arbitration should not be excluded
This chapter demonstrates why arbitration is important for communities, whether they are
religious communities or cultural communities. To study community arbitration from a different
angle, this chapter proposes many reasons that community arbitration should be supported.
This chapter expresses the legal basis that underpins the mechanism of enforcing
judgments and the obligation community members to do so. In modern society legal enforcement
of commitment is by Contracts that used to create long lasting status relationships. It is possible to
avoid legal enforcements and use transactional arrangements instead, but these have limited effect.
Central to this thesis is how arbitration has become an effective method of resolving minor
conflicts within communities. Arbitration is a tool for self-regulation within a normative
community. Courts are already drawing out the boundaries of communal autonomy in cases
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regarding First Amendment claims to freedom of speech, religion, and communal rights.
Therefore, it was very important to provide a brief understanding of a community’s right to
arbitrate. The legal and constitutional protection of the right to arbitrate should be promoted for
all communities around the world.
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CHAPTER THREE: RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
3.1. Introduction
3.2. Definition and Overview of Religious Arbitration
3.2.1. Historical background of religious arbitration
3.2.1.1.The History of Islamic arbitration
3.2.1.2.History of religious arbitration in Western societies
3.2.2. Definition of Religious arbitration
3.2.3. The reasons behind the rise of religious arbitration
3.3. Types of Religious Arbitration
3.3.1. Jewish (Orthodox Jewish Law) in the United States
3.3.2. Christian arbitration
3.3.2.1.Arbitration within the Church itself
3.3.2.1.1. Peacemaker ministries approach
3.3.3. Islamic arbitration
3.3.3.1.Canada
3.3.3.2.England
3.3.3.3.United States
3.4. Religious Arbitration Agreement
3.4.1. The characteristics of Religious Arbitration Agreement
3.4.1.1.Application of governing law (choice of law provision)
3.4.1.2.Religious agreement is a contract of adhesion due to religious duress
3.4.2. The religious arbitration critique
3.4.2.1.Heightened risk of unfairness rule and procedural protections
3.4.2.2.Dangers of religious arbitration in the family law context
3.4.2.3.The use of religion to resolve secular matters
3.5. Enforceability of Awards of Religious Tribunals
3.5.1. Constitutional protections implicated under 1 st Amendment
3.5.1.1.The religious question restraint
3.5.1.2.The neutral principles of law approach
3.5.2. Judicial review of religious arbitration awards
3.5.2.1.Applying unconscionability doctrine in the context of religious arbitration
3.5.2.2.Applying the protection of public policy in the context of religious arbitration
3.6. Conclusion
3.1 Introduction
The relationship between a single person and his or her religion is a connection that
cannot be severed. In the past, most civilizations were established by religion, and followers of
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam lived in their own respective communities. Every community
could resolve its issues through the religious courts of the state itself. However, due majorly in
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part to globalization, today’s societies are made up of a myriad of religions, each practicing its
own form of religious law. And because of post-colonial legal pluralism, these religious groups
were compelled to organize methods of arbitration that would resolve conflicts according to their
respective laws while also securing support from their country’s secular courts. 495
This chapter discusses the Right to Arbitrate496 within religious communities, specifically
focusing on the major religions, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Members of these religions
practice their own methods of resolving conflicts in accordance with their faith. These methods
are referred to as religious arbitration. While religious arbitration functions in a similar manner
to secular arbitration, the law applied by religious communities is usually doctrinal law, and
some faiths even require the arbitrator to be a religious leader or at least a member of the shared
community. This chapter will use the United States, England, and Canada as examples of
countries that allow the practice of religious arbitration and the enforcement by secular courts of
religious tribunal awards. However, because this method of arbitration is based on religious law,
it functions a little differently from the secular form of arbitration, and therefore, some
complications may arise when enforcing the awards.
Enforcing religious law in a secular court has always been at the crux of this complicated
relationship between courts and religious law. This relationship is made more complex in the
United States by the church autonomy doctrine, which gives religious bodies the right to certain
levels of self-government. In short, this doctrine puts limitations on secular courts from deciding
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over religious questions and greatly restricts their ability to review religious tribunals’ decisions
and awards.
This chapter will focus on the method of arbitration used by certain religious
communities to resolve conflicts. It will also outline how secular courts deal with these
resolutions and enforce awards. It will then discuss the criticism surrounding religious
arbitration.
This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section will give a definition
and overview of the term ‘religious arbitration’ while noting the history of religious arbitration in
certain religious groups. The next section will discuss in detail the various ways religious
arbitration is practiced in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. This section will also delve into the
reason why certain religious arbitration practices are more developed than others. The final
section of this chapter will discuss the judicial review of religious arbitration agreements and
awards. It will go on to mention how and why the religious awards are to be enforced by secular
courts.
3.1 Definition and Overview of Religious Arbitration
This section provides a general definition and overview of religious arbitration, including
discussing the differences between how religious arbitration and ordinary arbitration are
practiced. It also considers the historical background of how religious arbitration has evolved in
the context of a certain set of specific religions. The underlying question behind this discussion is
a contemplation of the rationale that lies beneath the use of this certain type of arbitration.
3.1.1

Historical background of religious arbitration
It is very important to mention the history of arbitration with regard to three of the

world’s largest and most populous religious groups: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Each
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religion has its own way of dealing with issues. What follows is a brief historical background of
Islamic Arbitration and the Arbitration in Western societies.
3.1.1.1 The History of Islamic Arbitration
It has long been agreed upon by Muslim scholars that non-Muslims have the right to
consult with and adhere to their own religious principles and values when they seek to resolve
conflicts. In reality, however, this right was not exercised during the Prophet Muhammad’s
lifetime, because conflicts between non-Muslims and Muslims did not arise; the Islamic state
was small at that time, and there were so few non-Muslims in this Muslim society that their
numbers were insignificant. However, it was clearly explained in the Qur’an and the Sunnah that
the “people of book” or Dhimmahs497 (in other words, Jews and Christians) have the right to
adhere to their own religion and resolve their conflicts according to its precepts.
The general duty of the Dhimmahs is to follow the rule of Islam without compromising
their own beliefs and religious freedom, even when they live in Islamic territories and have the
citizenship of that country. Dhimmahs have the right to choose between their own religious laws
or the laws of the Shari’a to resolve conflicts. The Islamic concept, supported by a verse from
the Holy Qur’an, is that all non-Muslim have the right to choose between going to a Muslim
judge for resolution of an issue or to their own religious leaders for arbitration. 498 Issues that
Jews and Christians may decide according to the requirements of their own religious codes
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include marriage and inheritance; in other words, such social and/or personal matters that are
different from crimes that transgress state laws. 499
Muslim scholars have agreed that conditions apply in the case of non-Muslims being
permitted to resolve their matters according to their own faiths. 500 First, the conflict must be
strictly between Christians and Christians (or between Jews and Jews) within their communities,
and the subject matter of the conflict must be a matter that has to do purely with a religious issue
(whether Christian or Jewish). Second, as noted above, the dispute must be a matter that would
be considered civil or family related, rather than something that has to do with the security and
protection of the country.
It appears that during the Ottoman Empire, the Islamic state, for the first time, systemized
the right of the Islamic state to arbitrate among Muslim communities while allowing non-Muslim
communities to adjudicate among themselves according to the precepts of their own religions. 501
This kind of legal pluralism in the Ottoman Empire became known as the Millet system, 502 and
under this system, different faith groups were permitted to adjudicate their own domestic (family
law) issues according to the laws of their respective beliefs. 503 Also, different religious
communities were recognized as having their own autonomous and self-governed courts. 504 In
accordance with the particular religious doctrines of each community, these courts functioned
499
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separately from the structures of the Empire’s civil court and they also ruled on civil law
issues.505 The Millet system is based on the Dhimmah principle that regulates the lives of people
of the book who live in Islamic territories where Shari’a law is applied.506
3.1.1.2 History of religious arbitration in western societies
Historically, the Church—in countries like North America, France, and England—was
the law of the land and demanded compulsory jurisdiction over all disputes. 507 However, in the
early part of the nineteenth century, North America saw secular courts become the main method
to arbitrate a dispute.508 Religious arbitration had lost its appeal, considering its main mode of
sanctions was excommunication.
England and France saw a similar departure from religious arbitration, though it
happened gradually. The Church was an early precursor of religious arbitration. However, in
both England and France, while religious courts held compulsory jurisdiction, they still
competed with civil courts.509 In the thirteenth century, the Church in France shared its
jurisdiction between royal, seigniorial, ecclesiastical, municipal courts, yet it still claimed wide
jurisdiction over issues of faith, family law, marriage, and even contracts. 510 By the fourteenth
century, church courts in England began hearing appeals from secular courts, though this was not
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looked favorably upon by the King who passed statutes to prevent it. 511 It wasn’t until after the
English Revolution, in 1857, that the Church extended control over all issues to the secular
courts.512
Today, arbitration successfully balances the jurisdiction of civil and church courts and
provides a speedy, informal, and inexpensive alternative to litigation.
3.1.2

Definition of Religious Arbitration
Religious arbitration is considered a common form of private arbitration; some scholars

call it faith-based513 arbitration, while others refer to it as religious arbitration. The religious
communities that offer self-dispute resolution are also well-known and common religions:
Judaism, Christianity and Islam.514
Religious arbitration could be defined as a voluntary approach to solving religious and
secular disputes using religious principles and norms. 515 At the outset, religious arbitration
parties (frequently members of the same religion) must agree to resolve disputes before a
religious tribunal according to religious values, rather than to adjudicate them in a secular court
via ordinary arbitration.516 Another important feature is that the parties will choose a religious
arbitrator such as a Rabbi or Imam to preside over the dispute proceedings, or they will choose
the leadership of a religious institution such as a church or a mosque to resolve their dispute.
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In addition, the Religious Arbitration Agreement requires that members of the
community act as arbitrators and resolve disputes. For example, in the Ismaili community in
England, members sign a clause that states, in addition to holding high office within the
community, arbitrators must be “respected members of the Ismaili community.” 517 However,
when Sir Anthony Coleman’s appointment as arbitrator was deemed unacceptable, 518 in the case
Jivraj vs. Hashwan, the Court of Appeals voided the arbitration clause itself because the Ismaili
community determined employment of an arbitrator on purely religious grounds. 519 As a result,
arbitration clauses cannot restrict appointment of an arbitrator based on religion, race, disability,
belief, or sexual orientation else they risk being decreed void. However, the Supreme Court by
the majority found that the arbitration clause would not have been void because the arbitrator
was an employee and not hired biased on the religious restriction.520
The right to religious arbitration comes from the principle that religious entities have the
right to a certain level of autonomy (also known as the church autonomy doctrine); this doctrine
prevents state (secular) courts from adjudicating “religious questions” and radically limits the
ability of secular courts to review the awards made by religious tribunals. 521
3.2 Difference between religious arbitration and ordinary arbitration
Religious arbitration often functions in a manner that is very similar to secular arbitration
panels522 in resolving disputes related to businesses, breaches of contract, family issues, personal
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injury, employment and real estate.523 However, there is one feature of religious courts that is
different from the secular courts, which is that the substantive and procedural rights of parties
stem originally from religious principles. 524
The clear distinction between secular arbitration and religious tribunals is that arbitration
before a religious tribunal is instilled with a particularly religious and moral content. 525 The
litigants are members of religious entities that have decided to resolve their disputes based on
religious values, before a religious tribunal or court that consists of arbitrators who are members
of their religious entities and who have religious experiences and credentials. 526
There are some characteristics of the religious arbitration method that demonstrates the
differences between secular and religious courts very clearly. First, religious arbitration
agreements usually take place in religious spaces (like churches or temples), and they have their
own religious language to clarify the terms of the arbitration procedures. 527 Second, the
governing law of the religious tribunal is religious law that serves as a replacement for the
substantive secular law of the country, or at least is recognized as existing in parallel with it. 528
Additionally, religious arbitration is sometimes conducted according to certain specific religious
procedures themselves. Finally, the arbitration awards and/or remedies prescribed by the
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religious courts are typically religious in nature, and the matters being considered are issues that
secular courts likely would not consider hearing at all. 529
The Beth Din rules are perhaps the main example of the codes that govern Jewish religious
arbitration. According to the official Beth Din website, these rules are intended to “encourage
[disputing] parties to resolve disputes according to the compromise or settlement related to
Jewish law principles (p’shara krova l’din).” 530 The Christian faith also has a code that informs
and shapes religious arbitration. The Institute for Christian reconciliation has established a
protocol for Christian religious arbitration that clearly states that the ultimate authority in a
dispute between Christians shall be the (Christian) Bible: “arbitrators shall take into
consideration any state, federal, or local laws that the parties bring to their attention, but the
Bible shall be the supreme authority governing every aspect of the conciliation process.” 531
3.2.3

The reasons behind the rise of religious arbitration
One of the many reasons for disputing parties to utilize arbitration in general is that

arbitration is often cheaper and faster than going through the regular court system. 532 An added
benefit is that an arbitrator can be chosen from among the general public, and may include
almost any person who has expertise in the matter of the conflict. Because arbitration is generally
conducted in private, and the transcripts and records of proceedings are kept confidential, and the
awards are enforced by means of a simple court order, many people prefer to settle commercial
and personal conflicts in an arbitral tribunal, rather than in open (public) court. 533
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Religious arbitration offers other advantages. Resolving a dispute based on one’s
religious beliefs is, in many ways, an expression of faith and an homage to the importance and
primacy of one’s religion. It is also an active exercise of the precept of freedom of expression
and religion. Disputants may manage conflict in a way that aligns with their personal beliefs and
according to ideals and a moral framework that is familiar to them. 534 This pertains not only to
Jews and Christians, but also to Muslims. For example, we read that: “In Shari’a councils in
England, Muslims believe that the framework of dispute resolution is “culture- and religionfriendly,” while on other hand, the secular court, when compared with religious arbitration,
appears unfriendly and incapable of considering cultural and religious factors.” 535
Religious arbitration may contribute to the construction of “religious legal communities,”
whose members recognize the standards of their community as the supreme legal standards. 536
Comprehending and adhering to these standards becomes an essential part of a community
member’s religious duties, since the standards upon which the community agrees become not
just religious obligations, but also legal obligations. 537 Further, and as noted above, submitting
ones disputes to religious arbitration may be considered a form of practicing ones religion. For
example, the Qur’an states that Muslims cannot call themselves Muslims unless they abide by
the "guidelines, counsel, and principles related to them through the Qur’an and the Prophet
Muhammad.”538 Likewise, many Christian communities believe they are following St. Paul’s
order to resolve conflict between Christians when they take their problems to a Christian
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court.539 Similarly, the Beth Din of America requires parties to sign binding contracts that
include the arbitration clause known as sh’tar birurim, according to New York law CPLR §75.540
An additional benefit of religious arbitration is the role it plays in unifying and building
communities.541 Religious groups need safe and accessible spaces in which to worship. Such
spaces are also necessary for people who belong to a group that adheres to a particular (in this
case, religious and/or cultural) belief system to discuss and sort out conflicts. Religious
arbitration tribunals may be seen to support the cohesion of the members of the religious group
in question.542
Occasionally, people of religious groups fear the secular courts, because they fear that
secular laws will not align with their religious principles, or they fear being discriminated against
because of their religion.543 Some scholars and studies have suggested that the process of
religious arbitration can be more conciliatory than ordinary arbitration. Some people may believe
that religious arbitrators would adjudicate their conflicts based more on ethics and morals than
on the secular laws of the state.544
Additionally, some people feel more comfortable arguing their case in front of a religious
arbitrator who has the same beliefs and lives according to the same norms as they do. 545 For
instance, in Muslim communities, many people prefer to debate family law matters such as
divorce and khul’ before an Imam, because Imams are understood to have specific religious

539

Walter, supra note 444, at 512.
Reiss, supra note 445.
541
Choksi, supra note 437.
542
Id.
543
Fried, supra note 448, at 633-39 (2004).
544
Wolfe, supra note 449. See also Kozlowski v. Seville Syndicate, Inc., 314 N.Y.S. 2d. 439, 445 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
545
Sturman, supra note 422, at 417-18.
540

138

The Extent and Limits of the Right to Arbitrate Among Religious
and Cultural Communities (Sulha as a case study)
knowledge in such matters. Using religious arbitration provides a “sense of togetherness and
unity in the community.”546
Members of certain religious societies are at times obligated to use religious arbitration;
otherwise, they would be subject to religious and cultural penalties. 547 For example, in the Jewish
faith, if an individual chooses to resort to a secular court to resolve a problem, a Beth Din may
issue a seruv, which is a manuscript stating that the individual mentioned must be shunned for
choosing to present his or her issue to a secular court. 548 Furthermore, members may be forced
into arbitration through a variety of communal or other events, such as the possibility of
disownment or being excommunicated.549
Members of religious communities that are minorities in their respective geographic
locations, especially in the United States, have encountered the negative aspects of “judicial
refusal” when involved in deciding disputes associated with religious issues. Therefore, these
religious communities have begun to develop special entities that may review and resolve such
cases.550 A typical example of judicial refusal would be a secular court refusing to enforce an
Islamic marriage contract, or the so-called Mahr agreement between a Muslim couples (a Mahr
contract stipulates an amount of property that is promised by the husband to the bride as a
dowry).551
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The Supreme Court has not ruled on the justification for the refusal of a secular court to
adjudicate religious claims.552 Rather, it has come to be seen as a given that secular courts cannot
“litigate religion” because of the “church autonomy doctrine.” 553 The “church autonomy
doctrine” provides for deference to faith-based societies in any situation in which “the questions
of discipline or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by church
judicatories.”554 Helfand questions the wisdom behind a doctrine that prevents judicial action on
any and all religious claims or issues and automatically defers them to the authority of religious
institutions; Helfand’s objections rest in the concern that there may be occasions in which no
religious institution exists to handle the case. 555
As noted above, confidentiality is one of the benefits of arbitration, and this is
particularly true of religious arbitration. Civil courts are public courts and their proceedings are
almost always discoverable as public record. Many religious groups, such as the Mormons, do
not wish the general public to know (or to read potentially embarrassing details) about conflicts
among fellow Mormons. The easy accessibility of the proceedings of civil courts might harm the
“appearance and reality of Mormon solidarity” should certain cases be publicized. 556
Perhaps the most often discussed advantage of religious arbitration is that it supports
autonomy.557 “Personal autonomy” is the ability of an individual to make his or her own
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decisions and to be a “part-author of [his/her] own life.” 558 The ability to choose among
numerous methods for resolving a dispute gives a person the ability to choose the one most
favorable to his or her needs.559
When secular courts preside over religious issues, they may change the tenor of the
judgment, and even inhibit the safeguarding of religious groups and their cultures. 560 Religious
arbitration thus has particular significance and value in a multicultural society that strives for
religious tolerance and legal and cultural pluralism.561 The main goal of both legal and cultural
pluralism is to create an overall legal system that allows people to express, and to according to,
their religious beliefs.562
3.3 Types of Religious Arbitration
The following section of this Chapter discusses the role played by religious arbitration in
certain major religions. It explores how Jewish, Christian and Muslim communities use
arbitration to secure a court’s enforcement of the awards handed down by religious tribunals.
The Jewish arbitration is the most developed form of religious arbitration is the United States
and England. Next comes Christian arbitration in the U.S, which is less developed but practice is
more widespread via the Peacemaker Ministries. While Islamic arbitration’s practice and
development differs depending on the country, being the most developed in England, and
somewhat developed in Ontario, Canada, however, in Ontario, there are certain restrictions in
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regards to family law. In the United States, it is very under-developed, especially when
comparing it to the arbitration of the other religions.
3.2.1

Orthodox Jewish law in the United States
Arbitration among Jewish communities is often considered by scholars to be one of the

most organized types of practical religious arbitration, especially as it is conducted in England
and the United States. Jewish communities have established their own dispute resolution
procedures on religious grounds. Across the world, Judaic communities for many years have
applied Jewish methods of autonomy and adjudication, which are based on the Bible and the
Talmud.563 In modern times, Jewish communities have continued to conduct a form of Jewish
arbitration, which takes place in the Beth Din (House of Judgment). 564 Therefore, we may look to
precedents set by Jewish arbitration for identifiable characteristics that show how Jewish
arbitration compares with Christian and Muslim systems of arbitration.
The current understanding of the modern context of Jewish law is that members of Jewish
communities are obligated to resolve disputes within the Jewish community before a rabbinical
court. According to the directives of the Talmud and Jewish law codes, community members are
obligated to present all disputes before a Beth Din rather than before a secular court. 565 In the
United States, the most well-known rabbinical court is the Beth Din of America (BDA), which
was established in 1960 to serve the arbitration needs of American Jewish communities. 566
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Arbitration in a Beth Din is subject to the directives of Jewish law, as well as to the
choices made by both parties regarding the legal provisions of Jewish law. 567 Shulhan Arukh –
also known as the “Jewish Law Code” -- is the highest authority recognized by Jewish legal
code.568 Permanent rabbinical arbitration courts are common in densely populated urban centers,
such as Chicago,569 New York570 and Los Angeles,571 where they serve large Jewish
communities.572
Jewish arbitration is quite comparable to ordinary arbitration in terms of how the
arbitration takes place. The arbitration before a Beth Din may occur in three ways. First, parties
may implement an agreement to arbitrate before a Beth Din after a dispute occurs. 573 Second,
parties may include an arbitration clause in a contract agreeing to arbitrate any dispute that might
arise in a Beth Din.574 Third, a Beth Din may send an invitation to arbitrate in the Beth Din on
behalf of one of the parties.575 If the party to whom the invitation is issued does not accept, the
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Beth Din may then issue a seruv, which is a document stating that the party has rejected the
invitation to participate.576
The most distinguishing feature of Jewish arbitration occurs after the parties have agreed
to arbitrate; as a first step, the supervisor of the Beth Din, who is called an Av Beth Din, appoints
neutral arbitrators to hear the dispute.577 At least one arbitrator must be a rabbi, and it is most
common that the arbitration will include a panel of three rabbis. 578 The arbitrator may be any
faithfully observant person with knowledge related to the dispute and to Jewish law. 579 Litigants
that come before a BDA are required to sign a binding arbitration contract between themselves,
according to rules and procedures that have been established by the BDA. 580 The parties progress
to the discovery phase as soon as they agree to arbitrate their dispute before the BDA. 581 The
BDA claims extensive jurisdiction over types of remedies, and it may “grant any remedy or relief
that it deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties, including,
without limitation, [the] specific performance of a contract and injunctive relief.” 582
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The award must be issued in writing in English within three months of the case being
heard; the award must have the agreement of the majority of the BDA’s panel or, if required the
parties’ agreement so stipulates, it must be unanimous. 583 The award may include “any remedy
or relief that [the BDA] deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the
parties.”584 The BDA must also initiate a process of appeal that allows for the evaluation of
awards granted; any such appeal must be made within twenty day of the award being handed
down.585
Certain awards made by the BDA have been recognized by secular courts in the United
States. For example, the state of Maryland’s Court of Special Appeals affirmed that the BDA had
the authority to review and modify its (the Maryland court’s) decision in a case called Lang v.
Levi.586 In this case, one of the parties involved in the dispute submitted a motion to the
Maryland court requesting summary judgment. The Circuit Court of Montgomery County,
Maryland, found that the parties involved had voluntarily sought and agreed to abide by a
judgment from the BDA; the Maryland court found the BDA’s judgment to be proper and the
resulting award defensible.587
3.3.2 Christian arbitration
Arbitration among Christian members of Christian communities is perhaps as widespread
(geographically) as Jewish arbitration, but Christian courts are less developed. Indeed, Christian
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arbitration has appeared in a wide variety of forms,588 and decisions handed down by Christian
courts have been treated differently over the years by civil courts. 589 A hallmark of American
religious communities is their corresponding religious educational institutions, which are rooted
in their respective faiths (Catholicism, Lutheranism, Mormonism, etc.). These institutions often
become involved in legal controversies and their opinions must be considered, conciliated,
mediated, arbitrated or adjudicated. 590
There are different forms of Christian arbitration in the United States, the first of which
came about in circumstances in which the religion evolved with its own religious court that was
separate from secular and civil court systems; examples include religious courts affiliated with
specific kinds of Christianity, such as the Mormon faith and the Amish belief systems. Another
form that Christian arbitration has taken involves cases in which civil institutions, businesses,
schools, companies and even some religious entities include clauses in employee contracts that
state that disputes will be resolved using religious arbitration. Finally, it has happened that a
Christian entity, such as a church, provides its own religious method to resolve a dispute; in this
form, churches vary in their services. Some communities, such as the Mormons and the Quakers,
offer arbitration services;591 others, the Amish, for example, may offer mediation or negotiation
services.
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3.3.2.1 Arbitration within the Church
Mormon
There is no evidence that Mormons currently use any form of arbitration to resolve their
disputes. However, in the past, they did use a form of arbitration known as the Bishop Courts,
which were established in 1834 by Joseph Smith.592 The Bishop Courts used to resolve disputes
between Mormons, and in certain cases it would also resolve disputes involving non-Mormons
along with Mormons. 593In the Bishop Courts, the counselors would present their case and any
evidence along with it, and then advise the Bishop on his ruling. 594 The Bishop would then
present his scrutiny and express his decision, which then had to be supported by at least one
counselor.595 They maintained this form of arbitration for over 60 years; however, a 1903
magazine article stated that Mormon dispute resolution courts had ended. 596
Quakers
Starting in 1967, to avoid the secular courts system, Quakers (first called “Children of
Light” then “Friends”597) held Yearly Meetings to practice private arbitration for resolving
conflicts that rose among them.598 According to Quaker scholar Robert Barclay, they used
“gospel order”599 (a term that comes from extremely religious values in the Quaker faith) to
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influence their dispute resolutions.600 A standard method of arbitration included three steps—
“negotiate, mediate, arbitrate”—and was introduced at the London Yearly Meeting in 1782. 601
This method was used as the standard for 120 years until 1810, when at the New York Yearly
Meeting, a section was added to the Book of Discipline that outlined more formal ways to
resolve issues that arose among members of a Quaker societies. 602
Another 100 years later, according to the 1922 Philadelphia Meeting minutes, an effort
was put forth to re-organize the Book of Discipline to make it more relevant to current social
concerns.603 In addition, Quakers hoped to make the document easier to understand. 604
Subcommittees were assigned chapters of the Book of Discipline to review, and the chapter on
“Arbitration” was given to two groups: the “Testimonies and Advices” subcommittee and the
“Life and Conduct” subcommittee.605 The latter committee argued that Friends communities
should be guided by more general principles. 606 The combined efforts of these two committees
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resulted in an outline that did not address arbitration or secular conflicts among the Quakers,
except to refer to “Peace”607 and later to “Inter-national Relations” for “Peace.”608
While the 1927 edition of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting Book of Discipline included
chapters on “Religious Expression,” “Principles and Application,” and “Meetings for Business,”
it did not mention arbitration at all or refer to any general ways to resolve internal conflicts. 609
However, the New York Yearly Meeting’s Book of Discipline still included arbitration, and it
called for the use of gospel order as a form of conflict resolution among Quakers. 610
Almost 30 years after that, due to the rising cost of printing documents, the New York
Yearly Meeting found that it could not afford to continue printing its Book of Discipline; New
York Quakers agreed to adopt the Book of Discipline that was being used by the General
Conference.611 Consequently, they would no longer review or advise people (Quakers or nonQuakers) about acceptable Quaker methods for resolving conflicts.
Old Amish Dispute Resolution
The Old Amish Order, which comprises followers of the Mennonite faith, is governed by
principles of submission, forgiveness, humility and brotherly love. 612 The Amish are guided by a
central set of informal rules called the Ordnung, which dictates how they are to act toward each
other and the rest of the world.613 They typically isolate themselves from the rest of the world so
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that they may live according to a literal reading of the Bible. 614 However, they are not totally
separated from society; while they cannot own conventional things, like cars or phones, they can
use them when necessary.615 Regarding dispute resolution between an Amish person and a nonAmish person, the Amish view the secular judicial system as sinful, 616 and therefore, they
typically do not to initiate lawsuits nor are they permitted to defend themselves in secular court.
Their source of law is the Bible.617
The Amish sort disputes into two types: disputes involving non-Amish people and
disputes among members of their community. 618 Disputes involving non-Amish people usually
result in the Amish changing their ways to comply with secular conditions, although it has
become more common lately for Amish people to use non-confrontational strategies with nonAmish people, such as negotiation and bargaining, to settle disputes in ways that protect their
interests.619 However, within the Amish community, the Amish are expected to first try to solve
any disputes themselves. If this proves unsuccessful, an elder is consulted. If the disputant does
not accept the ruling of the elder, he or she may be shunned or excommunicated. The Amish
system adheres strongly to devotion to religious beliefs and community values and does not rely
on any particular institutions or systems of justice. Today’s secular society lacks the type of
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uniform devotion to a code or to a set of community elders that has made the Amish system of
dispute resolution successful.620
Disputes within the Amish community more often involve about personal matters
between family and neighbors.621 The Amish use avoidance and silence622 to resolve their issues,
and such tactics usually cause the matter to be fixed or dropped. 623 However, when they cannot
resolve issues between themselves, they may appeal to their church leaders, and this involves
agreeing to a form of resolution that includes elements of binding arbitration and mediation. 624
During such an arbitration, all sides of the issue are heard privately by mediators, after
which the disputants are brought together and testimony is taken by someone involved with the
dispute. The committee in charge of mediating comes to a judgment and both sides take this
judgment to be the final word. Ultimately, the decision is enforced by the parties’ general
acceptance of the moral authority of the church elders and mediators. 625
However, a famous case in which this type of dispute resolution was ignored and a case
involving Amish people was taken to an outside court was Yoder v. Helmuth,626 tried in Wooster,
Ohio in 1947. In this case, Yoder, a former Amish man, had been shunned by the congregation.
He claimed that his shunning was meant to force him to bend to the will of church officials
regarding how he managed his trade and business affairs, and that their ruling had prevented him
from forming business or social relations with other members of the church. 627 The Amish
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people brought to court as part of this case chose not to defend themselves or to be represented
by counsel, and Yoder was awarded $5,000. 628
Scientologists
Scientology,629 created by American author L. Ron Hubbard in 1954, is a religious
system that pushes universal freedom and religious enlightenment. 630 Scientologists believe
members can reach enlightenment and freedom through the study of Hubbard’s books. 631 It is
based very much on the individual, making it more personal in context. 632 Most significant about
Scientology is that it does not prevent members from affiliating with other churches while
continuing to be members of Scientology. 633
Because Scientologists see the conventional court system as unfair and distrustful, they
use their own system for solving disputes. Their system does not allow members to associate
with non-members and in the 60 years since its founding, there has not been actual arbitration.
The only exception occurred in 2015 in the case Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org.
The case was brought against the Church of Scientology by Garcia and his wife, former
Scientologists.634 However, Garcia was made to sign a document that indicated he must submit
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his dispute to the justice procedures outlined by Scientology. 635 Garcia claimed he and his wife
were deceived into giving large sums of money to the Church. 636 The claim was made in front of
a panel of scientologists instead of a court and may have been the Church’s first case of religious
arbitration.637
3.3.2.1.1. Peacemaker Ministries Approach
Formed in 1982, Peacemaker Ministries is a faith-based organization that requires people
to use the Bible as the supreme authority in mediation or arbitration cases. 638 It is used primarily
by schools, private companies, and Christian lawyers. The Institute for Christian Conciliation
(ICC), a division of Peacemaker Ministries, uses mediation and arbitration as the sole method of
administering cases.639 By definition, Christian conciliation uses the bible as its basis to resolve
conflicts through mediation, arbitration, counseling, and coaching. 640 Not only do many
conciliations occur through Peacemaker Ministries, but a fair number of U.S. based conciliators
are also certified through them.641
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Disputes involve religious issues, including doctrinal schism, and secular issues, like
patent infringement while arbitration may resolve a wide array of cases; 642 it is not used in cases
where civil courts refuse to give up jurisdiction. 643 Child support, custody, and visitation cases or
cases that deal with family issues or issues with the church are all examples of jurisdictions over
which the civil courts will not relinquish. 644 The different providers of Christian conciliation
include professional mediators, volunteers, certified conciliators, or formally established
conciliation ministries (such as the ICC). 645
Christian conciliators are treated by courts under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) or
the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA). Ministries like the ICC market their openness to being
enforced by these Acts. Take the case Prescott v. Northlake Christian Sch. The original conflict,
having failed mediation, went to arbitration designed by the ICC, which was conducted
according to the Montana Uniform Arbitration Act. 646 Another example can be seen in the case
Encore Productions, Inc. v. Promise Keepers.647 Courts found that the arbitration clause in the
contract meant secular contract rights could be enforced regardless of the religious affiliations
claimed by one of the parties. The court ultimately dismissed the action against both corporate
and individual defendants.648
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3.3.2

Islamic Arbitration
The right of Islamic communities to adjudicate religious matters in Islamic courts is well

developed in England and Canada; however, it is not well developed in the United States. 649
Therefore, since the development of Islamic arbitration in the United States is still in its early
stages, the information provided in the following section may assist Muslims in the US develop
their practice of religious arbitration while avoiding some of the mistakes encountered by
Muslims in England and Canada.
3.3.2.1 Islamic Arbitration in Canada
The Muslim community in Canada is well-organized and well-established, especially as
compared to Islamic societies in the United States. 650 The Canadian Society of Muslims, led by
Syed Mumtaz Ali, proposed the founding of the Darul Qada; this suggestion led to arguments
within the community over using religious law to resolve family law issues in Ontario. 651 Islamic
arbitration was established on October, 21, 2003, 652 with an arbitration board now identified as
the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice (IICJ) and the Muslim Court of Arbitration (MCA). 653 The
intention of the IICJ and the MCA is to provide mediation and arbitration services for a variety
of matters among Muslims, including family law issues. 654 Through the IICJ, the Muslims of
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Canada have a chance to resolve their personal disputes according to Islamic principles but also
within the context of Canadian laws and certain shared beliefs. 655
The goal of IICJ is to give the Muslims of Ontario an alternative religious method of
resolving legal issues according to Shari’a law within the structure of the Ontario legal system
and under the umbrella of Canadian society. 656 This has the benefit for Muslims of giving the
arbitrating parties "peace of mind and satisfaction that the Shari’a law is obeyed and that the
Ontario law is not flouted."657 Parties have the opportunity to arbitrate disputes such as
inheritance via the IICJ, but they may not arbitrate matters that touch on federal jurisdiction over
criminal fault or family law issues. 658
The idea of practicing Shari’a law within the Ontario legal system aroused tough
opposition, because of concerns over social integration, public policy and legal validity. 659 For
example, the representatives of the Muslim Canadian Congress referred to the proposed family
law tribunals as “flea-market justice.” 660 Others described the proposed Shari’a courts as the
“dark side of multiculturalism.”661 Still other opponents expressed alarm that the application of
family Shari’a law to settle disputes between Canadian Muslims would be “inherently
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discriminatory and divisive,”662 particularly in cases of recent female immigrants who may
become involved in such a tribunals and (because they had only recently moved to Canada)
would not be aware of their rights under either Islamic or Canadian law. 663 The author of this
paper would argue that the main objection rose against the IICJ—concerns about the protection
of human rights under Shari’a—has been fueled by a misconception about Shari’a law expressed
by a number of women’s rights organizations. 664
The focus of many of the arguments for and against religious arbitration of family issues
by the IICJ has been the wisdom (or lack thereof) of using arbitration in family law disputes. 665
Because of the strong resistance in Ontario to the IICJ, Marion Boyd, a person who formerly
served as both Attorney General and Women’s Issues Minister of Ontario, was selected by the
Ontario provincial government to examine the concerns. In December 2004, she prepared a
report for the Ontario government about whether Ontario should allow Islamic arbitration
tribunals to preside over matters of family law. 666 Boyd recommended the establishment of the
IICJ tribunals.667 She advised Canadians to continue to resolve family law disputes using
religious law in alignment with the limitations of the Arbitration Act. Hence, in 2004, arbitration
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was upheld as an alternative avenue for dispute resolution among Muslims in cases involving
family and inheritance matters.668
As a general principle, Ontario’s Arbitration Act at that time allowed parties some
flexibility to decide upon the set of legal values that they wished to use to govern their
disputes.669 However, there was then a statute amendment in 2006, promulgated due to the AntiShari’a movements. Therefore, since 2006, religious law in the context of family law matters is
no longer offered as a choice as a legal provision for family law-related arbitrations in Ontario. 670
The procedure of the IICJ for other matters (i.e., non-family law-related matters) requires
parties to sign an agreement that establishes the time frame for the arbitration and the scope of
the matters to be adjudicated.671 Neither party may reject or avoid the arbitration once the
framework has been created, because the arbitration agreement is a binding contract that can
be enforced by the secular courts.672 Just as with any other type of arbitration, the parties have
the right to make an arbitration contract according to the Arbitration Act, but they are not
allowed to waive the secular court’s authority to enforce the arbitration agreement. 673 Also, the
parties may challenge the arbitration agreement, and the secular court may override it according
to general principles of contract law,674 such as the legal incapacity of one of the parties, undue
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influence,675 duress, coercion, unconscionability or fraudulent conduct on the part of the
arbitrator.676
According to the IICJ’s website, the parties may present their issues to the jurisdiction of
Islamic arbitration tribunals one of two ways. 677 First, parties may go directly to arbitration and
avoid having their case heard in the Canadian court. 678 A second method is for the Canadian
court to recommend to the parties that they resolve their disputation by religious arbitration. 679
Notably, in either scenario, the parties have the right to choose the law that they want to
apply to resolve their conflict; in other words, they may choose whether the arbitrator shall apply
Canadian law or Shari’a law.680
When it comes to appointing the arbitrator, at least one must be a Muslim arbitrator, and
the arbitration panel may include non-Muslim associate arbitrators who act as “private judges”
applying Islamic law in matters such as division of property, wills and inheritance, gifts and
waqf. The consent of parties to abide by the laws (fiqh) of a particular Islamic school is required:
schools from both the Shia’a and Sunni Islamic sects (i.e., the Hanafi, Shafi’i, Hambali or Maliki
schools) are acceptable.681 The arbitration awards in most cases are final, and they must be
rendered in writing (in English) and contain the rationale for the judgment. 682 Finally, the
arbitration awards are enforceable with the help of the Canadian judicial system. 683
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3.3.2.2 Arbitration (Shari’a courts) in England
Arbitration practiced by Shari’a courts in England represents some of the most organized
and well-established religious arbitration based on Shari’a law in the western world. In fact,
informal Shari’a tribunals have been present in England for more than thirty years. These
Councils initially functioned out of mosques, and their decisions were not legally binding. 684
Such non-binding resolutions were simply accepted if the parties agreed and were intended as a
friendly technique for parties to resolve disputes on religious grounds without incurring a legal
remedy.685 Eventually, many Muslims in England sensed the need for a more official approach to
solving disputes according to Shari’a within the framework of the British legal system. 686
The Muslims of England faced problems with their informal Councils, including
unreliable procedures, arbitrators who were not versed in both Shari’a law and British law, and
the fact that awards made by these councils were non-binding. The results of Islamic councils
were considered religious only because the councils operated outside the state structure and
could not be enforced in secular courts. 687 However, these unofficial courts generally were
enforced—by mutual agreement—because the parties chose such an outcome.
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Consequently, the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) in England and Wales was
founded in 2007688 as a model that established achievement and growth of the successful practice
of Islamic arbitration. The purpose of MAT was to offer a feasible substitute for Muslim
community members who sought to resolve disputes in accordance with Islamic Law. MAT
dispute-resolution councils were established in seven places in the UK: London, Bradford,
Manchester, Birmingham, Nuneaton, Glasgow and Edinburgh. 689 The MATs have been
supported by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams, and by Lord Phillips, the Lord
Chief Justice, who agreed with both the legal weight of the Shari’a courts and also the
integrative role they could play within the legal system of the UK. 690
More importantly, the Archbishop and Lord Phillips have noted the increasing need for
the services of the MAT, and noted how the MAT could institute a symbiotic affiliation with the
UK’s secular courts in regulating fairness and justice through the judicial system, promote
acceptance of society’s general morals and ideology, and allow Muslims to find grassroots
resolutions to community problems via alternative dispute resolution. 691
However, many have criticized the Archbishop for recommending a separate legal system
that applies Shari’a law in the UK.692 His observations about the role the MAT councils could
play in public integration and peaceful dispute resolution through "transformative
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accommodation" have been seen by some as signifying support for separate legal systems and
opposing the rule of British law in the UK. 693 According to Shaykh Siddiqi opined that the
rationale behind Shari’a arbitration is to “give people choices,” and he insists the goal is not to
create a parallel legal system for Muslims or other religious communities. 694
Under the Arbitration Act 1996695, the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) shall act as
an exceptional Alternate Dispute Resolution institute that is in agreement with Islamic Law and
resides within the structure of the UK’s legal system. 696 The only areas of law that MAT does not
have jurisdiction over are child custody, non-religious divorce proceedings and criminal
subjects.697 In such cases, the applicants are sent to the secular civil courts. 698 The majority of the
matters that are submitted to the MAT can be classified as cases of domestic violence; obligatory
marriage; commercial, family, inheritance and debt disputes; and minor community nuisances. 699
As the MAT explains on its website, it “will operate within the legal framework of
England and Wales thereby ensuring that any determination reached by MAT can be enforced
through existing means of enforcement open to normal litigants.” 700 The arbitration awards are
enforceable under British law and subject to judicial review. 701 The England and Wales Court of
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Appeals clarified in Halpern v. Halpern that "arbitral tribunals can and indeed should decide
disputes in accordance with the law chosen by the parties" under the Arbitration Act of 1996. 702
Arbitration procedures are often “friendlier” than the trial procedures, reducing the
adversarial nature of trial and thus helping to protect personal relationships between the
parties.703 Clause 23 of Islamic Procedural Rules deals with appeals. It states that “No appeal
shall be made against any decisions of the Tribunal. This rule shall not prevent any party
applying for Judicial Review with permission of the High Court.” 704
The procedural rules that regulate and govern the MAT tribunals require that it must
consist of at least two members, one who must be a scholar of Islamic Sacred Law and the other
may be a solicitor or barrister registered to practice in England or Wales. 705 Parties may appoint
representatives, and submit detailed oral, written, or any other form of evidence relevant to their
case.706 Parties are entitled to detailed notice of hearings, and the hearings are held in private
unless both parties wish for a public hearing, subject to the Tribunal’s discretion to limit public
attendance for the betterment or protection of the parties involved. 707 The Procedural Rules of
the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal outlines all of the procedural guidelines. 708
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3.3.2.3 Islamic Arbitration in the United States
Islamic dispute resolution services do exist in the United States, usually in the form of
mediation, but sometimes employing arbitration as well. 709 Even though mediation is more
informal than arbitration, courts may be more likely to enforce an agreement reached via
mediation, since arbitrated agreements are sometimes seen as incompatible with local US laws
and society. However, it has been reported that mediated awards are frequently not enforced. 710
Accordingly, Islamic arbitration in the United States is still in what may be considered a
beginning stage. Islamic arbitration in the US currently lacks consistent rules and procedures,
and its proceedings have been described as merely “informal arbitration.” 711 Muslim
communities have in recent times begun to pursue plans to institute a system of Islamic
arbitration courts around the United States.712 For example, Islamic arbitration is being practiced
by a tribunal in Texas that operates under Shari’a law and issues a form of “non-binding dispute
resolution.713 Other organizations exist as well, such as the “Texas Islamic Court” 714 and the
Islamic Tribunal (IT).715 The cases handled by the IT (according to its website) include divorce,
Khul’, community problems, family problems and business disputes. 716 Nevertheless, most
Islamic dispute resolution forums in the US remain localized. Some mosques, such as the Masjid
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Al-Huda Islamic Center in Minneapolis, present “court-like” “arbitration services.” 717 However,
it remains difficult to determine exactly how many mosques and Islamic centers offer such
services.718
In Islamic arbitration in the US, the disputing parties choose someone, such as an Imam
or Islamic scholar, with whom both parties are comfortable to serve as the sole mediator or
arbitrator. Mediation or arbitration is most common for issues involving marital disputes. 719
Muslims usually choose mediation to resolve family disputes such as religious divorce, 720
business conflict, and child custody in the event of divorce and property division. 721
Currently there are only a few American cases that have gone to arbitration before an
Islamic tribunal.722 For example, in Jabri v. Qaddura, the parties chose to arbitrate their issues
after the case was filed; the issues involved included divorce and child custody. 723 The goal was
for the Texas Islamic Court to determine the responsibility and duties of each party according to
Shari’a law.724 The court held that the arbitration agreement was “valid and enforceable and
covers all disputes between the parties that arose prior to the date the parties signed the
Arbitration Agreement.”725 Another example is Abd Alla v. Mourssi, a case in which the two
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parties agreed to submit their dispute to an arbitration committee and to view the committee’s
award as being binding on all parties. Further, the parties agreed that, in accordance with a
condition of the sale contract that was at issue in the case, all disputes regarding a restaurant (the
Al–Bustan Restaurant) were to be resolved according to Islamic Jurisprudence; the district court
confirmed the arbitration award.726 In El-Farra v. Sayyed, an in-house arbitration was conducted
between the ICLR executive committee and the Imam of ICLR because of his “confrontational,
controversial, and offensive behavior in his khutbahs (sermons) and his interference in the ICLR
administration.”727 In this case, the secular court declined to enforce an employment agreement
governed by Islamic law because the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to review
it.728
Despite the occurrence of examples such as those just described, in general, Islamic Law
does not seem widely practiced or accepted by American courts. The city of Irving, Texas issued
a bill for banning foreign laws from being used in the state of Texas; this was considered a very
significant blow against the existence of Shari’a tribunals in Texas.729 The mayor of Irving,
Texas, Beth Van Duyne was one of the most ardent supporters of this ban, stating publicly that
“the American Constitution and our guaranteed rights reign supreme in our nation.” 730
In 2010, Oklahoma voters sought to amend their state constitution, and they adopted a
State Question known as the "Save Our State Amendment." This measure stipulates that the
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courts shall not take into consideration the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. 731
Specifically, the courts shall not consider or implement international law or Shari’a Law.”732 The
Oklahoma District Court in a case known as Awad v. Ziriax invalidated a ban on Shari’a law;
this ruling relied on constitutional issues and does not necessarily indicate a favorable view of
Islamic law as a choice that may be used in the United States. 733
However, Islamic law is currently one of the three most prevalent legal systems in the
world.734 Court application of Shari’a law in the US has occurred slowly due to constitutional
issues, social rejection and an entrenched institutional establishment. 735 Nonetheless, there are
still some people in the United States, as well as internationally, that seek to have their disputes
adjudicated in the US under Shari’a law.736
For American Muslims to successfully support the use of Islamic law in the United
States, Islamic arbitration must become more professional and organized, and it must be
demonstrated that it can be exercised in alignment with the US legal system. American Muslim
scholars could support this development by establishing a code of laws and procedures for
Islamic arbitration in the US; currently, no such code exists. Any such rules and procedures must
exist within the context of US law and public policy. Muslim scholars cannot change the Qur’an
and Sunnah; however, there are many areas in Islamic law, such as family law, in which many
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published and vetted scholarly opinions and principles of jurisprudence could be used to make
sure Islamic arbitration is practiced within the context of the secular courts. American Muslims
may benefit from the studying how the Beth Din operates, in terms of its having a set of rules
that make it easier for parties and arbitrators to use Islamic Arbitration.
However, simply having rules and procedures in place likely will not suffice to establish
Islamic arbitration in the US. American Muslims may benefit from the precedents set by the IICJ
in Canada and the MAT in England; they might consider establishing a professional organization
that would work solely on Islamic arbitration, supported by the work of scholars with strong
academic reputations and a track record of interacting with their communities.
In addition, such scholars must have strong knowledge of Islamic laws and, in particular,
of the four Islamic jurisprudence schools (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafie and Hanbali schools), as well as
of the Shi’a school. It may be difficult, perhaps even impossible, to find a scholar who has
knowledge of both Sunni and Shi’a schools of Islamic study. Therefore, more than one scholar
and counselor should be consulted to develop rules that would be most likely to work in
American society and with the American legal system while still adhering to the fundamental
scope of Islamic principles. Potential scholarly arbitrators should have basic knowledge of the
American legal system, so that they will be able to construct valid awards that will not be easily
overlooked on grounds public policy or anti-Shari’a criticism.
Ultimately, supporters of the use of Islamic arbitration in the US may benefit from the
examples set by the IICJ and MAT by avoiding oversights that these two organizations have
made in the past. For example, both organizations had concerns regarding justice and equal
treatment of women. Establishing substantive rules of procedure that protect women’s rights may
help American Islamic tribunals avoid accusations that they do not treat women fairly. Islamic
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scholars must find a competent way to apply Shari’a law that fits with the secular values of
western society. After all, as some Islamic scholars have noted, applying some Shari’a principles
is better than applying none of them at all.
3.4

Religious Arbitration Agreements
In terms of practicing and enforcing religious arbitration awards by means the secular

courts, religious arbitration offers parties the choice of deciding which religious laws to apply to
resolve their conflicts. However, an agreement reached via religious arbitration is considered a
contract of adhesion, which can sometimes mean that the parties sign a religious arbitration
clause under religious duress. Further, some critics of the practice of religious arbitration claim
that it sometimes conflicts with standard precepts of family law, such as in Ontario, Canada, for
example. Critiques have included concerns that religious arbitration leads to unfair rulings and
procedures during the arbitration, and that using religious arbitration to decide about certain
secular matters may cause practical enforcement problems.
3.4.1

The Characteristics of Religious Arbitration Agreements
The first step toward religious arbitration is to reach a valid agreement between the

parties.737 The problem with religious arbitration is that courts might enforce religious arbitration
awards even though the agreement was reached under communal pressure; certain rules
established may be unfair and certain procedures unjust. Secular courts often have difficulty
establishing that a tribunal’s decision involved enough inequity or undue pressure on the parties
to invalidate the arbitration agreement.738
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Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). Each state also has an arbitration statute.
Helfand – Religious Arbitration, supra note 441, at 1295.
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There are two ways to perform religious arbitration. First, a written contract between the
parties may contain expressly stated terms and conditions.739 For example, arbitration clauses
are frequently used in commercial or employment contracts, as well as in prenuptial
agreements.740 Such agreements are required by both the ICC and the BDA. 741 Second, parties
may implement a written agreement, after a conflict occurs, and present it to arbitration. 742 In
other words, after the controversy arises, the case may be taken to private arbitration (religious
arbitration) to resolve the dispute according to the disputants’ beliefs and norms. Accordingly, in
the US, religious arbitration falls under the scope of the FAA (Federal Arbitration Act) and its
requirements.743
Consequently, arbitration clauses and choices of legal provisions apply in religious
arbitration agreements, and together these clauses and provisions empower members to replace
the secular judicial system with an alternative religious arbitration method. 744 Accordingly,
religious arbitration agreements have identifiable characteristics that allow the parties involved
to apply their shared faith and norms. Some religious agreements differ from most regular
agreements, because they may involve a contract of Adhesion due to Religious Duress (which is
discussed later in this Chapter).
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3.4.1.1 Application of Governing Law
Religious arbitration involves the adjudication of a dispute outside the boundaries of the
regular court system.745 However, religious arbitration agreements are governed by religious
law746 and by a choice of legal provisions. In other words, arbitration panels are required to adopt
and apply certain specific religious procedural rules and substantive laws. 747 In general, as the
US Supreme Court has made clear, “Section two of [the] FAA embodies the national policy
favoring arbitration and places arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other
contracts.”748
For example, the Beth Din organization decides issues in accordance with Jewish law,
instead of secular law, and according to pure Jewish law (din), it reaches settlements in
accordance with Jewish legal principles (p’shara krova l’din).749
In Lang v. Levi, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland rejected a motion to vacate the
award of a Beth Din on grounds that the arbitrator went beyond his authority. 750 The court held
that if an arbitrator relied on religious beliefs to make an award, the appeals court could not delve
into Jewish law to review the arbitrator’s decision. 751
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3.4.1.2 Religious Agreements are Contracts of Adhesion due to Religious Duress
In general, in cases where religious agreement is reached but coercion or duress was
involved, the secular courts will not enforce it. 752 Normally, the courts will examine the
conditions surrounding the agreement for signs of duress, 753 attempting to identify duress by
determining whether religious pressure forced the consent of one or both of the parties, leaving
the weaker party with “no reasonable alternative.” 754 This test has been misapplied in some
situations, however; cases have been cited in which secular courts mandated arbitration despite
the fact that one of the disputants only agreed to it under duress. 755 Indeed, pressure may take
various forms; forcing the party to enter the contract, or convincing the party to enter the contract
to avoid social penalties, such as exclusion/ostracism.
Coercion that has the effect of forcing the parties initially to enter the contract occurs
fairly commonly in family law, such as a case in which a woman feels a sense of responsibility
to her religious legal community and to the obligations of a secular system of governance. 756
Sometimes religious legal communities treat women unequally and allow them less power in
matters concerning family law.757 In addition, many women are financially dependent on their
religious community, which may force them to accept religious arbitration. 758
Another reason to enter into religious arbitration is to avoid certain social penalties. An
example of this may be found in some Jewish communities, in which a siruv may be issued to
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parties that do not agree to resolve issues with the Beth Din. A siruv can have a terrible influence
on the member’s family and his or her social life. 759 The issuance of a siruv indicates that a
particular member of the community is disloyal, and this disloyalty should be made known
among the community. Such a stigma may result in the loss of business for that person or in
significant financial damage.760
Indeed, in Lieberman v. Lieberman, the court defined a siruv as “a prohibitory decree that
subjects the recipient to shame, scorn, ridicule and public ostracism by other members of the
Jewish religious community.”761 However, the court did not consider it a threat or evidence of
duress significant enough to invalidate the religious agreement that had been reached. 762
The court did not recognize the religious duress in this case for several reasons. First, the
court did not identify this kind of duress as being severe enough to vacate the award of reached
via arbitration. Second, the court may have been reluctant to interfere with the workings of
religious organizations that have the right to a level of autonomy that prevents courts from
adjudicating religious questions. Third, the court may have been reluctant to interfere in religious
matters in which it lacked expertise.
3.4.2 The Religious Arbitration Critique
There have been many criticisms of religious arbitration, which this chapter attempts to
highlight, especially those practical concerns that affect the standard concept of fairness,
including the Heightened Risk of Unfairness Rule and procedural protections, the dangers of
religious arbitration in the family law context and the use of religion to sort out secular matters.
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3.4.2.1 Heightened Risk of Unfairness Rule and procedural protections
In order for a tribunal award to be enforced, it must meet procedural guidelines required
by the FAA. However, as long as the parties in the arbitration have surrendered their right to
statutory grounds of protection (FAA), some jurisdictions are bound by FAA review. 763 For
example, in the Kovacs case, the court held that parties under the FAA had the right to waive the
statutory protections provided by the FAA and submit their dispute to tribunal proceedings that
did not follow statutory requirements. 764 Secular courts generally seem to allow parties to waive
the application of state and federal laws and to voluntarily replace them with religious
substantive and procedural laws.765 This proposition may raise the issue of the Risk of
Unfairness Rule and raise questions about certain procedures of religious arbitration.
In addition to what was discussed above, it is important to note that secular courts also
have interpreted the First Amendment of the US constitution in a way that prevents them from
reviewing the decisions of the religious courts; this then also prevents them from further
reviewing ordinary requirements of fairness. 766 Therefore, religious arbitration in effect amounts
to the application of religious law and religious awards that are protected from the regular
analysis and review of secular court because of the double impact of arbitration and
constitutional doctrine.767
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The dilemma involved in enforcing a religious award is that religious arbitration
agreements involve religious tribunals determining disputes according to religious substantive
law and procedural rules; the secular courts mandate not to discriminate on grounds of freedom
of religion makes it hard for those courts to rule to vacate a religious award on procedural
grounds.768 As a result, if the arbitrating parties follow the rules of procedure that they agreed to
when beginning the arbitration, the secular court will review the case only in the scope of
applying and enforcing the religious doctrine. 769
Accordingly, secular courts face two challenges when applying religious procedural
rules. First, the court will not be able to identify or judge any potential lack of fairness due to
religious doctrine. This may discourage the courts from reviewing religious arbitration awards or
examining if they meet the expectations set by any agreement made between the parties, or from
examining the religious rules in question to guarantee the fairness of the proceedings. 770
Second, religious procedures may clash with statuary protections, public policy and the
unconscionability doctrine. A clear example of a statuary protection is Article 10 of the FAA,
which states that “the court may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any
party to the arbitration… in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy.”771 The problem that may arise here is that based on a religious reason, a religious
tribunal may refuse to hear evidence that falls within the scope of Article 10. Probably the most
interesting hypothetical example of this has to do with the testimony of women in a religious
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court. Shari’a law accepts the testimony of one man and two women, 772 while a Jewish
rabbinical court does not accept the testimony of a woman at all. 773 Defining what “pertinent and
material” evidence is a challenge; as such determination is restricted by the rules of evidence
prescribed by certain religious legal systems and procedures. 774 This challenge remains a real
issue as long as secular courts do not investigate arbitration decided under religious doctrines for
fear of invading religious freedoms.
3.4.2.2 Dangers of religious arbitration in the family law context
Religious family law in some religions, particularly in Shari’a law and Jewish law,
includes various features that may be impossible to reconcile with Western civil secular systems.
For example, according to Shari’a law, when a family member dies, a male may inherit double
the amount that a female would inherit.775 Another example is found in Jewish law, which
prescribes that women are not allowed to work as judges. Similarly, some Islamic scholars
believe women are not allowed to serve in Islamic tribunals. 776 All of these examples raise
concerns about applying religious law in a way that will not invalidate and or render
unconstitutional the results of the religious arbitration; however, because of such concerns, some
countries have shut down the use of religious arbitration in family law.
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Secular courts do recognize and enforce religious arbitration in the US, the UK, and
Canada, with limitations on family law cases. For example, the US case of Golding v. Golding 777
exemplifies the dilemma that a Jewish woman suffered when her husband declined to divorce her
(to give her a “get”). The court investigated whether there was an imbalance in bargaining power
between couples in which a wife signs a separation agreement from her husband after going to
the Beth Din, and, in exchange, her husband divorces her (gives her a get).778 The court held that
the separation agreement was invalid because of duress and coercion. 779 The husband argued that
the agreement took place according to the process of rabbinical arbitration; therefore, he denied
any coercion or duress.780 Concerns such as these will persist, whether the state court recognizes
the existence of inequality or not, because such courts may misunderstand the character of the
religious laws that were applied and the function of the religious arbitration that was used. 781
The integrity of religious arbitration in Canada has been a popular topic among legal
experts and politicians as exemplifying traditional arguments against religious arbitration
because of concerns about women’s rights.782 The question of whether religious arbitration
denies women certain basic rights has been aggressively debated in Ontario and parts of Quebec.
The banning of religious tribunals in Ontario was a result of “political pressure” that led to the
decision to not apply religious arbitration in the family law context; however, the reasoning
behind this decision remains vague. 783 International political discussion that has led in some
countries to the rejection of legal pluralism has been extensive; for example, both former French
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President Nicholas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have declared the failure of
the idea of new multiculturalism.784 In Ontario, there was overwhelming pressure from “well
organized, politically savvy women’s groups” to ban legal pluralism. 785 Many politicians were
urged to consider religious arbitration a threat to the common ground across the entire country. 786
In addition, some politicians challenged the idea of pluralism in general, and of legal pluralism 787
in particular, because they supported an ideology of legal centralism, which holds that the state
has control over lawmaking within its sovereign territory. 788
Legal concerns and arguments have focused on discrimination against woman and a
concern to maintain equality between men and women in the application of religious ideology in
cases of family law.789 The main criticism has focused on the inappropriateness of using Shari’a
law in religious arbitration in the context of family law.790 Concerns have also been raised that
some women do not voluntarily consent to resolve their issues with religious arbitration;
specifically, that they only submit to arbitration because they fear they will be subject to
domestic violence if they do not.
Remarkably, there are no examples of case law from opponents of Shari’a law that
demonstrate that comprehensive application of Shari’a will result in the unfair treatment of
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women.791Also, no particular code or body of Shari’a law has been identified as particularly
dangerous or unfair to women.792 The complexity of this debate stems from the historical
standpoint that considers that Shari’a law has developed and changed over time, that it now
incorporates different interpretations of jurisprudences, and that the current application of it in
Muslim countries varies greatly.793 It is already known among Muslims that Islamic principles
may change according to the place and the time of their interpretation and implementation, so
long as such changes do not contradict the Qur’an and Sunnah. In addition, the understanding in
Islam of the concept of these two main sources varies among Islamic scholars according to their
respective schools of thought.
The concerns about the potential vulnerability of women due to social isolation and
domestic violence are valid; however, these concerns typically are more related to the particular
society in which a woman lives, rather than to a purely religious precept. The overall position of
women in their communities is important, given that many women are recent immigrants who
may not know their rights in accordance with the laws of their adopted country. 794 In some
societies, women may be more likely to be isolated within their communities, trapped in abusive
situations, and threatened with consequences such as losing the sponsorship of their husbands. 795
Other concerns include the fear of violence that may lead women to submit to the mechanism of
religious arbitration. Most of these concerns seem to have contributed to the banning of religious
arbitration in the context of family law by Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty in September 2005.
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McGuinty proclaimed at that time that Shari’a law could not be used for religious arbitration in
Ontario.796
It has certainly long been noted that, in many cases, women are not treated equally by
most religious legal establishments.797 However, such concerns may be seen to be more related
to the social fabric of the societies in which these women live, rather than to the specific precepts
of their religion; however, this distinction is not often recognized. Also, many women may
willingly choose to use religious arbitration because of their faith. In some faiths, relinquishing
the opportunity to apply religious law is considered to be a betrayal of the religion as a whole.
3.4.2.3 The use of religion to resolve secular matters

Perhaps the most vital practical criticism of a religious arbitration clause is that it has
been used in secular matters such as for claims of financial fraud, wrongful death and
employment contracts. There are many civil organizations, businesses, schools and companies
that include a clause in their affiliated members’ handbooks that states that any disputes that
arise will be resolved using religious arbitration. In such a scenario, the civic company or civil
organization establishes the condition that any dispute shall be solved before a Christian
Arbitrator and under biblical rule.798 This gives disputing parties the right to resolve conflicts
using morals and values that they have in common (provided, of course, that both parties are
“Christian” and practice the same kind of Christianity). Therefore, religious communities and
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secular courts need to make sure that the (in this case, Christian) processes and laws that are
being implemented are fair and unbiased. 799 However, there are some concerns that the use of
religious arbitration in secular matters denies disputing parties the justice of the regular legal
system of the country.
As noted earlier in this Chapter, religious arbitration may be initiated in more than one
way. Parties may agree before a conflict occurs that they will apply religious law when faced
with a conflict. For example, in Abd Alla v. Mourssi, a partner in a restaurant business filed a
motion in a Minnesota state court to confirm an arbitration award against his partner that had
been rendered by an Islamic arbitration committee.800 He and this partner had previously agreed
that they would use Islamic arbitration in the case of any conflict. 801 Or, institutions, either civil
or religious, may require employees and affiliates to sign contracts that stipulate that secular
conflicts will be resolved before a religious tribunal. For example, the Higuera Hardwoods
Company in Washington State proclaims on its website that any customer who purchases
bamboo floors and has an issue with the quality or performance of the product must take the
conflict before a Christian arbitrator. 802 Another example is the Carolina Cabin Rentals company,
which rents out luxury vacation properties in the Blue Ridge Mountains of North Carolina; this
company informs its customers that disputes may be resolved according to biblical principles. 803
799
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Dilemmas occur in these cases when a member or a certain party feels that religious
arbitration deprives him or her from resolving secular objections according to the ordinary
judicial system of the state or country. The New York Times wrote a story in which it stated that
“Americans are being forced out of court and into arbitration.” 804 For example, in the case of
Prescott v. Northlake Christian School,805 a case that wound through religious arbitration, a
federal appeals court and state court 806 found that Northlake Christian School failed to carry its
burden of proving that the arbitration award should be vacated and thus the arbitration award was
confirmed.807 The Fifth Circuit court ruled to uphold the award, although the damages thus
awarded would not have been available to the plaintiff under any state law given the evidence
and justifications provided in the course of the arbitration. 808
In the case of the death of Nick Ellison during the Teen Challenge International USA v.
Elleson,809 religious arbitration did not fulfill Nick’s mother’s need for answers regarding her
son’s death. Religious arbitration took away the legal obligation for the Teen Challenge program
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Teen Challenge, Int’l USA v. Elleson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85006, *1, 2006 WL 3388471 (D. Haw. Nov. 21,
2006).
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to explain how and why the death happened. 810 The Teen Challenge program was not required by
law or by any court order to cooperate, because Nick had signed a waiver stating that neither he
nor his family could ever sue Teen Challenge, and that they would have to go through religious
arbitration to resolve any disputes. Nick’s mother felt that she got nothing out of the religious
arbitration except for a financial settlement after two long and heartbreaking years. 811
Another example is a case within the Church of Scientology. In his decision, Judge James
D. Whittemore of the Federal District Court in Tampa said the Garcia family was bound by the
terms of the contract they had signed with the church. While acknowledging that Mr. Garcia may
have had a “compelling” argument about the potential bias of the process, Judge Whittemore
said the First Amendment prevented him from even considering the issues. Mr. Garcia’s lawyer,
Theodore Babbitt, said the ruling might have scuttled many future lawsuits against the church.
“Arbitration,” Mr. Babbitt said, “is inoculating the Church of Scientology from liability.” 812
3.5 Enforceability of Awards of Religious Tribunals813
Religious arbitration is a method of arbitration that deals with religious matter, therefore,
United States’ courts must be more sensitive when reviewing such awards because the freedom
of religion, supported by the first amendment. However, courts may interfere in religious matter
only under neutral principle doctrine, where the courts have the ability to review a secular issue.
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Emily Moulton, Religious arbitration under spotlight, http://www.news.com.au/world/north-america/religiousarbitration-under-spotlight/news-story/2a6c8382d8b9d4f850f5d17ccfc9065b. See also Corkery & SilverGreenberg, supra note 788.
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Id.
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This chapter focuses on how United States courts enforce arbitral awards. The United States includes three major
religions that practice religious arbitration, including the Jewish Beth Din and Peacemaker Ministries, which are
highly developed in the US. Second, US courts have reviewed an abundant number of religious arbitration awards.
Third, religious arbitration often involves conflict with (or at least contemplation of) the first amendment of the US
constitution and the constitutional right to freedom of religion, which is important in issues of religious arbitration.
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3.5.1 Constitutional protections implicated under the 1st Amendment
First Amendment issues have, and likely will continue to, come up in cases in which
courts review religious awards and issue rulings that may be seen to interfere with religious
doctrines. The US constitution contains provisions called religion clauses; namely, the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.814 Also, and of course famously, the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” 815 Accordingly,
this article restricts the abilities of civil courts to review the awards of religious organizations. In
other words, the civil courts are excluded from deciding issues involving the disputes of religious
organizations “whenever such disputes affect religious doctrine or church polity or
administration.”816
In general, almost all scholars and courts have tended to agree that matters of religion
cannot be litigated in the secular courts. 817 This has continued to mean that these disputes are
settled outside of the US state and/or federal court system, and the resolutions that are reached
are considered to be of “ambiguous constitutional origin.” 818 US courts and legal scholars
continue to debate whether the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, both, or neither
provide a basis for maintaining the separation between church and state that secular courts
continue to observe.819

814

See the Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth, Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 449 (1969). See also Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah, 869 A.2d 343, 353 (D.C. 2005).
815
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
816
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
710 (1976).
817
Id.
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Helfand – Litigating Religion, supra note 455, at 506.
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For example, in the Petruska v. Gannon University,820 which was grounded in the Free
Exercise Clause, the court held that: “the First Amendment protects a church’s right to decide
matters of faith and to declare its doctrine free from state interference.” 821 As an example of
protections provided under the Establishment Clause, the decision in Schleicher v. Salvation
Army822 opined that “[t]he ministers exception is a rule of interpretation, not a constitutional rule;
and though it is derived from policies that animate the First Amendment, the relevant policies
come from the establishment clause rather than from the free-exercise clause.” 823 Finally, as an
example of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment clause being used together is Tomic
v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria,824 in which the court held: “the exception is based on the
establishment and free-exercise clauses of the First Amendment.” 825
3.5.1.1 The Religious Question Constraint
Courts are prevented from adjudicating religion questions because faith-based
organizations have the right to a certain level of autonomy. 826 This question of constraint based
on the existence of religion doctrine is sometimes referred to as the “church autonomy
doctrine.”827 Initially, the church autonomy doctrine concerned the affiliations that may have
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Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006). See also Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference
of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999) (In this case, the court rejected a claim of
employment discrimination against a church based on the Free Exercise Clause.).
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Id.
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Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F. 3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008).
823
Id. See also, Klagsbrun V. Va’ad Harabonim Of Greater Monsey, No. CIV. A., 97-3134, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732
(1999).
824
Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F. 3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006).
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Id. See also Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F. 3d. 648, 655 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The
[church autonomy] doctrine is rooted in the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.”).
826
See JOHN WITTE, JR., & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 241
(Oxford University Press, 3d ed. 2010).
827
The phrase “church autonomy doctrine” is typically associated with Douglas Laycock, who used the term in his
work “Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to
Church Autonomy.” Laycock has stated that he did not originate the term; rather, he borrowed it from Paul G.
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existed among institutions.828 Significantly, this issue narrows how deeply courts may evaluate
and examine the awards of religious courts. This remains a fraught and complicated question that
has attracted many scholars and gained traction in ongoing debates over religious arbitration.
The US courts have developed two constitutional doctrines—the “polity-deference” and
“neutral principles”—in the context of church property disputes. 829 Scholars of the Religion
Clause have called for the application of one or both of these doctrines in cases involving
religious disputes.830
The principal of polity-deference came from the Watson v. Jones case, in which it was
argued that certain ecclesiastical questions in religious disputes require that the issues be decided
by the highest religious authority in a religious hierarchy. 831 In other words, the secular court will
accept the determination of ecclesiastical issued by a religious body, as long as the governance of
that entity can be shown to adhere to a hierarchical system. 832 Also, in the Diocese v.
Milivojevich case, the court “constitutionalized” the dispute over the control of church property
within a hierarchical church and decided that if the highest authority in the church decided a
question of faith, or of ecclesiastical rule, then the courts must accept these decisions as
binding.833

Kauper’s Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 347.
Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 253, 254 (2009).
828
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115-16 (1952). See also Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1929).
829
See Alicea v. New Brunswick Theological Seminary, 608 A. 2d 218, 223 (NJ. 1992) for an example of how the
court applied neutral principles to the concept of an employment contract.
830
See generally Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1843. See Grossmen, supra note 23.
831
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872).
832
Id.
833
Diocese v. Milivojevich 426 U.S. 696, 698 (1976).
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However, secular courts do have the authority to reject the church’s judicatories if it is
proven that “fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness” was involved, according to Gonzales v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop.834 The doctrine of religious question constraint may be exercised if the
religious institutions may be shown to operate according to a nonhierarchical system, particularly
in cases involving the nature of current religious tribunals. 835
According to the First Amendment, civil courts in the US have no subject matter
jurisdiction to review disputes that arise as a consequence of an arbitration award provided by a
religious tribunal, because such awards involve ecclesiastical issues. For example, U.S civil
courts have tended to refuse requests to determine basic standards of clerical conduct, such as
matters that claim a minister or priest has breached a contract 836 or committed clerical
malpractice. El-Farra v. Sayyed, heard by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, held that the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review this religious dispute that was affiliated with an
Islamic institution.837 Similarly, the Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed Neiman Ginsburg &
Mairanze v. Goldburd, stating that “this court has no power to review the Beth Din’s
determination that it was appropriate under Jewish law to issue the siruv.”838
With respect to contracts, a US court applied the ministerial exception doctrine of
the United States to protect the freedom of religion in DeMarco v. Holy Cross High
School839 and also in the Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC case. The Hosanna-Tabor decision expanded
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Gonzales v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
Grossmen, supra note 23, at 185.
836
Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
837
El-Farra v. Sayyed, 226 SW 3d 792 (Ark. S. Ct. 2006).
838
Neiman Ginsburg & Mairanz, P.C. v. Goldburd, 179 Misc. 2d 125, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
839
DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F. 3d 166 (Ct. App., 2d Cir. 1993).
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ministerial exception to allow the firing of a teacher who taught secular subjects. 840 By means of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, plaintiff Cheryl Perich filed a complaint and
won approval to sue the school because they fired her. Attorneys for the school argued the
application of the “ministerial exception” under the First Amendment, which gives religious
institutions certain rights in terms of employment issues without intervention from secular
courts.841 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school; however, that
ruling was overturned by the U.S Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and the case was sent
back to the lower court for a full trial “on the merits.” 842 Eventually, the lower court ruled that
the ministerial exception was not valid in the case, because Perich’s position at the school was
not terminated for religious reasons, but because she taught secular subjects. 843
As noted, there currently is no clear standard for secular courts in the US when it comes
to religious questions, and the courts have shown time and again that they do not like to interfere
with religious issues or affairs. This aversion is informed by the courts’ concern to protect the
civil court from becoming “entangled in religious affairs,” 844 rather than because they are trying
to protect the rights of religious institutes and their members.
3.5.1.2 The Neutral Principles of Law Approach
According to US constitutional theory and First Amendment principles, religious
institutions do not exist or operate above the law. Neutral principles of law “are secular legal
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Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 132 S.Ct. 694, 700
(2012).
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Id.
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Id.
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Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 132 S.Ct. at 700.
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Witte & Nichols, supra note 811, at 241.
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rules, the application of which does not entail theological or religious evaluations.” 845 US courts
have authorities who review cases that involve religious groups by applying “neutral principles
of law,” and they tend to avoid any decisions that are not ground in a review of religious
jurisprudence (for example, “rituals of worship or the tenets of faith.”) 846 If no religious
questions are involved, the courts will apply the neutral principles approach, but their analysis
will be based solely on secular methods to investigate non-religious questions, such as whether
something like secular property rights are involved in the case. 847
The neutral principles doctrine derived from the 1979 case of Jones v. Wolf, in which the
Supreme Court constitutionalized the religious question doctrine. 848 The court may hear religious
cases and apply secular law; however, it must do so without examining religious matters. The
importance of this principle when applied to religious arbitration is that if religious language, or
terms used in religious agreements, is not clear as it is being used in arbitration related to secular
matters, and/or may be interpreted multiple different ways, then it may be disqualified. 849
In Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah, 850 the court contemplated the enforceability of
the award; namely, did any exceptions exist according to the “neutral principles of law” doctrine
that may have affected the court’s ability to enforce the award. In this case, the court did not find
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Encore Productions, Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1112 (D. Colo. 1999). See also Jenkins v.
Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 356 Ill. App. 3d 504, 292 Ill. Dec. 195, 825 N.E. 2d 1211 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
(“The First Amendment did not prohibit the court’s exercise of jurisdiction; the court noted that the church bylaws
in that case adopted the ‘neutral principles’ doctrine, giving civil courts jurisdiction over contract disputes as long as
they did not involve ecclesiastical issues.”).
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See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (This case cites Maryland & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg
Church, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970)). See also information about J. Brennan, concurring in Bennett, supra note 724.
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Teen Challenge Int’l USA v. Elleson, No. CIV.05 00463 DAE BMK, 2006 WL 3388471, at *5 (D. Haw. Nov.
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any conflicts related to religious subject matter. The court determined that it had jurisdiction over
enforceability and also over deciding whether the parties’ underlying dispute fell within the
scope of the arbitration clause.851 The court accepted the arbitration tribunal’s award, because it
held in the end that its proper role in this case was to review an award rendered by an
arbitrator.852
The fact that the neutral principles doctrine allows the usage of neutral principles to
achieve a verdict that may at times disagree with a church body’s decision is a major issue of
criticism of this doctrine. When applying neutral principles, the courts may hear certain religious
cases and apply secular laws without returning to the religious issues underpinning the case;
some scholars have viewed this outcome as an infringement of the “Free Exercise rights of the
Church and also [as a violation of] the Establishment Clause’s prohibition against advancing
religion.”853 Another criticism of allowing courts to use neutral principles is that the method has
been seen to give the courts leeway and freedom to adjudicate disputes in specific religious
cases. However, the latter critique does not take into account that without the neutral principle
doctrine, the courts’ hands would be completely tied, such that that would not have any ability to
look at any cases or resolve any disputes that involve a religious doctrine or question. 854
3.5.2 Judicial review of religious arbitration awards
Religious arbitration has drawn considerable attention and been subject to strong critique.
The following section discusses two different doctrines commonly used by the courts to mitigate
the potential dangers of religious arbitration. First, the unconscionability doctrine, which can be
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Meshel, 869 A. 2d at 343.
Id. at 343. See also Bennett, supra note 724.
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applied to agreements reached in religious arbitration proceedings; this doctrine may apply when
a certain party is found to have weak and/or unequal bargaining power, due to being subjected to
duress and to the imposition of unfair rules and procedures. Second, public policy concerns can
be applied to both the agreements and the awards to prevent certain damages to third parties that
may result from the use and enforcement of religious arbitration.
3.5.2.1 Applying unconscionability doctrine in the context of religious arbitration 855
The unconscionability doctrine may be applied to cases involving religious arbitration in
the same way as it has been used in some cases of ordinary arbitration. The unconscionability
doctrine is an approach that takes into account the general principle of arbitral justice and
addresses problems of communal pressure and clearly unfair rules that have had an effect on the
parties.856 This doctrine has had an extraordinary impact on arbitration, even though parties that
rely on the unconscionability argument do not always win their case. 857
The unconscionability doctrine provides ideal justification for judges vacating awards as
a way to respond to the shortcomings of arbitral justice, especially as the incidence and
development of arbitration law increases. 858 Applying the unconscionability doctrine to religious
arbitration may make up for the shortcomings and injustices that sometimes occur in the process
and application of religious arbitration.859
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As has become well-known, arbitration of all types may benefit the participating parties;
however, so-called unconscionable arbitration provisions undermine the interests of the members
of religious institutions. The idea that unconscionable provisions are sometimes promulgated by
arbitration may call religious arbitration into question among the religious society itself, even to
the extent that the people of that religion may abandon its usage. Accordingly, the
unconscionability doctrine often raises questions about more nuanced forms of communal
pressure and helps to expose and get rid of arbitral procedures that are shown to be grossly
unfair.860
The FAA and UAA861 understand the dilemma of unconscionability in arbitration
agreements and allow courts to reject the enforcement of any type of agreements that can be
shown to be purely unconscionable. Unconscionability is not intended to vacate arbitration
awards; however, it may serve as grounds to invalidate certain arbitration agreements, according
to the FAA.862 Section 2 of the FAA refers to unconscionability when it states that arbitration
awards shall stand "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract;"863 this language goes directly to the validity and enforceability of arbitration
agreements. The courts have expounded upon Article 2 by stating that “[g]enerally applicable
contract defenses, such as … unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration
agreements.”864
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Id.
UAA has mentioned the “concerns over fairness in arbitration involving unequal bargaining power.” See
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS: ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 123 (Thomson West, 5th ed.,
2009).
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See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) for the list of statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards.
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9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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The nature of community interaction and organic governance is considered one of the
reasons for the rise of religious arbitration, because communities often operate by means of
putting pressure on members to resolve disputes via religious arbitration. 865 However, the courts
do not seem to consider such pressure to constitute legal duress, or to serve as sufficient reason
to void an arbitration agreement.866 Hence, religious arbitration awards may be enforced by
courts even in cases when it seems clear that “both communal pressure and grossly unfair rules”
were present.867 Indeed, to convince the secular courts that unconscionability occurred, the
appealing party needs to prove both “substantive unconscionability" and “procedural
unconscionability.”868 “[S]ubstantive unconscionability ‘refers to harsh, one-sided, and
oppressive contract terms.’”869 One-sided contract terms may occur frequently in arbitration
proceedings, as only one of the parties in an arbitration is required to submit the dispute to
arbitration; this is called the non-mutual arbitration clause. 870 This is yet another obstacle to
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Hirsch v. Hirsch, 774 N.Y.S. 2d. 48, 48-49 (App. Div. 2004).
Greenberg v. Greenberg, 656 N.Y.S. 2d. 369, 370 (App. Div. 1997).
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proving substantive unconscionability; further, other clauses exist that set limitations on
discovery about arbitration provisions.871
Procedural unconscionability involves proving that "bargaining naughtiness" occurred
during the structuring of the agreement, 872 and it is associated with terms such as "unfair
surprise" and "lack of meaningful choice" and “hidden” contractual provisions. 873 These terms
encompass “not only the employment of sharp practices and the use of fine print and convoluted
language, but [also] a lack of understanding and an inequality of bargaining power." 874
"Bargaining naughtiness in the form of unfair surprise, lack of meaningful choice, and an
inequality of bargaining power.” 875
An example of procedural unconscionability may be found in a case known as Tillman V.
Commercial Credit Loans, Inc.876 In this case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed with
the trial court findings, based upon the evidence provided, that the arbitral clause in the loan
agreements in question met the standard of being unconscionable. 877 Rationale for the trial
court’s decision and the Supreme Court’s agreement included that the substantive provisions of
the arbitration clause were found to be oppressive and one-sided, and also that to two sides did
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not have equal bargaining power. 878 This case resulted in the trial court denying the lender’s
motion to force the other party to go to arbitration.”879
According to scholars who highlight the effectiveness of using the unconscionability
doctrine to control cases of “quasi-duress,” it is generally agreed that the unconscionability
doctrine can be used to directly address coercion and unfairness. 880 Therefore, as has been
written, "most courts take a `balancing approach’ to the unconscionability question, which is [to]
examine and check a certain quantum of procedural [matters] as well [as] the quantum
substantive [matters that are enough to prove] unconscionability."881 Courts will examine
religious arbitration agreements if the law that was applied appears to be patently unfair, and the
weak party appears to have signed the contract under communal pressure. In such cases, the
court can void an arbitration agreement on grounds of unconscionability. 882 The court will
“consider all the facts and circumstances of a particular case,” 883 when inquiring into
unconscionability.
Let us return to the concern about the protection of women’s rights in religious
arbitration; for example, a case in which a woman may be prevented from providing testimony
during the arbitration process while at the same time being forced to sign the arbitration
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agreement under religious or societal, communal or family (marital) duress. Such a case would
involve the woman being excluded from fair procedures, and a secular court likely would find
the contract unconscionable because “equity may require invalidation of an arbitration agreement
that is unconscionable.”884
The party with the burden of proof of unconscionability is considered to be mounting an
affirmative defense.885 This party must raise the issue of unconscionability, particularly with
respect to the procedural events that occurred prior to the beginning of the procedure of the
arbitration itself, in order to win the case.886 “The party claiming unconscionability must provide
proof of the claim.”887 However, in general “the Court authorized the use of adhesion because it
extended arbitration to a greater number of disputes and limited the impact of class litigation in
the legal process”888 In sum, the unconscionability doctrine may provide secular courts with
justification to void an arbitration agreement, which in turn may force the religious arbitrator to
hear the testimony of a woman.889
3.5.2.2 Applying the protection of public policy in the context of religious arbitration. 890
The right to vacate an arbitration award has been exercised by various secular courts in
cases in which a remedy is judged to be in violation of “public policy” 891 which should be
defined as against positive law. Parties wishing to challenge the enforcement of an arbitral award
884
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Grossman, supra note 510, at 195. See United Paperwork’s Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc. 484 U.S. 29, 42
(1987) (“A court may refuse to enforce contracts that violate law or public policy.”).
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in the arena of international arbitration, for example, have been known to argue that the
judgment transgresses commonly accepted public policies or standards. Public policy has been
mentioned in the New York Convention as one of the grounds on which a party has the ability to
challenge the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. The concept of appealing for the vacating
of an arbitral award has been considered by some scholars to be a “highly debated, controversial
and complex subject,”892 in part because various state (or country) courts have different
approaches to applying an award made by an international arbitrating body.
“Under subject- matter inarbitrability, a dispute cannot be submitted to arbitration- as a
matter of law- because it involves maters directly linked to the public interest.” 893Inarbitrability
can arise because of the subject matter of the dispute or because the agreement to arbitrate is a
deficient contract.”894 In some cases, U.S courts have applied the concept of public policy to
vacate an award granted by a religious tribunal or to refuse to enforce agreements made by (for
example) the Beth Din. Matters involving child custody895 and child support in some
jurisdictions,896 and matters including wills and criminal violations, have been affected by public
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Sameer Sattar, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards and Public Policy: Same Concept, Different Approach? The
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policy arguments.897 The right to vacate an arbitral award if it violates something that can be
shown to be commonly accepted public policy is based on principles such as the protection of
third parties, or the inability or refusal to apply a foreign law in a sovereign nation, for example;
these principles are generally not considered susceptible to arbitration.
Cases have been noted in which courts have refused to conform religious awards on the
grounds of public policy concerns, such as Hirsch v. Hirsch898 in which the entire award was
vacated by the court on public policy grounds related to child custody and support. 899 In this
case, the courts found that the child custody issue was not considered to be an issue that could be
subject to arbitration, and also the child support award did not meet the current Child Support
Standards Act.900 Another portion of the award was vacated on the ground that it breached public
policy because the wife’s father, who was not a party to the arbitration, was deprived of his
property (by the arbitral award) without due process.901 In another case, Neuwirth v. Neuwirth,
the court stated that it would not support the child custody agreement stipulated in the arbitral
award if it found that the agreement did not meet the child’s best interest. 902
Even though, “under U.S. law, most, if not all, statutory rights can be adjudicated through
arbitration,”903 a court may apply the public policy concept and vacate a religious arbitral award
if it finds that the award violates a standing statutory requirement. Kovacs v. Kovacs is a good
example of this. In this case, a Beth Den award concerning child custody and support that had
been granted by the Beth Din (religious) court was vacated by the Maryland Court of Special
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Appeals, because it was found that the Beth Din court did not apply independent judgment to
consider the needs of the children involved, nor did it follow commonly applied public policy
regarding child support guidelines pursuant to Maryland family law. 904 Incidentally, note that the
court also opined that the wife had not shown sufficient proof of her claim that the judgment she
originally received failed to conform to the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act; therefore, the
court further held that in considering the appeal of the judgment, it was only required to adhere
to principles of basic fairness.905
Also (sometimes) in the realm of child custody and support concerns, certain public
policy considerations may deter courts from confirming, for example, a Beth Din award, if the
court finds that such an award would threaten the constitutional rights of one of the parties or
impinge on a state’s right to consider a criminal matter. 906 In Rakoszynski v. Rakoszynski, the
court found that the arbitration award attempted to limit the parties’ access to the civil courts.
Holding that such restriction violated the parties’ constitutional rights, the court vacated the
award.907 Further, it refused to grant the motion of one of the parties (the ex-wife) to find the
other party in contempt, finding that she had not first attempted any other, less drastic, remedy to
ensure enforcement of the child support order. 908
However, the application of standards of public policy as grounds to vacate arbitral or
court awards is not without its challenges. Courts must still enforce arbitral awards, even as they
consider arguments to apply public policy exceptions to justify vacating those awards. And in
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general, it seems that a public policy objection to an award is a “narrow approach” 909 that only
applies in very limited conditions. For example, in order to overturn an arbitration award on
public policy grounds, Misco requires that the overturning body must show that the award
violates explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policies that are rooted in law and legal
precedents.910 However, the purview of the US courts to review arbitral awards to ensure they (or
the enforcement thereof) do not endanger any common public policy norms or protections has
been well established; the US Supreme Court handed down precisely such a ruling in United
Paperworkers International Union v. Misco.911 Misco provides the framework for how the courts
may vacate arbitral awards on public policy grounds, despite the prevailing deference offered by
secular courts to arbitral tribunals.912 The ruling in Misco notes that while courts rarely review
arbitration decisions, because “excessive judicial interference” would undermine the use
of arbitration as an alternative means for settling disputes, they certainly retain the right to
conduct such reviews if an award is seen to endanger the public policy rights of certain parties or
of the general public.913
The term "public policy" is vague,914 and court definitions of what the term means vary.
The Supreme Court defines it as a policy “to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal
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precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.” 915 Supreme Court
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in the Eastern Associated Coal case affirmed a lower court’s
application of the Misco standard, and agreed with that court that the term vacatur is appropriate
when an award violates “positive law.”916 Supreme Court Justice Scalia wrote a conflicting
opinion, in which he criticized the majority for inviting what he expected would be
"flaccid" public policy challenges that were not based on clear statutory or regulatory
prohibitions.917 In Scalia’s view, a violation of public policy only occurs when an award is
clearly contrary to "actual prohibitions of the law." 918
Disagreement about what constitutes a violation of “public policy” may occur in cases
that involve Shari’a law and Jewish law. For example, many Muslims are required to respect
certain documents such as wills. Those that wish to adhere to the specific guidelines of Shari’a
about how to handle inheritances may write such guidelines into a properly drafted will. In a case
known as Will of Jacobovitz, a court held that the civil law of New York was the only law that
could be applied to inheritance matters, and that the validity of a will, and the bestowing of an
estate, was not susceptible to the jurisdiction of an arbitration court, per the New York state
constitution.919 Similarly, in Berger v. Berger, a court upheld the denial of an award related to an
inheritance, because standard public policy considered that the matter of the deceased person’s
estate was precluded from any sort of arbitration. Specifically, the court held that the tribunal’s
action in attempting to interpret a “letter” about the estate amounted to the tribunal attempting to

that state, and as well the applicable principles of the common law, are to be considered. Primarily it is for the
lawmakers to determine the public policy of the state.”).
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direct the division of the estate, an action that went beyond the tribunal’s legal mandate. 920
Finally, the court held that even if arbitrating wills and estates did not already contradict public
policy, it would have denied any of the tribunal’s findings and awards, because it would have
dismissed the entire matter on grounds of forum non conveniens.921
However, the legal scholar Michael A. Helfand has written that the public policy
exception may represent a viable option to force courts to void arbitration agreements that are
found to have violated a private party’s rights by coercing that party to waive certain rights that
are meant to apply to the public generally.”922 For example, there was a case in which the Jewish
legal precept of Hasagath Gevul was found to violate the common good (public policy) because
it sought to prevent an individual from opening a new business close to another business selling
similar or identical goods or services. 923 Rabbinical courts continue to apply this principle of
definite damage when considering whether a ruling violates public policy. 924 Courts in general
are well-advised to consider the ramifications of an arbitral award and ensure that the effect of
implementing it will not unduly damage or contradict public policy measures put in place to
protect a class of third-party persons or indeed the entire general public. 925According to Helfand,
courts should always carefully weigh the rulings of arbitration courts, even if it seems clear that
they might violate public policy.926
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Public policy should be defined as against positive law 927because some issues that may
violate public policy have nothing to do with third-party needs; for example, child custody
matters or discrimination against woman. Conversely, in some cases, as noted in the case studies
above, a court may have to impinge on the individual’s rights in order to protect the welfare and
protections of the public. When a court interacts with religious law, it sometimes happens that an
arbitrating party wishes to be ruled by a set of laws that are endemic to another country’s culture
and legal structure. This poses challenges if the two legal systems differ significantly, and in
such cases, the best option may be to consider the ruling and rationale of an arbitration body
carefully against the positive law of the country in which the arbitrating parties reside, to ensure
that the arbitral award is in fact enforceable.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter evaluates religious arbitration as a right practiced among faith-based
communities by relating such arbitration to an ideal standard of ordinary arbitration. Religious
arbitration is based on religious law, and as it is law applied by religious communities that is
based in doctrinal law, it functions differently than secular arbitration. This chapter provides
historical background as to why certain religious communities rely on arbitration, and it explores
the legal concepts that affect the extent to which these communities have the right to arbitrate
their disputes in their own religious courts. Also, this chapter examines the extent and limits of
the Right to Arbitrate among religious communities, noting that certain impediment issues may
arise in this type or arbitration, especially in the mechanisms of enforcing the awards.

927

Positive laws are laws enacted as statutes. They come in various forms at different levels, such as judicial orders,
administrative regulations, and executive decrees; they may include any written order issued by the government. See
generally Office of the Law of Revision Counsel, United States Code,
http://uscode.house.gov/codification/term_positive_law.htm (last visited Feb., 2017).
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Defining religious arbitration is not a simple matter, due to the many differences that
exist among religions in terms of how they each practice arbitration. Some religious communities
consider the religious law to be the applicable law and require the arbitrator to be a religious
leader. Others require the arbitrator to be a religious leader of a group of shared religions. Still
others impose the condition that the dispute must be one that exists among members of the same
community, and the arbitrator must be a member of that community as well.
A number of challenges cause political and legal anxiety for states, and one of the most
crucial challenges occurs when religious law exists in parallel to the law of the state. Shari’a law
and Jewish law in particular include various features that may be impossible to reconcile with
western civil secular systems. This concern becomes more problematic if the religious law
affects the rights of weak parties or raises gender issues such as the women entering the religious
arbitration agreement in family law context, although it may be noted that there are no examples
of case law regarding Shari’a law that demonstrate that comprehensive application of Shari’a
results in the unfair treatment of women.
Enforcing religious law in a secular court has always been at the crux of this complicated
relationship between courts and religious law. This relationship is made more complex in the
United States by the church autonomy doctrine, which gives religious bodies the right to exercise
certain levels of self-government. It may be necessary to evaluate the issue of the Risk of
Unfairness Rule and raise questions about certain procedures of religious arbitration in order to
determine whether the practice of religious arbitration is fair. Another challenge may be that
certain religious procedures may clash with statuary protections, public policy and the
unconscionability doctrine. Such challenges may support the rejection of religious arbitration.
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“Arbitration’s methodology of dispute resolution became conversant with nearly all civil
disputes.”928 Despite challenges, religious arbitration may fulfil the need of certain minorities to
resolve their problems according to shared religions and faith systems. Furthermore, religious
arbitration is a modern method by which religion is used in the context of arbitration because of
the impossibility of dividing religious people from their own religion. “The Revolution in Law
through Arbitration”929 may thus be used in the context of religious arbitration. Finally, this
chapter argues that arbitration is an important way to resolve problems and save civil courts and
the state from becoming involved with problems that might otherwise be resolved outside the
courts, saving the parties and the state money and time.

928
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Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 257 (2008).
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE RIGHT TO ARBITRATE AMONG ETHNIC COMMUNITIES
Cultural Arbitration: Peacemaking Methods Based on Culture
Case Study: The Sulha
4.1. Overview:
4.1.1. Examples of cultural arbitration around the world
4.1.1.1 Kurdish Peace Committee
4.2
Sulha as case study
4.2.1 Brief historical background of the Sulha
4.2.2 The Definition of Sulha
4.3
The Process of Sulha
4.3.1 The Effect of Sulha
4.4
The use of Sulha in Occupied territories and the Absence of Government
4.4.1 Palestinian groups under Israeli occupation
4.4.2 Sulha in Gaza and West Bank
4.4.3 The instance of Environmental Sulha
4.5
The need of Sulha
4.6
Choice of law provisions:
4.6.1. The link between customary law and Sharia law
4.6.2. The relationship between customary law and state law
4.7
The Criticism of Sulha
4.7.1 Tribal law is not a valid law
4.7.2 Tribal system is unjust to the parties
4.7.3 Interference in the work of the judiciary and parallel judicial system
4.7.4 Customary law violates constitutional rights
4.8
The difference between Tahkeem, Arbitration, and Sulha
4.8.1 Western Style ADR v. Cultural Arbitration
4.8.2 Tahkeem vs. Sulha
4.8.3 Arbitration vs. Sulha
4.8.3.1 The concept of conﬁdentiality in Sulha
4.8.3.2 The concept of neutrality in Sulha
4.9
The Legal Basis of Tribal Law Reform
4.9.1 The Legal Basis of Tribal Reform in the civil conflict
4.9.2 The Legal Basis of Tribal Reform in the criminal matters
4.10 Enforcement of the Sulha
4.10.1 Legal Enforcement of the Sulha
4.10.2 Social implementation of the Sulha
4.11 Conclusion
This chapter discusses arbitration within communities that share the same culture and
heritage. These communities practice their own techniques to resolve issues based on their values
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and traditions. The tools and mechanisms that they use are based on their own principles and
culture.930 They apply their customary law/s to any conflicts that may arise. There are many
examples around the world of the use of this mechanism to resolve issues, such as (for example)
the traditional conflict resolution mechanism that continues to serve portions of the Pashtun and
Baloch peoples in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Another example is the arbitration practice of the
Kurdish communities in England or German and the use of the Sulha among the Bedouin
peoples of the Middle East.
There is both similarity and heterogeneity in the examples of the use of arbitration by
ethnic communities; therefore, the researcher decided to shorten the arbitration by ethnic
communities to Sulha and as a model for all practices used in the Middle East to solve
differences between members of a single community. The similarity lies in the framework and
principles of the arbitration practiced by these societies to resolve differences, while the
difference lies in the mechanism—the details of the proceedings and the choice of applicable
law—that each community chooses.
The Sulha mechanism represents a unique way of resolving issues among the Bedouin in
the Middle East. The focus of this chapter is on the use of the Sulha in Palestine and Jordan as a
representative example of cultural arbitration. The Sulha is a culturally driven way of resolving
certain issues, and it is similar to arbitration. This chapter discusses the process of framing a
reconciliation by means of the Sulha and introduces a new concept of arbitration: cultural
arbitration. Cultural arbitration resolves issues in a particular manner and involves its unique
methods of social enforcement.
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The Sulha is similar to modern arbitration931 in many aspects. For instance, just like
arbitration, a Sulha’s committee must uphold neutrality with regard to all conflicts. However, the
Sulha committee is primarily focused on establishing (or reestablishing) peace. Its goal is to
resolve issues by advocating peace and putting a stop to violent acts. In conflicts resolved by
arbitration, the role of the arbitrator role is the same as that of a judge; i.e., to hand down a
binding decision that will end the conflict. Likewise, the decisions of the Sulha are binding by
means of court recognition in Jordan and social enforcement by society Modern arbitration, as
has been mentioned, is binding upon all parties. There are differences between the Sulha and
arbitration,932 but this chapter argues that the Sulha is a type of arbitration based on customs and
tradition. This chapter focuses on points of similarity between the Sulha and arbitration.
Arbitration based on culture is a unique method of resolving issues, and it has unique techniques
because the law and the procedure based on culture. The goal of this chapter is to introduce a
new understanding of the Sulha as a form of arbitration and make clear that the Sulha is not
simply an occasional kind of informal justice.
The Sulha is a reconciliation mechanism used to resolve disputes within communities,
according to Islamic traditions in the Middle East. The Sulha is mainly used to manage interclan
(Hamula) resolutions and disputes in tribal cultures. 933
This chapter focuses on the methods of arbitration used by cultural communities to resolve
conflicts. It also outlines how national courts deal with these resolutions and recognize awards
and discusses the criticisms that have been expressed about cultural arbitration. This chapter is
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divided into several sections. The first section provides a definition and overview of the term
‘cultural arbitration’ by means of narrating the history of the Sulha in Jordan and Palestine and
describing the process of the Sulha. The next section discusses in detail the various ways in
which the Sulha has been used in the following places and situations: the situations involving an
absence of government,934 among Palestinian groups under Israeli occupation, in Gaza and the
West Bank, by the Jerusalem Arbitration Center (JAC), and instances of environmental Sulha.935
This section will also delve into the question of why the Sulha is impotent for societies in
Palestine and Jordan. The final section will discuss the differences among Tahkeem, Arbitration,
and the Sulha, and it will then explore the legal basis underpinning tribal reform. Finally, this
chapter discusses the enforcement mechanism of the Sulha, especially with regard to the social
implementation of Sulha judgments.
4.1 Overview
Every society has its own beliefs and cultural traits that distinguish it from other
societies. Social groups practice their beliefs according to their particular culture. Some cultures
resolve issues and disputes among themselves by applying their own customary rules. The Sulha,
for example, is an important method of resolving disputes within the Bedouin society. It is also
used in certain subcommunities in Jordan and Palestine. According to Sheikh Salem Abu Athena
Alhjaya, one of the Sulha judges in southern Jordan, a Sulha tribal hearing is considered by the
people as a first step that also has the authority of a civil judiciary. 936 The author of this paper
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interviewed Sheikh Alhjaya, and the Sheikh noted that Jordanian society is a tribal society, and
therefore the Sulha is a necessary part of that society’s fabric. 937
The method of the Sulha is complex and difficult to examine, due to a lack of sources;
most of the proceedings between disputing parties and the Sulha judges depend on oral
transmission among generations.938 The Jordanian Bedouin society refers to the Sulha as the
“Master of Rulings” and considers it to be a unique method of resolving conflicts within
Jordanian society.939 The main goal of the Sulha is to engage the conflicting parties in a
conversation about the events that led up to the dispute; this timeframe is the known as the peace
stage. Dispute resolutions in the Middle East are guided by the overarching principle of the
collective interests of the family, the tribe, the community, and the country. Islamic and tribal
history encourages Arab Muslims to prioritize the collective interest as the highest principle in
terms of the hierarchy of values where dispute resolution and everyday dealings are
concerned.940 The maintenance of relationships and the restoration of harmony is a duty that is
incumbent upon all members of the group, as well as upon a third-party, be he a judge (a qadi),
an arbitrator (a hakam) or a conciliator. Therefore, collective interests and the Sulh (amicable
settlement) are at the core of any dispute resolution system in Islam that seeks to maintain the
ties of family, brotherhood and sisterhood, and community.941
Confidentiality and neutrality are the key characteristics of the Sulha that make it an
efficient method for resolving conflicts; this makes the Sulha similar to modern arbitration. The
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process of the Sulha consists of numerous negotiations. During these negotiations, a member of
the Jaha must sustain confidentiality.942 All Jaha members are aware of the importance of
confidentiality. Therefore, they understand that any thoughts and opinions about the dispute that
are expressed must never be discussed outside the Jaha.943
Most countries in the Middle East,944 including Jordan and Palestine, practice the Sulha;
however, it is not seen or used as a replacement for criminal state law or civil state law. Victims
of crime in the Arab states often seek justice through the Sulha and the state court system
simultaneously. Eventually, the national court issues the final binding result, but the Sulha offers
a culturally beneficial mechanism for maintaining long-term peace. In cases of conflict between
individuals, judges often employ the Sulha to reach an agreement that reconciles the conflicting
parties. Such an agreement would not favor any party in particular when determining guilt,
although it may favor the accused 945 during sentencing.946
Many groups in Arab societies, such as Muslims, Druze Arabs, and Christians, use the
Sulha to resolve conflicts among individuals, families, and villages. It is widely used to resolve
disputes, however trivial or serious, between families, and it has the cultural moral authority to
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handle grave offenses, such as murder.947 On the other hand, some groups in Jordanian societies
oppose the use of the Sulha,948 such as the Chechnya and Circassian peoples; however, despite
this opposition, the use of the Sulha is still practiced in many societies. 949
The Sulha depends on the overall wisdom of numerous communities and their religious,
ethnic, and political experiences, as well as on the principles of common law. 950 Historically,
tribe members had to maintain equal groups to make sure they had protection and control over
their own territories.951
The Sulha been practiced in Gaza, through the conciliation department of the Palestinian
Scholars’ League.952 500 conciliators constitute this League953; these conciliators are respected
and trusted among families in Gaza, and they are credited with having significant knowledge
about the traditions and customs of Palestinian families. The conciliators reduce the number of
cases that are brought to official courts by moving them to tribunal courts; the swifter resolutions
that tribunal courts are able to render have helped nearly two million people in Gaza. 954 There is
a department called the Palestine Scholars Association, which is concerned with the Islamic
arbitration of the various cases that are submitted to it; the Association prioritizes disputes filed
through its reform committees.955
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In Jordan, the Sulha acts as a form of arbitration for disputes that occur within
subcommunities, and it is one of the most effective methods of resolving disputes. The Sulha has
been practiced extensively in Jordan, and it is essential to resolving disputes among the Bedouin
people.956 Meanwhile, the Sulha is also used in modern (non-Bedouin) Jordanian communities,
including for very serious cases, such as murder.
4.1.1

Examples of cultural arbitration around the world
As mentioned earlier, this chapter focuses on the Sulha, although it also sheds light on

some of the uses of alternative methods to resolve conflicts between members of the same
community. There are many examples of such alternative methods being employed around the
world that the researcher could not address, given the parameters of the scope of this study. Such
other methods should be thoroughly examined, and a comprehensive encyclopedic study of these
forms, which may vary depending on place, language, ethnicity, and etc., should be compiled.
Despite the near similarity, in the general concept, between various types of cultural
arbitration around the world, the difference in detail is worth the mention. The researcher chose
to focus on Sulha as a model for cultural arbitration for that and several other reasons. First, the
method of Sulha differs from culture to culture and each method is unique according to each
community and its practice Cultural arbitration also differs in terms of the mechanism of
implementation, some of these methods are binding, and in my view, can be considered
arbitration, such as instances of settling disputes according to culture, while others are non-
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binding and could be considered mediation or negotiation. If we assume that all methods of
cultural arbitration are binding, then the mechanism of enforcement and the imposition of
compulsory socialization, for example, differ from each other.
The researcher of this paper limits himself in this chapter to describing one example of the use of
alternative methods of conflict resolution that occurs among the Kurdish people.
4.1.1.1 Kurdish Peace Committee (KPC): Gurbet
The Kurdish people have their own alternative methods of dispute resolution, as practiced
by the Kurdish Peace Committee (KPC) in the UK (London) and also in Germany. 957 The
Kudish method is called the Gurbet (diaspora), a term that is used by Kurds who emigrated from
Turkey to the UK and Germany. Similar to many other communities, the Kurds have their own
ethnicity that distinguishes them from society at large. 958
As a result of living in a large city like London, many Kurds wish to seek refuge in, and
rely upon, the practices of their informal legal system and customary laws as an alternative to
engaging in formal legal processes. For these Kurds, the KPC is viewed as a customary way for
them to resolve conflicts. 959
“Gurbet” is the Kurdish and Turkish term for people who have migrated from their
original countries; the term also refers to the new place in which a migrant will be living for
some period of time. Many emotions, including sorrow and nostalgia, are associated with the
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loss of the homeland, and many members of the migrant Kurdish community also feel isolation
while living in "temporary" locations outside of their homeland. 960
Conflicts between Kurds are resolved by their “family elders, feudal leaders, religious
opinion-makers (sheikhs or dede),” 961 or by respected and well-regarded individuals who are
known locally and viewed as knowledgeable of the Kurdi culture. Such individuals act outside
the state system as judges, and they are often sought out to settle disputes because of their age
and extensive knowledge of Kurdish customary practices. 962
The types of cases that the Gurbet considers tend to involve family conflict: underage
marriages, obligations of family support, and divorce. Property disputes may also be decided by
the Gurbet.963
The use of the Gurbet has faced many criticisms, the most important of which is
incompatibility with the idea of modernity in the current world. Nevertheless, resorting to the
Gurbet helps a range of people resolve their disputes, and it is recognized by many regimes, such
as England and German, because it reduces some of the judicial burdens (and caseload) that they
face.
4.2 Sulha as a case study964
The Sulha mechanism represents a unique way to for the Bedouins of Jordan to resolve
conflicts. This methodology has received interest among scholars due to the importance of the
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Sulha idea in Bedouin societies. The Middle East is of great interest to researchers in general.
Hence, this chapter focuses on the use of the Sulha in Palestine and Jordan as examples of
cultural arbitration.
4.2.1 Brief historical background of the Sulha
Tribal history extends back to ancient times. The Sulha was practiced before Islam
became a widespread belief system, but it has differed in practice as times have changed and also
because of the influence of Islam in Arab societies. The practice of reconciliation among the
Arab tribes of old, and among the tribes that still exist today, demonstrates the tribes’ need for an
efficient way to resolve the disputes they face that is steeped in principles and norms that are
commensurate with the customs and norms of the earliest tribes. 965
Hundreds of years ago, the use of the Sulha arose among Arab tribes in middle east and
was practiced according to tribal principles. These principles were commensurate with the
customs and traditions that were dominant at that time before Islam excited. During the preIslamic age, it was common for tribe members to appeal to wise men, judges, and reformers for
help resolving conflicts between tribes and individuals. Some of these wise men included Alalaa
ben Haretha, Al aqrah ben Habes, and Hashem ben abed Al Mutaleb, who was the grandfather of
the prophet Muhammad.966 The pre-Islamic period in the Middle East was characterized as a
“time of ignorance.” because the Arab tribes at that time often fought over petty issues. As a
result, killings, the displacement of families, revenge, and retaliation frequently occurred.
Community leaders had to find a way to prevent matters from escalating and to quickly resolve
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differences within the communities.967 Escalating conflicts could easily lead to entrenched
violence, such as the war that was fought between the two tribes of Dahes and Gabrah. 968
Tribal reconciliation was the first mechanism used to resolve disputes between Arabs,
and tribal law was the first law used by the Arabs. The advent of Islam ended the use of
customary law, because it was incompatible with Islamic law and strengthened old (rather than
Islamic) traditions. Although Islam abolished pre-Islamic tribal law, the idea of Sulha did not end
with the emergence of Islam, but reconciliation remained in place, but with an Islamic character.
At that point, the Sulha, which was a traditional way of resolving differences in Arab societies,
spread widely in Turkey and the Levant area.
4.2.2

The Definition of Sulha
In Arabic, the word “Sulha” means reconciliation, “cooperation” or “forgiveness.” 969 It

refers to the literal act of stopping conflict; “Sulh” is the process of settling into a state of
peace.”970
Some define Sulha as a contract of obligations between the family of the aggressor and
the family of the victim. For instance, the family of the victim may agree to waive all or some of
the penalties assessed against the aggressor, and certain obligations will be incumbent upon the
aggressor and his family in return. 971 Some define Sulha as a “non-written religious (Islamic)
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judiciary,972 because they understand the Sulha from the viewpoint of the influence that Sharia
law has over it. Others define it as a settlement between two parties that gives certain rights to
the deserving party.973 It has also been defined as a method or approach to conflict resolution that
provides a solution based on a set of systems or rules that have been passed down from
generation to generation.974
There are those who perceive a difference between tribal justice and tribal reform. The
tribal reconciliation (the Sulha) is the resolution of a dispute between conflicting parties.
However, tribal justice requires the leadership of people with special competences and
knowledge of tribal traditions. It is an informal judiciary practice that may be regulated by a
special law or that tribal justice, including the use of the Sulha, was tribal law – and specifically
not part of the state law.975
The Sulha can be defined as a cultural mechanism that provides for amicable dispute
resolution by means of good faith negotiation between the disputing parties; it creates a binding
solution dispensed by a mutual third party that is satisfactory to both of the parties that were in
conflict.

4.3 The Process of Sulha
The process of the Sulha is similar in most cases, but it varies depending upon the nature
of the conflict. Naturally, the complexity of the process depends on the complexity of the case.
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For instance, when a murder occurs in a village, the village has a tribal ritual that consists of the
following steps: “evacuation (Jalwah), truce or cease-fire (Atwa), peacemaking process (Jaha),
blood money (Meda), and peace agreement (Sulha).”976
A. Atwa
Initially, the offended side offers a statement that indicates that there will not be any
retaliation for the murder. In the Sulha, this “statement” a well-known law called the Hodna or
Atwa,977 which may last for just a month or for up to a year. 978 Atwa is typically offered for two
kinds of crimes: murder and crimes based on honor. The first line of communication among the
parties in such cases is the offer of Atwa.979
Usually, after the conflict occurs, the process of the Sulha begins with the Atwa, which is
time given by the victim’s family to the perpetrator and his or her family in which no revenge
will be sought.980 It is vital to the purposes of reconciliation, which is mandatory, especially in
“cases of blood” such as murder and provide a “cooling off” period to prevent further bloodshed
from occurring between the two parties . The victim’s family must accept the truce to prevent
further bloodshed and murder.981 When the police learn about the crime, they will immediately
go to the family of the victim and to the perpetrator’s family to secure a truce (Atwa), which is
set at three and one third days. Once this time period is completed, the perpetrator’s family may
ask for more time if the Sulha did not take place yet.982 During this “cease fire” period, the
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conflicting parties may negotiate peace. Also, the Sheikh may negotiate between the parties to
affect the return of the women, children, and the elderly who were evacuated to the village. 983
Following the crime, the perpetrator’s family must leave their home/s and relocate to a
sanctuary at their earliest convenience lest they face retribution. Basically, if there is no truce,
under traditional customs, the victim’s family is permitted to exact retribution. The village
policemen conduct the process of evacuation (Jalwah) in order to ensure maximum safety for the
perpetrator’s family.984. This unit is jurally responsible for its members. The Bedouin tribesmen
gave various labels to the corporate vengeance unit of khamsah (unit five generations ago) that
referred to it by various that responsible for its members 985
Two types of Atwa are generally used: honor Atwa and money Atwa.986 The former is
when the injured party gives his or her word of honor as a guarantee for the truce. The latter
indicates that money is paid to the vctim’s family as a guarantee of the truce. This payment can
be “Atwa Lafia” (which may be included as part of the Diya settlement) or “Atwa Dafia” (which
is independent of the amount paid in the Diya).987
Atwa is typically offered for two kinds of crimes: murder and crimes based on honor. The first
line of communication among the parties in such cases is the offer of Atwa.
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B. Jaha Committee
Once the Atwa is given, a Jalwa committee, the role of which is to mediate and negotiate
between the parties, is summoned.988 A Jaha is a group of people unrelated to the aggressor; they
are appointed by the elders of the aggressor’s family. A Jaha usually consists of older men who
are respected leaders in the community and whose opinions are valued by the community
members at large. There is no restriction on the number of people on the Jaha; it could range
from a single individual to more than fifty people. 989 In some cases, the size and value of the
Jaha depends on the size and social value, and at times the economic status as well, of the
victim’s family. The size of the Jaha also depends on whether the crime was intentional and on
how badly the victim’s family and community were affected by the crime. For example, if
somebody accidently hits a person with a car, the Jaha would be substantially smaller than if
somebody killed a child intentionally. Sometimes, when a crime of blood occurs, it is virtually
impossible to form the Jaha, because the Sulha itself cannot be passed.990 In such cases, the
victim’s family, and perhaps the entire community, will desire the heaviest punishment for the
aggressor.
It is important to mention that the “Musleh” 991 is appointed in Jordan based on family and
paternal ancestors. In Jordan, for example, the Sheiks or Mosleheen that are appointed as Musleh
in the state of Jordan retain this position for life.992
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As noted above, the Jaha must be formed of men who are not related to the perpetrator’s
family. When the Jaha is formed, a representative immediately begins communicating with the
elder or leader of the victim’s family.993 The first responsibility of the Jaha is to suggest the
Sulha and try to convince the victim’s family to accept it. The Jaha is also supposed to discover
what the victim family’s requests are, and then deliver them to the perpetrator’s family. If the
Sulha is not accepted immediately, the duty of the Jaha is to request more time to negotiate with
the victim’s family to prevent an act of revenge. If the Jaha anticipates the possibility of the
Sulha being accepted, it will initiate the process of the Sulha and work to establish agreement as
to a time and place for the families to meet. 994
During the Sulha, the time and place are agreed upon and arranged. The offender’s family
ensures that there are enough men to attend the Jaha and that the agreed upon time and place are
suitable for all members. The victim’s family, along with their relatives and family members,
must all be present at the scheduled time and place of the meeting for the Sulha. If they are not
able to attend the meeting, the Jaha may ask the friends and neighbors of the victim’s family to
attend. The number of people who attend the meeting indicates the overall level of respect for the
Sulha process and willingness to resolve the conflict.995
C. Meeting and integration of the Jaha committee
Before seeing the victim’s family members, the Jaha members meet to discuss,
understand the situation, and prepare for any obstacles that may hinder the Sulha.996 The goal of
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the discussion is for all Jaha members to come to an agreement about the key issues and about
their responsibility to the victim’s family. The greater the number and social status of the
members who attend the Jaha increases the group’s importance and prestige.997
The members of the Jaha will appoint a speaker who will address the family on behalf of
the Jaha. The speaker must be well known and highly respected in the community.
D. The Qadah.
The Jaha can meet at the victim’s family house or at another place. After shaking hands,
the members of the Jaha will take the places appointed to them. Their representative speaker or
elder will be served a small cup of coffee that will not be drunk until the Sulha is accepted.998
E. Negotiations and deliberations
The negotiations begin after the elder or the representative speaker of the Jaha gives an
introductory speech. He needs to show that the Jaha understands the situation and has sympathy
for the victim’s family’s loss and pain. The success of the Sulha often depends in part on the size
of the Jaha and the prominence of its members.999
The role of the speaker or the head of the Jaha is extremely valuable and important. He
needs to display a strong character and persuasive speaking skills during the negotiation, and he
must speak with clear and convincing arguments. He must present well-structured thoughts, use
extensive knowledge and quotations from the Quran and Sunnah to support his arguments, and
sometimes share knowledge about similar cases that were resolved with a Sulha. He must
emphasize Arabic morals, especially those of forgiveness and generosity. Finally, he must be
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well versed in tribal laws and in how to act as a judge. 1000 His goal is to encourage the victim’s
family to forgive the perpetrator and his or her family. After the introductory speech, the Jaha
will listen to the victim’s family’s desires and requests. “The victim’s family might ask for
100,000 Jordanian dinars for Meda to compensate for their loss and restore their tribal
honor.”1001
F. Drinking the coffee or not?
The deliberations between the Jaha and the family of the victim may last for up to two
hours. The Jaha speaker will drink the cup of coffee on the table if the victim’s family accepts
the Sulha completely and forgives the perpetrator; he may also drink the coffee if they accept it
under certain conditions.1002 The requests of the victim’s family will depend on the situation and
circumstances. For example, if the victim is in the hospital and his or her health status is known,
the victim’s family may request that the perpetrator and his or her family pay all the medical
expenses. They may accept the Sulha after the injured person recovers and leaves the hospital.
Sometimes, the victim’s family may require more time to consider their requests, with a promise
to eventually accept the Sulha. In some cases, they may accept it only after receiving
compensation for damages (if accrued). This compensation is known as the “Diya,” which is the
amount of money given to the victim’s family as compensation for their loss. The appointed
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Jaha elder will refuse to drink the coffee if the victim’s family refuses to accept the Sulha under
any conditions.1003
G. Accepting the victim’s family’s request
As mentioned above, the request of the victim’s family will vary depending on the
circumstances of the case. Reaching an agreement is generally not too difficult if the incident
was an accident, such as a car crash in which a person died because of his or her own mistake.
On the other hand, the issue could be much more complex, and the victim’s family’s requests
could be too difficult to fulfill. For example, in a case in which a woman was kidnapped and
raped, the victim’s family may request that the criminal be killed, and that his family pay
compensation and leave the city. The Jaha will negotiate all possibilities to reduce the
punishment, but in certain cases, they will have to settle even for the highest demands for
punishment to prevent any further bloodshed. 1004
H. The Sponsor’s role
Reaching an agreement based on the Sulha is not enough to resolve a conflict. The terms
of the agreement have to be respected. Therefore, to ensure that both parties uphold the terms,
there must be a sponsor. Sponsors are people who take responsibility if one of the parties breaks
the terms of the agreement. There are two types of sponsors: the guarantor of fulfillment (Kafel
Waffa) and the protector of fulfillment (Kafel Dafa).1005 The guarantor is the sponsor of the
perpetrator and his family and guarantees the enforcement of the Sulha on their behalf. The
conditions of the guarantor’s obligations depend on the victim’s family or the victim’s family’s
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elder.1006 The protector of fulfillment (Kafel Daffa) is in charge of the victim’s family’s
protection. Upon the signing of the Sulha agreement, the protector makes sure that the victim’s
family will not conduct any form of revenge against the perpetrator and his or her family. 1007
I. The document of peace
The Atwa will end with the peace agreement between the conflicting families. The
victim’s family forgives the perpetrator, and the next step is to bring the perpetrator and his or
her family or close relatives (father, uncles, sons… etc.) to the location of the victim’s family.
The goal here is to ensure a complete and lasting peace and to have both parties shake hands.
After this, the agreement document will be written and signed by the parties and their sponsors in
front of public witnesses. This document of peace could be described as a written paper that
expresses the adoption of the tribal resolution of the issue, which concludes the tribal issue and
prevents any disputes about the conflict in the regular courts. 1008
4.3.1

The effect of Sulha
Having interviewed the disputants and witnesses and visited the scene of the crime, the

Jaha (if it has more than one member) will discuss all of the issues. 1009 The elder will lead the
discussion and give the representatives appointed times to speak. In some complicated cases, the
Jaha committee will have a vote. Once they have achieved a majority, the final verdict will be
reached and the discussion will be finished.1010 Every region of the Middle East has a certain set
of compensations for wrongdoings. There is a list of prices owed for different physical
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disabilities or emotional pain suffered by the victim. The Jaha may consult an expert to help
them determine the amount of compensation they believe should be paid. For example, if the
victim suffered a permanent injury, the Jaha may bring in a doctor to evaluate the victim’s
injury.1011
Reconciliation based on the Sulha can be realized in two forms: complete reconciliation
or incomplete reconciliation. Complete reconciliation is a type of Sulha that indicates a total
resolution of the issues and the establishment of a complete peace between the parties. For
example, if the Jaha presides over a murder case, it will determine the amount of “blood money”
(Diya) to be paid, as well as the usual amount of compensation called the Taawid. 1012 If the
dispute does not involve violence, the Jaha will assign no guilt. The verdict of the Jaha
committee is final and may not be appealed or modified. 1013
As a final step, the Jaha committee determines the location and date of the public
ceremony.1014 Officials from local governments, religious leaders, and police representatives
may attend this ceremony.1015 The Jaha committee and members of each of the disputing parties
read the agreement aloud and sign it.
Incomplete reconciliation assumes that a settlement has been reached that includes
certain requirements from the victim’s family. This type of reconciliation depends on the
circumstances surrounding the crime. For example, as described above, if the victim is
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hospitalized and the future of his or her health status is uncertain, the Sulha agreement would
depend on the victim’s health. The ultimate stage in the Sulha process occurs when the Jaha
committee signs the official peace agreement in a ceremony that includes all parties to the
crime/dispute, and a security forces officer from the location where the incident occurred. 1016
As in a case of complete reconciliation, in an incomplete reconciliation, the Jaha
committee will patiently talk with the parties until both accept the verdict. The discussions may
last for months or even years. However, one or both of the parties could reject the verdict for
different reasons (for example, if the victim’s family believes the amount of compensation
offered is insufficient). This would severely hinder the entire Sulha process and be considered an
insult to the Jaha and the other dignitaries who participated in the process.
4.4 The use of the Sulha in the occupied territories and in the absence of government
The use of the Sulha in Palestinian society is of the utmost importance, as it has multiple
forms that benefit the Palestinians and also provides a unique model that other parts of the world
may consider implementing. The first form is the possibility of applying peace mechanisms to
achieve peace between two parties that are members of societies (Israelis and Palestinians) that
are locked in an international and political dispute. The second form involves economics.
Despite the intensity, difficulty, and historical depth of the political conflict between these two
peoples, they have significant trade and commercial relations. “Israel is by far Palestine’s largest
trading partner and, according to some estimates, Palestine is Israel’s second largest trading
partner after the United States.”1017 Thus, differences between these two peoples must be
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resolved. Sometimes, the resolution occurs by means of the Jerusalem arbitration center (JAC).
The JAC, which is discussed in more detail below, is “the first joint initiative of its kind, the JAC
is tailor-made for the type and scope of disputes usually arising between the two sides, and
accounts for the often-uncertain conditions in the region.”1018 The third form is the need of the
Palestinians as a people living under occupation to resolve their own internal disputes. The best
method for the Palestinians is to use the Sulha, given the inefficiency and incompetence of the
independent Palestinian judiciary, as well as the Palestinians’ unwillingness to recognize Israel
and resort to its judiciary.
4.4.1 The Sulha between two conflicted nations: from the Sulha to peace?
Can the Sulha be used internationally, as (for example) between the Palestinians and the
Israelis, two international entities with a long and complicated conflict? The idea of using the
Sulha to resolve international political conflicts in the Middle East has been contemplated by
scholars for the past two decades. Some scholars have put forward the idea of using the Sulha to
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a cultural and ethnic perspective1019.
Irani and Funk adopted the idea of using the Sulha as a bridge to resolve the political
conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis, writing:
“in the long term, rewarding. Before the ritual of sulh can be adapted for Track Two
conflict resolution efforts between societies…The guarantor must respect the consensus
of the international community, balance power relationships, demonstrate a nuanced
appreciation of local histories and cultural values and engender a context of common
security and equity.”1020
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Irani describe the values of the Sulha and the mediation process that should be adopted in
order to have a successful Sulha. He also emphasizes the importance of a neutral third party, and
he supports incorporating, and thus legitimizing, the direct participation of various social and
religious groups in a dialogue.1021
Another scholar suggests adopting the elements of the Sulha and integrating them into the
current efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He writes that this would "advances the
idea that we ought to look at indigenous techniques and procedures of conflict management such
as the rituals of sulh (settlement) and mosalaha (reconciliation).1022 The intention is to breathe
life into the negotiation process by signaling to the Palestinians an appreciation of their; cultural
pillars and their right to have dignity and to participate in international discussions. 1023
The above views sum up the idea of establishing the Sulha (peace) at the international
level and using its elements to achieve peace between Israelis and Palestinians. The Sulha
mechanisms that seem most valuable for this goal include: finding a neutral third party to resolve
the conflict as a reformer, and achieving peace in the society as a whole by involving all social
and religious communities directly in the reconciliation process. These Sulha mechanisms may
be applicable in the international sphere, but implementation will be difficult for several reasons.
First, international conflicts are different than personal and clan conflicts in terms of content and
effects. Second, the Sulha works in culturally homogeneous societies linked by customs and
traditions, and for it to succeed outside of this context is unlikely. It is most likely not possible to
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apply a Sulha-like reconciliation process to international disputes, and the Sulha is not suitable
for resolving the Palestinian issue.
4.4.2 Palestinian groups under Israeli occupation
This researcher believes that the Sulha could, in theory, be an important mechanism to
use to resolve disputes between the Palestinians and the Israelis. However, the disagreements
that occur between members of these two communities tend to be purely commercial disputes;
therefore, it would not be possible to use the Sulha, with its unique cultural context, for such
disputes. Arbitration in its modern incarnation would be more appropriate. It is difficult to
replace the idea of arbitration by the use of the Sulha with its Arab context, because this cultural
context may not be appropriate for, or accepted by, the Israelis. Moreover, the international
enforcement mechanisms of arbitration are valued both internationally and domestically. Thus,
again, it seems most appropriate to comprehensively apply arbitration in any purely commercial
dispute, while the Sulha may be applied between parties if the dispute has a significant social
impact, such as rape. In general, for disputes between Israelis and Palestinians, arbitration is
more successful and more effective for both parties than the use of the Sulha.
Let us return now to the concept of the JAC, which was briefly introduced above. As a
result of the significance of the economic ties between the Israelis and Palestinians, on 18
November 2013, an important event took place in the history of international commercial
arbitration. In East Jerusalem, a unique arbitration institution called the Jerusalem Arbitration
Center was launched, aimed at resolving trade disputes between Israeli and Palestinian
companies.1024 One of its main objectives is to increase trade and investment between the two
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communities and enhance the economy in the region by providing a neutral, feasible, and
satisfactory mechanism for settling disputes between Israeli and Palestinian companies. 1025 “ICC
arbitration model was adopted by JAC and adjusting it to local conditions. Its legal form will be
a joint venture, with ownership shared equally between the ICC Israel and the new ICC
Palestine.”1026 The main objective of the JAC is to resolve emerging trade disputes between
Palestinians and Israelis through international arbitration. 1027
However, according to Rogers, when the JAC was first proposed, the very idea faced
significant challenges. The idea of international arbitration was considered a new and largely
untouched concept among the Palestinian legal and commercial community. Second, under
Israeli law, in the event of a commercial conflict with a Palestinian entity, the Israeli entity had
the full right of access to civil justice, while it was extremely difficult for Palestinians to resort to
judicial proceedings in Israel, and Palestinian court rulings were usually unenforceable. 1028 As a
result of the political conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, there was little basis for
confidence that the JAC project would be a success. 1029 Third, one of the major practical
challenges facing the JAC was the enormous disparity in commercial and legal expertise
between Palestinians and Israelis, which affected the process of establishing JAC mechanisms.
Finally, there were legal challenges, including whether JAC arbitration proceedings would be
held in Israeli or Palestinian courts. 1030
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For the JAC to serve as a symbol of equality and an opportunity to prove the
effectiveness of arbitration, the legal form must be a “joint venture and ownership [must] be
shared equally between the ICC in Israel and the new ICC in Palestine.” All of this would occur
under the umbrella of the supervision and international support of [the] ICC in Paris. “The JAC
itself will be headquartered in Jerusalem, there are plans to build contact centers in Ramallah and
Tel Aviv, the respective homes of the ICC Palestine and the ICC Israel.” 1031
The JAC could be a model upon which regional arbitration centers could be developed,
given that it serves as an example of “regionalizing international arbitration” and an institution
that seeks to bring about the best binding and legal means to settle disputes. 1032 Whatever method
is used to resolve trade disputes between Palestinians and Israelis, both sides must find a
mechanism to resolve their disputes. The JAC is ideal as an independent body that is able to
resolve disputes between these two ethnicities. In sum, the JAC is a local, independent,
professional, and apolitical arbitral institution applying well-established international arbitration
principles, with the intention of providing a neutral and effective solution for business disputes
arising between otherwise hostile parties. Its activities present a unique opportunity to strengthen
economic cooperation and generally improve relations between Palestinians and Israelis. 1033
4.4.3 Sulha in Gaza and West Bank
As stated earlier, the Sulha is relatively ineffective in Palestine, due to the conflict with
Israel. Palestinians living in the West Bank do not recognize Israel as a state, nor do they trust
Israeli courts. Rather, most Palestinians continue to hold firmly to their own cultural principles
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and norms, and they also save money by avoiding Israeli courts and resolving their conflicts
internally. Israeli courts, for their part, benefit when Palestinians parties resolve their own
conflicts, because it saves these courts time and effort. For Palestinians under Israeli occupation,
the Sulha has nothing to do with Israel formal judicial system. However, it plays a key role in
preserving peace in the Arab communities within Israel. 1034
The Sulha is used in Gaza and the West Bank as a method to minimize crimes. It is based
on a caring approach for the honor of the victim’s clan in keeping with the Arabic cultural ethos.
Centrality and honor are closely related with tribes, clans, and the Middle Eastern family in
general. In Arab culture, family is central and extremely important. 1035 Honor is the key aspect of
life in Arab culture, and it is of central importance in dispute resolutions. Current analyses of
how disputes are resolved in the Middle East, including the use of the Sulha, agree that honor
(Sharaf) is central to the Sulha process.1036
In Arab culture, the aspect of honor is most clearly, yet most unfortunately, displayed in
the so-called “honor killing.”1037 This is a tragic event that occurs when male members of a
family murder their own female family members, such as mothers, sisters or daughters. 1038 This
terrifying act is done to restore the violated family honor. Indeed, one cannot think of a more
poignant (and brutal) statement of the meaning of honor than when a person murders his own kin
in order to restore the honor that he or she perceives as lost. 1039
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The Sulha presents an alternative that provides a higher honor than revenge. 1040 The
desire for vengeance is based on the idea that vengeance will bring back lost honor; however,
forgiveness is also rooted in the view that a ritualized, public forgiveness is a more honorable act
than vengeance.1041 The perpetrator’s family restores some of its lost honor by acknowledging in
public its responsibility for the crime and by offering to pay compensation and publicly stating
an apology. The perpetrator’s family may even offer (or be required) to move to a different area
for a period of time.1042
As for arbitration, in Gaza, despite the fact that the judgments of regular and tribal courts
are separate, formal courts still respect their tribal counterparts and perceive their arbitral rulings
as binding, if both litigants approve them. 1043 Conflicting parties are allowed to appeal and
challenge arbitral judgments. In such cases, a new decision is issued by two different arbitrators,
and the decision is binding for both litigants. Regular courts are responsible for enforcing the
tribal courts’ judgments.1044
4.4.4 The instance of the environmental Sulha1045
The Sulha is a traditional way of solving conflicts among Arab Palestinians in Israel and
fostering peace. However, there is a particular type of Sulha used by Palestinians in Israel—the
“environmental Sulha”—that is quite different in comparison to the Sulha that is used in some
other countries. Also, the composition of the Jaha is different from its traditional composition,
and it does not always address all of the issues at stake. Therefore, some concerns should be
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considered. The environmental Sulha is a revised model of Sulha that was introduced in 2009 as
an optimal method to be used in environmental disputes. The idea of rejecting the traditional
Sulha was put forward in an article on the types of environmental conflicts that broke out
between the Palestinians and the Israelis.1046 The authors of this article concluded that traditional
Sulha succeeded in achieving its goals, but it did not solve the main source of conflict—
environmental concerns—between the two ethnicities.1047 There are many examples of
environmental conflicts within the Arab society in Israel: conflict between residents and
municipal governments over high-voltage power lines due to fear of electromagnetic radiation,
disputes over failure to maintain proper hygiene and waste management, concerns about noise,
problems with land management such as dust and the proper care of buildings, etc.
The author of the article mention above, suggests that three different groups of people
should be included in an environmental Sulha. The first is the "social group" - legal members of
the community, who would be included in any type of Sulha. The second is the "professional
group" – those with the necessary expertise in the field of the environment. The third is the
“religious group” – those who are familiar with Islamic law, particularly on the environmental
matter at hand1048.
Official legal jurists seldom support the Jaha’s process in an environmental Sulha. Thus,
the Jaha that tackles environmental problems usually includes experts on environmental
problems, and the environmental Jaha should contain at least three members who are proficient
in the specific environmental problem that is causing the dispute. For instance, if environmental
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planning issues are disputed, the group should contain planners. If the dispute concerns air
pollution, certain Jaha members should have knowledge of that area, etc. 1049
The innovation of the environmental Sulha model is evidence that the idea of the Sulha is
achievable in various fields, although it still may be subject to criticisms that are expressed about
the traditional Sulha in general. The environmental Sulha model drew attention to the
importance of resorting to people with experience with the Sulha and including them in the Jaha
as independent members. They are recognized not only for their technical expertise in the
environmental issue in question, but also for their interest in helping to resolve a conflict in a
peaceful way. Therefore, the idea of having Jaha members with “subject matter expertise” should
be adopted in all medical, technical, political, scientific, commercial and other fields that are
addressed through the use of the Sulha.
4.5 The need for Sulha
Tradition and custom are among the main sources of modern law in many societies. The
law usually represents and regulates the social conditions of the people. Therefore, important
components of any law should be the society’s social fabric and communal conditions. religious,
cultural, economic and political factors are also vital when it comes to creating laws. 1050
Accordingly, the law is a fusion of human and societal behavior that develops over a long period
of time. Law abiding people will abide by their society’s laws out of a feeling of moral
obligation to themselves, and legislators focus on binding the people to the law. Tradition and
custom are the source of legislation in Jordan and Palestine. Law based on custom is practiced in
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many matters by means of the Sulha. Obedience to customary law is reflected in the respect that
people show for its regulations and norms.1051
The goal of the Sulha is quite different from that of a regular court. The Sulha aims to
maintain a strong relationship between a subcommunity’s harmony and strength. 1052 The Sulha
aims to resolve conflicts and to bring the conflicting parties back to the state in which they
existed before the conflict occurred. It also aims to prevent acts revenge taken by the victim’s
family side in the case of murder, for instance. The Sulha is also used to prevent lasting damage
to relationships among clans or to individual affiliations within the clan. 1053 For example, two
parties from the same family will prefer to use the Sulha instead of going to the state court,
because the process and result of the Sulha will be more confidential, so the conflict will be
confined only to the families involved.
Also, a tribal verdict usually provides more satisfaction to the parties than a court order
would with regard to charges or resolutions, because the outcome of the process will be in
accordance with the spirit of the culture and/or of Sharia law. 1054 The tribe judge presides over
the proceedings as a part of his social responsibilities as an elder. 1055 The parties involved are
more likely to follow their own norms and traditions, presided over by the elder of a family that
is well known to them, than to seek judgment according to the legal regulations of the country.
Also, the Sulha procedure is often quick and inexpensive (in fact, it is often free). In minor civil
cases, a tribal judge may reach a decision immediately after the first hearing or meeting with the
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parties.1056 However, in some complicated matters or an old conflict between two parties, the
Sulha process may continue for a years. 1057 Still, compared with the Sulha, the state court’s
procedures are typically longer, 1058 often taking take years to process a case, 1059 which is one
reason that most parties do not prefer the state courts. Another reason that tribal community
members tend to eschew the official courts is that these courts do not have the same institutional
dignity as the tribal courts. The tribal courts’ power and significance comes from traditions and
customs that passed down among the tribe through many generations. In addition, the arbitrators
of tribal courts issue rulings that cannot be abolished due to the high esteem in which the
arbitrators are held by the people in the community. 1060
Tribal justice forms a social protection network and maintains dignity within the shared
subcommunity.1061 It also prevents internal fighting, because the Sulha is an excellent way to
reduce the victim’s family’s anger and prevent retaliation. The Sulha ruling restores the social
dignity of the families involved and of the society at large. If the perpetrator’s party chooses the
Sulha to settle an issue, this shows that they respect the victim’s family and are willing to listen
to their requests and respect their rights. If no Atwa requests are made from the perpetrator’s
family, that means that they do not respect the victim’s family, and the outcome of the issue
becomes more uncertain.1062
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In many cases, the legal authorities of the country’s state justice system take part in the
Sulha, even though the Sulha aims to resolve matters without other judicial interference. In a
case of murder, the Jaha will guarantee that the case will be handed to the authorities and solved
according to their procedures. In this case, the goal of the Sulha is to lead parties to reach an
agreement and prevent further violence. In cases when mitigating the court charges against the
perpetrator is not the goal, then the perpetrator will receive the proper punishment for his or her
crime. The perpetrator’s family will admit responsibility for the bad actions (Atwat Eteraf) of the
perpetrator.
The courts, on the other hand, focus more on the wrongdoing itself and apply the same
charges to every perpetrator. The Sulha is more flexible; for example, if the criminal is a firsttime offender, the victim’s family may be willing to forgive the crime, and the Sulha will move
quickly to a resolution. Also, the tribal judiciary law plays a major role in controlling the
community, as most of its principles are taken from Islamic law and agreed upon norms. 1063 The
state courts have less control in the communities, and some issues cannot be resolved by the
police or the courts. In fact, a state judge or the police may direct the people to engage in a Sulha
after certain kinds of conflict. The tribal judicial system can resolve conflicts in a single session
and prevent further bloodshed.1064
Lawmakers in Jordan and Palestine have understood the value of the Sulha in that it
allows people to resolve their own problem as they see fit. The Sulha is important for the state
because it saves their courts time and energy. 1065 In many cases, the Sulha can be of service to
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the state courts when the two disputants agree to resolve their problem, and the perpetrator
accepts the state court’s charge or turns himself over to the authorities for a prison sentence.
4.6 Choice of legal provisions
It is important to understand how important tribes are in Arab societies. The family
traditionally has mutual assistance obligations to its own kin and to the tribe as a whole. The
tribe is a structure of extended families, and tribes are divided into clans. Clans are divided into
family groups (ha’mulah), some of which can trace their origins back ten generations or more.
Based on genealogy, each of these family groups consists of people who share a direct blood
connection. Individuals share blood connections across five generations and are responsible for
each other on issues related to blood revenge. 1066
Studying the method of the Sulha is complex, because most of the sources for both the
disputing parties and the judge depend on oral transmission between generations. The Bedouin
society refers to the Sulha as the “Master of Rulings” and considers it to be its own unique
method of resolving conflicts within the society. Dispute resolutions in the Middle East are
guided by the overarching principle of the collective interests of the family, the tribe, the
community, and the country. The Arab people’s Islamic and tribal history places collective
interest as the highest principle in a hierarchy of values in terms of both dispute resolution and
everyday dealings. The maintenance of relationships and the restoration of harmony is a duty
incumbent upon all members of the group as well as the third-party intervener, whether he is a
judge (a qadi), an arbitrator (a hakam), or a conciliator.
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Tribal law was formed as a result of common sense and general principles across
generations of tribal society. The tribal system has flexibility in discovering solutions to
conflicts.1067 Therefore, the law adopted to resolve a given case will be whatever law is most
appropriate to that case and will meet the purpose of restoring community peace and preserving
the dignity of the family of the victim. The applicable law should meet four conditions that are
understood in the collective conscience of the society and are viewed as stable principles of law
that is applicable to tribal conflict.
The first is proportionality and justice in the judgment of the Jaha committee or the
Sheikh (Muslih). For example, the aggressor should not be sentenced to a punishment greater
than the harm he or she caused, meaning that punishment should always be proportionate with
the degree of assault. Second, the tribal law should match with the tribe’s norms, customs, and
public sensibilities. Third, the tribal law governance must be consistent with the provisions of
Islamic law and with the public order of the state. In the case of rape, for example, the judge
would not order the rapist’s sister or mother to be raped as a punishment; a wrong is not
corrected with another wrong. Fourth, the law should not explicitly contradict the provisions of
the national law or of the state tribal law; therefore, the Jaha committee does not issue sentences
of imprisonment or the death penalty. 1068
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4.6.1 The link between customary law and Sharia law 1069
The concept of the Sulha existed before Islam was widely adopted and practiced.
However, presently, the Sulha is known and adopted across almost the entire the Middle East 1070
by Muslims, Christians, and Druze. Arab culture is a strong common factor that brings together
many religions, and Islam is a common reference.
Jordan has formal judicial system, Sharia law, which coexists with tribal law. 1071 The
prophetic tradition and the Quran’s basic concepts and norms are present in Jordan, but they
have their roots deep in the traditional Arab method of resolving disputes. 1072 Today, the form
that is known as Tahkim, even though the meaning of this term has endured changes throughout
history. It first meant a form of reconciliation that mixed the elements of mediation and
arbitration. Currently, the term is used in alignment with the modern meaning of arbitration. In a
way, the Sulha stands for Islamic conflict resolution with a list of priorities. It values moral
values more than an assessment of costs and benefits. 1073
During his prophetic career, Muhammad was a political leader and peacemaker in the
Muslim community. Indeed, his social and political role was not so different from the role of a
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traditional arbitrator.1074 In the early struggles of Muslim societies, and in the history of Islam in
general, the role of dispute resolution was critical.1075 Observed from the Islamic theological
angle, Islam has the power to resolve global disputes and conflicts on the basis of principles: a
moral educational program used for preventing conflict, and a value-based system that would
differentiate between unjust and just arguments and claims. 1076
The Muslim’s holy book, the Quran, fosters forgiveness and reconciliation between all
Muslims because of the value of unity among communities. According to the Quran, “the
believers are but brothers, so make settlement between your brothers. And fear Allah that you
may receive mercy.”1077 This verse indicates that Muslims are obligated to protect the familial
relationships in their society and foster unity within the community. As part of worshiping
(Allah), Muslims are awarded for righteous deeds, such as resolving communal conflicts. For
example, the prophet Muhammad, according to the Hadith, ( )ﷺsaid: “Shall I not inform you of
something more excellent in degree than fasting, prayer and almsgiving (Sadaqah)? The people
replied: Yes, Prophet of Allah! He said: It is putting things right between people, spoiling them is
the shaver (destructive).”1078 The Quran encourages all communities under divine guidance to
apply the guidance that it grants them.1079
In general, Islamic Sharia law charges penalties for wrongdoings. For example, the
amount of money that will be given to the victim’s family (Diya) will be in accordance with the
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Sharia calculation and methodology.1080 When a person commits the crime of adultery, the
Sheikh will rely on the provisions of Islamic evidentiary law, which requires four witnesses to
the act or a confession from the adulterer. 1081 In addition, to prevent endless reciprocal bloodshed
between families and tribes, Islamic law contains a proportionality principle regarding revenge
or reprisal.1082 Islamic norms encourage forgiveness as a divine and social ethical good that is
fostered through Diya.1083 The Sulha’s purpose, to make peace between clans, makes it one of
the most important aspects of Sharia law and of Islamic principles in general.
4.6.2 The relationship between customary (tribal) law and state law
The Bedouin people1084 use their own law, which is customary law in many aspects. The
two chief problems faced by their judicial system are bloodshed and violence, and conflicts
related to women.1085 Other issues such as assault, slander, and even some civil disputes may be
resolved by applying customary law. Some describe the Bedouin’s customary legal system as a
body of confirmed beliefs and rules that are older than Islam. The Bedouin customary laws are
important, because, along with the state legal system, they govern key questions concerning the
Bedouin people.1086 Sally Falk Moore described customary law positively, even though she
understands this law as a set of rules coming from a social space, which, while not completely
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controlled by the state, is still related to it.1087 Therefore, in Jordan and Palestine, authorities
recognize customary law to a certain extent.
As mentioned before, the phrase “legal pluralism” refers to a situation in which at least
two judicial systems are functioning in a single area.1088 Some scholars think that using the term
“law” when referencing customs may be problematic, as it expands the term “law” to mean
different sets of norms.1089
The Jordanian1090 “tribal court law was issued in 1924 and modified in 1936.” 1091 This
law was valid until 1976, when it was abolished according to the Abolition of Tribal Laws Act
no. 34, which stated that Jordanian tribes fell under state jurisdiction. The tribe members could
still take their cases to their traditional judges according to their legal tradition. 1092 However, the
law mention above was practiced informally until 1987, when King Hussein signed a document
that considers tribal customs to not be legally binding. 1093
Tribal legal systems in Jordan have neither the death penalty nor prison sentences;
however, it can settle minor disputes relatively easily, depending on the creativity and efforts of
the Jaha.1094 Tribal law’s power has been weakening, however, and it seems to be focused on
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family conflicts and controlling women, although it does also cover cases of individual death and
car accidents.1095 Consequently, the state law has become crucial for Jordan’s judicial system. 1096
This law may be used if one of the disputing parties is not a Bedouin, but only if all parties agree
to this; otherwise, the dispute will be settled in the Jordanian courts. 1097
Regarding criminal issues, the Jordanian “law recognizes two rights: a personal right (AlHaq Al-sakhzay) and a public right (Al-Haq al’am)”1098 and assumes an interconnection between
tribal law and state law. The public right is realized if there is a conviction in the state’s judicial
system. The sentence imposed may be reduced by the state court if the victim’s family approves,
which may occur after tribal procedures are conducted and the “blood money” has been paid;
accepting the blood money means that the victim’s family has agreed to give up its private right.
Courts may reduce capital cases to imprisonment in such a case. At present, tribal law is such that
Jordanian law and Sharia law complement one another without conflict. 1099 Therefore, the
relationship between the law of the state and the customary law is intertwined, because both laws
have the same aim: to resolve issues and keep communities stable.
In Palestine and Jordan there is legal pluralism at both the state and non-state levels; there
is more than one “set of rules” operating in a single area, and they often overlap. 1100 Non-state
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law, such as customary law and norms of social order, are viewed as normative orders belonging
to the system of legal pluralism, which in most cases is independent of the state. 1101
Some scholars claim that states view non-state laws as laws that reflect a containment of
will, rather than as norms produced by society.1102 This might indicate the ‘domestication’ of
non-state law into processes of ‘recognition’ and ‘enforcement’ intended to create change
without regard to normative content. 1103
4.7 The Criticism of Sulha
According to tribal sheikhs and the advocates of adherence to tribal customs, the Sulha
can be justified for three reasons. First, societies have accepted tribal customs. Second, the Sulha
enables swift action that convinces the victim’s family not to take revenge on the perpetrator or
his or her family, thus preventing a potential crisis from escalating immediately following the
crime. Third, after the tribal reconciliation, the case usually ends without any form of further
crime conducted by the perpetrator’s family’s side. However, there are some major concerns
regarding the Sulha in general and about tribal law in particular. These concerns are discussed in
the sections to follow.
4.7.1 Tribal law is not a valid law1104
There is a certain dissonance when it comes to the tribal judiciary system. Some argue
that it is an outdated system that is inefficient in a contemporary legal environment, especially in
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relation to the issue of women’s honor. Another problem has to do with the “Jalwah” concept,
according to which the perpetrator’s relatives have to leave the area after the incident happens.
This is usually considered a severe punishment for the family members who did not commit any
crime or wrongdoing. The state authorities in Jordan realize how difficult this issue is for the
evicted families and for the stability of the societal structure. Therefore, the authorities have
attempted to minimize the use of Jalwah and mitigate the consequences of the honor crime. 1105
Despite the problems and the need for modernization, Jalwah does have some limits; namely, not
all family members are required to evacuate, and they often are only required to stay away for a
week after the crime was committed, and they may return to their homes after the Atwa.1106
Jordanian legislators realize the effects of the “Jalwah” concept for the societies, and in 2016,
they attempted to codify the process of the Sulha and the Jalwah.
Another concern about tribal law is that, in some cases, people believe that the customary
law is above the state law in cases in which customary law conflicts with the state law. 1107
With the above critiques being noted, others argue in favor of customary law and the
Sulha. People are different and therefore acts of wrongdoing will be different as well, and the
Sulha sometimes consider a judgment according to the character of a person and the nature of his
or her wrongdoing.
In cases of conflict between the state law and customary law, the state law always wins,
because the state allows people to use their own laws as long as they do not violate the active law
of the country. Neither the judgment of the Jaha or the Musleh’s decision shall be applied they
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contradict the public order or the provisions of Islamic law according to the Jordanian
constitution.1108
4.7.2 The tribal system is unjust to the disputing parties 1109
Some would argue that when it comes to the balance between justice and social peace,
the most often used type of informal justice is Palestinian and Jordanian informal justice.
Informal justice is necessary in both the Palestinian and the Jordanian legal environments. 1110 For
example, certain authors have stated that informal justice prevents further bloodshed.1111
However, the Sulha does not guarantee preventing violence and bloodshed permanently. The
conciliation process may not stop a conflict from escalating into vengeance and retaliation. 1112
However, the state charge for a criminal act may not be sufficient to resolve an issue.
Family conflicts tend to depend on the outcome of the Sulha. As mentioned, in some cases, in
order to issue his decision, the state judge will wait for the end of the Sulha. One local newspaper
reported that a defendant spent 10 years in person until the king ordered a special amnesty for
him; i.e., a release from prison with the condition that the victim’s family drop its personal
rights. The victim’s family still requested seventy thousand dollars as “Diya,” but the defendant
and his family refused to pay, because there was no Sulha, that the defendant would end up back
in prison.1113 After many negotiations with the victim’s family, the perpetrator was released with
a promise not to enter the city of Irbid (the location of the crime) for the rest of his life. 1114
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There has been debate over whether the Sulha weakens the state’s security system or
containment policy. Those who argue that the Sulha is not bad for the state’s containment policy
are mostly tribal leaders (Sheikhs) and administrative rulers. 1115 Sheikhs and administrative
rulers focus on security and peace more than anything else, and they see the Sulha as an essential
factor in social stability. They do not believe that in allowing the use of the Sulha, the state
stands idly by; rather, they believe that the state works to enhance security and control bloodshed
by taking security precautions and organizing to contain crises. 1116 Indeed, state authorities also
stress that they take appropriate security actions in times of crisis and deal with any attempts to
bypass the law.1117
However, some academics, jurists, and civil society organizations have argued against the
Sulha. Their arguments are based on several factors. First, they observe that the Sulha infringes
on the state’s sovereignty by allowing parties to not follow the national state law, which (they
argue) weakens the state’s security system. Second, they criticize the state’s administrative rulers
as embodying ‘weakness’, resulting from the state’s inability to empower them and enhance their
role. The Jalwah, which forces the perpetrator’s family to leave their homes and move away
from the victim’s family for a period of time, or forever, it too harsh, these critics claim. They
further emphasize that, in some cases, the Sulha is unjust to women.1118 For example, in order to
close a case, the Sulha committee may order the rapist to marry the raped woman, even if the
woman does not agree. The committee’s aim is to protect the honor of the victim’s family,
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without considering any of the emotional damage inflicted upon the woman. However, there are
movements afoot to reorganize the Sulha through a national law that reduces its severity and
makes it fit better into the framework of the Jordanian legal system, which provides justice,
social stability, and satisfaction to the tribes. 1119 Others may argue that the critique about
unfairness to women is off base, because women receive special treatment in Arab society. 1120
The customary law of tribes or the “moral law” that controls the community cannot be
ignored. In many cases, this will mean leadership and organization by governmental figures with
respect to the Jaha.1121 The goal of the Jaha is to give social value, prestige, and respect to the
victim family. Also, it generates more pressure on the victim’s family to reach an agreement with
the perpetrator’s family.
4.7.3 Interference in the work of the judiciary and a parallel judicial system 1122
Generally, the mechanism of the Sulha differs from that of the national judicial system.
However, the relationship between the two should be based on mutual collaboration without the
interference of any system into the procedures of another. In many cases, such collaboration is
successful in that the Sulha helps to resolve numerous small cases before they reach the state
courts, which helps the courts by reducing the number of cases they must handle. Also, in many
cases, the Sulha can help the court end conflicts quickly, such that the guilty party can come to
the court with an agreement, and the judge will end the case based on that. 1123
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However, in some cases, the courts interfere in the Sulha process, which will affect the
outcome of the court ruling when the case eventually comes before a judge. Also, tribes may
interfere with the quality of the evidence presented to the court. Some tribes, for example, refuse
to provide the any evidence that may exonerate the offender and/or refuse to hire a lawyer,
despite the offender’s legal right to have one as guaranteed by Jordan’s Code of Criminal
Procedure. In cases of murder, the family of the victim must arrest the suspect and have him
confess to the police within 24 hours, threatening that "which would not be praised" if he does
not comply. Some consider that this action constitutes a moral and material threat to the rights of
the suspect, which interferes with the work of the state’s judiciary system, violates the sanctity of
its courts, and may impact the conduct of justice contrary to the provisions of the Penal Code. 1124
4.7.4 Customary law violates constitutional rights 1125
Currently, there is a wide debate among scholars and legal experts in Jordan regarding
whether customary law infringes the provision of the constitution.1126 Some believe that applying
the provisions of tribal custom is a constitutional violation. Most of the “written constitution”
guarantees personal freedoms; does this mean that the individual has the right and freedom to
choose a residence and a decent living? As mentioned before, in tribal law, the victim’s family
may request “Jalwah” for the family of the perpetrator, which deprives them of the right to
choose their residence and to have the chance to make a living. 1127 On the other hand, some
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argue that even though this means that the customary law opposes certain constitutional rights, it
is still necessary to maintain peace in the society.
4.8 The difference between the Sulha and similar alternative dispute resolution methods
There are important differences and similarities between the Sulha and modern forms of
alternative dispute resolution methods. In the following section, we examine the differences and
similarities among) Western Style ADR) mediation and arbitration, arbitration with its modern
concept, and arbitration in its Islamic concept (Tahkim).
4.8.1

Western Style ADR vs. the Sulha
We call the Sulha cultural arbitration for the purposes of this research and to draw

attention to the limits of its similarities with the main elements of arbitration. The Sulha is a
traditional customary judicial process used by clans in the Middle East; the concept of Sulha
originates from a pre-Islamic era. 1128 It utilizes a special combination of local arbitration and
mediation methods to transform a desire for revenge into forgiveness in instances of community
conflict. In numerous cases, the Sulha successfully resolves conﬂicts between families. 1129 The
arbitration and mediation techniques that constitute the Sulha are performed interchangeably by
the Jaha, the members of which typically are communal dignitaries, i.e., individuals of high
esteem and social position in the community.1130 The Sulha mediates the dispute to make peace
between conflicting clans, and it also arbitrates the case, which means that its judgment is ﬁnal
and binding.1131 The mediator in a Sulha process is usually evaluative, aggressive, and, if
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necessary, coercive.1132 Still, Sulha mediators must be seen to be neutral in the eyes of the
conflicting parties, and all caucuses must occur in neutral location venues. 1133 The genuine
cultural feeling in the social environments in which the Sulha is utilized bends toward restoring a
family’s honor by means of revenge; the Sulha aims to replace the desire for revenge by
reconciling the disputing parties. 1134 As noted many times over in this chapter, the Sulha is an
invaluable way of resolving disputes, and the community and its leaders pressure the conflicting
groups to accept the Sulha and turn their respective families and clans toward peace. This allows
normal life within the community to resume. Without such resolution, the entire community may
experience bloodshed in its streets.1135 The violence can assume various forms, such as
explosions in public places, drive-by shootings, and various other psychological, physical, and
economic offenses.1136 While some narrow and ‘functional’ deﬁnitions of mediation state that it
solves only technical problems,1137 the Western understanding of mediation is broader than this,
because it assumes that groups would prefer to avoid minor technical matters when it comes to
reconciliation.1138 In most cases, the Sulha provides a solution that is similar to a broader
understanding of mediation according to the Western style. 1139
Thus, there are some similarities between Western style ADR and the Sulha. For
example, the mediator may suggest his or her own solutions, act as a go between, and initiate a
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dialogue toward resolution.1140 However, in most ways, the Sulha is different from traditional
mediation in the U. S. For example, the members of the Jaha may have previous relationships
with the disputants, whereas mediators are neutral in the West. In the Sulha, there is a formal
closing ceremony, while there is no such thing in Western mediation. The Sulha takes into
account the entire community, while mediation only concentrates on the two disputants. 1141
Unlike Western mediation, which the court orders, the Sulha is conducted on a voluntary basis.
In the Sulha, there is no difference between mediation and arbitration—both methods are used
when required1142—whereas Western mediation draws this distinction.
Philosophical and cultural differences are the main reasons why mediation or arbitration
and the Sulha are applied differently.1143 Western mediation and arbitration are utilized for both
individuals and groups. The Sulha, on the other hand, is exclusively community-centered. It
offers a solution for clans and does not replace a person’s culpability or responsibility. The state
judicial system subjects suspect to a trial but handles only speciﬁcally inter- or intra-clan dispute
results. This reﬂects the tight relationships of mutual responsibility among members of the same
clan,1144 for whom religious and formal legal systems offer no solutions. 1145 Arbitration and
mediation focus on direct disputants, while with the Sulha, the focus is on the community. It
merges elements from arbitration and meditation, which are different processes. As with Western
arbitration, the Sulha makes the final binding decision. There are various factors that encourage
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participation in a Sulha, such as atonement, religion, and participation. During the arbitration, the
contract binds the disputants to participate. This means that in the Sulha, the disputants are not
allowed to stop the process and try alternatives, while in Western mediation, the disputants are
free go to court at any moment.1146
Another difference between the Sulha and arbitration is a lack of “face-to-face meetings”
between the disputants. Modern arbitration combines private caucuses and face-to-face meetings,
while the Sulha occurs via private caucuses only1147 between the Jaha and representatives of the
conflicting parties.1148 Some argue that having no mutual meetings denies the conflicting parties
to change to experience the frustration of being a victim or to publicly perceive the injustice that
each disputant is feeling personally.1149 However, in the Sulha, the parties understand exactly
how the victim’s family is feeling, because the disputants share the same cultural background.
Private caucus meetings help alleviate the anger between conflicting clans. They enable the Jaha
to modify their arguments and increase the chances of reconciliation between the parties. 1150
The mediator’s or arbitrator’s roles also differ between the Sulha and Western arbitration.
The Sulha could include as many as 20 or more people on the Jaha committee,1151 whereas there
is often only one mediator in Western arbitration. The factors that affect the Jaha’s judgment are
oral history, precedence, and long conversations with its members. Throughout the Sulha, the
Jaha assesses the situation and may become aggressive with the disputants. If the Jaha evaluates
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that there will be no agreement, they will state that without the agreement, the community will
suffer, and they (the Jaha members) will lose face, and their honor will be offended. 1152 The
importance of concepts such as reputation and honor might appear trivial or obsolete to a
Western citizen; however, in a society that is clan-based, these concepts are of crucial
importance and constitute a leverage. 1153 The understanding of honor (sharaf) is an important
difference between modern arbitration and the Sulha. In the West, honor as a term is often used
in its usual ‘folkloric’ form without a great degree of importance. 1154 In Muslim societies,
however, honor is crucial to conflict resolution and life in general. 1155 In Muslim cultures, the
loss of honor usually escalates a dispute further, while restored honor is a key aspect in solving
the dispute.1156 Therefore, honor in the Sulha is identiﬁed as the central principle and a functional
tool in achieving peace.1157 Western arbitration or meditation does not use such pressure
tactics.1158 However, techniques such as reframing and alternatives’ comparison are employed by
both Jaha and Western arbitrators.1159
The logic behind the Sulha is to protect the community from divisions between families
and prevent further escalation of a conflict between parties. Usually, the parties involved in the
conflict consist of two groups: the family of the victim and the family of perpetrator, unlike the
conflicts involved in ADR style mediation, which tend to be between two individual parties or
two companies. The ideal of ADR-style mediation is not to resolve the problem per se, but to
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keep the society violence-free and stable. The Sulha is primarily concerned with forgiveness.
The offended party has to forgive for the Sulha to succeed and establish peace. 1160 Meanwhile,
modern arbitration and mediation are based on finding a quick and inexpensive resolution to the
conflict. Further, when it comes to contracts, modern arbitration values practical outcomes more
than moral theorizing. Also, it is flexible in choosing which means to use when pursuing
achievable ends.1161
4.8.3 Tahkim vs. the Sulha
The term Tahkim is used among Muslim scholars to mean arbitration, and it has been
practiced throughout Islamic history. It has origins in the pre-Islamic period, when tribe leaders
employed arbitration to take care of conflicts. 1162 There are differences between Tahkim and the
Sulha in two general ways: linguistically and in practice. Linguistically, the Sulha refers to a
settlement between two conflicting parties, while Tahkim is the fair judgment between two
parties. According to most Islamic scholarship, the Sulha is defined as a contract for settling an
issue after it happened or, at times, even before it takes place. 1163 The Sulha committee could
interfere and employ a Sulha if they think that two parties may disagree in future. Thus, we
consider a Sulha to be a case in which there are two conflicting parties trying to reach an
agreement to resolve their conflict. However, in a Sulha, the wrongdoer may have to
compromise by giving up all or some of his or her rights in deference to the damaged party in
order to maintain a good relationship between the parties. In Tahkim, two parties hire or go to a
judge (Muhakkim) who specializes in their type of conflict and will judge between the parties
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according the principles of law and justice without compromising either party’s rights. 1164 In the
Sulha, the outcome is usually a voluntary agreement between the two parties with the goal of
ending the conflict, whereas the outcome in Tahkim is a judicial decision enforced by the
appropriate judicial channels.
Scholars of Islamic jurisprudence agree that reconciliation is one of the contracts of the
Sulha as stated in the definition, but the majority of scholars believe that the composition of the
peace is not an independent contract with its own terms and conditions. Islamic jurisprudence
does not identify the Sulha agreement as a self-standing contract, because certain elements are
lacking, but they do identify it as a subcontract of the subject of the conflict. 1165 For example, the
reconciliation of money is considered a sales agreement, and the reconciliation of the benefit of
property is considered a lease or rent agreement. To better understand how that works, let us
consider an example of a conflict between the two parties regarding leasing issues. Essentially,
the Sulha will modify the lease agreement in question, and that will be the Sulha’s contract. To
be more specific, imagine that person A is renting a store from person B for a set price, and that
after one year, the rent will be doubled. At that point they turn to the Sulha to modify the terms
of the lease agreement such that it does not change after one year. The new, modified contract is
considered the Sulha contract. If A and B decide to use Tahkim instead, the Muhakkim will rule
in the same way that any judge would rule based on the laws and principles of a particular
judicial system.
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4.8.3 Ordinary Arbitration vs. the Sulha
The Sulha employs some practices that are similar to modern arbitration and also
contains some aspects of mediation-related practices.1166 In a Sulha, the offending group is
required to begin the process of the Sulha.1167 The perpetrator’s party is encouraged to employ
the Sulha, because if it does not, the victim and his or her family may commit yet another crime
in order to avenge the family and restore honor. 1168 A written authorization from the offending
group is usually given to the Sulha committee.1169 This authorization (Tafwid) allows the Jaha to
act on the behalf of the perpetrator’s family. This action contains two parts: first, the family
authorizes the Jaha to work on its behalf and employ the Sulha. Second, the perpetrator’s family
must agree to any verdict of the Jaha. The authorization clearly indicates that the Jaha’s
representative of the perpetrator’s family will accept the case. From that moment onwards, the
case is on the family’s conscience. The representative will agree to any legal decision issued in
the case.1170 In some cases, to confirm the Tafwid, the perpetrator’s family gives a token of good
will (Atwa). This is essentially a bond (for example, a few thousand dollars) that additionally
guarantees that the family will agree to the verdict that the Jaha reaches. The Jaha will first
arrange the Atwa and the Tafwid, and then it will visit the perpetrator’s family so as to make
them accept the Sulha. It will also silently ‘invite’ the victim’s family to participate. The Jaha
then states it has the authorization from the offender’s family, and invites the offended family to
consider it.1171 The Jaha employs this respectful approach because the victim’s family is still
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suffering from the damage of the crime, i.e., harmed honor and property. Moreover, the offender
family would likely respond to a commanding tone, especially if it is being ordered to participate
in a process that does not conform to its instinct of restoring lost honor by means of revenge. 1172
If the victim’s family accepts the Jaha’s invitation to take part in the Sulha, it must sign the
authorization (Tafwid) upon which the entire clan is bound by the Jaha’s verdict.1173 If the
victim’s family accepts the money (Atwa), that is an important sign of willingness to consider
peace instead of revenge.1174 When the victim’s family accepts the Atwa, it accepts the Hodna as
well, which is an agreement requiring the clans to stop all conflict for some time. The goal of the
agreement is to prevent retaliation for the course of the Sulha.
Regarding arbitration, the conflicting families consider the terms of the arbitration and try
to reach an agreement. If the agreement to participate in binding arbitration is reached, the
opposing clans’ agreement to the arbitrator’s ruling must be enforced. 1175 Essentially, the crucial
aspect in arbitration, that is the reason that an arbitral verdict usually has the same power as a
court ruling.1176
4.8.3.1 The concept of Conﬁdentiality in Sulha
In many cases, the Sulha occurs along with a formal legal process, whereas during
Western ADR processes, mediation and arbitration occur instead of a formal legal process. 1177
This difference can be seen in the way in which the conﬁdentiality concept is perceived and used
in Western ADR. Regarding Western mediation, the mediator must not give away any
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information about the process if no agreement is reached and the case returns to court. 1178
However, in court-mandated mediations, the mediator may disclose details of the agreement to
the judge if an agreement is reached.1179 The Sulha members are required not to disclose any
information while interviewing members of the conflicting or others.

1180

The Jaha will only

disclose information to the other party if such act will benefit the process or if the party who
gave the information agrees to it. The reason for such relative conﬁdentiality is the Jaha’s
willingness to encourage a peaceful relationship between the parties. The Jaha may restate the
information of a party if it benefits the process. 1181 The Sulha has another layer of conﬁdentiality
with regard to the Jaha’s decision-making process when contemplating the verdict. While the
Sulha’s process develops, different Jaha members will have differing opinions regarding the
case. Therefore, the Jaha must maintain conﬁdentiality with regard to its contemplations and
opinions. This minimizes any pressure of retaliation following a verdict that the parties may
consider unfair.1182 In the process of Western mediation, the members must keep any critical
information conﬁdential in the course of the process. 1183
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4.8.3.2 The concept of neutrality in the Sulha
Third party neutrality is critical in the Sulha as well as in Western ADR.1184 Neutrality is
deﬁned as being impartial and objective and keeping confidentiality. 1185 The conflicting parties
must consider neutrality during the entire process, because the Jaha’s aim is to reach a
settlement. Therefore, the conflicting sides must be aware that the Jaha is completely objective
during the process.1186 In a Sulha, the requirements for the neutrality are not always easily
kept.1187 For instance, in the Israeli Sulha, the Arab community occupies small areas, and the
Jaha members often belong to the same area as the disputing parties. Therefore, the Jaha is a
vital part of community life, taking part in personal, territorial, commercial, and political
disputes. This might affect the disputing parties, who may or may not consider the Jaha to be
neutral. Still, the Jaha members must maintain the image of being unbiased throughout the entire
course of their lives, which fosters their reputation as being neutral. 1188
‘Location neutrality’ is a specific aspect of neutrality available in the Sulha.1189 It means
that dispute caucuses occur in neutral places lest an advantage is given to one of the parties. 1190
However, this is often hard to organize in a small place, where the majority of people are either
related or know each other. The Jaha representatives know about those issues and attempt to
avoid them, so they usually organize meetings in council chambers. 1191 There is a tool in the
Sulha that helps maintain neutrality: the veto power that the parties receive regarding certain
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neutral members who may be participating in the process. Conflicting families and their leaders
may affect the process to some degree by having a veto power during the first phase of the
process. If some of the parties perceive a Jaha member as not being neutral, they may veto his
participation. The Jaha’s leader must accept the veto and find a replacement for the member. 1192
Honor and respect are key factors for the conflicting parties in Sulha. Thus, the Jaha arranges the
seats such that neither party is favored. 1193 Neutrality may be also affected by money. In a Sulha,
remuneration for the Jaha representatives does not exist, while it is standard in Western
mediation and arbitration. Jaha representatives should not accept money for their services. Such
an act would hurt their reputation and honor in the community. The services of the Sulha must be
voluntary (provided for free), which means some Jaha members suffer financially, because they
are providing their services for free. 1194
4.9 The Legal Basis of Tribal Law Reform
Both Jordanian and Palestinian legislators take a more daring approach when dealing
with tribal Sulha as an alternative dispute resolution method for civil affairs and as a judicial
recognition of criminal matters. Some see tribal law as part of the Jordanian legal system, just
like Sharia law, the state’s formal legal system. 1195 Sharia law rules all family law disputes such
as divorce, but the tribal law structure rules primarily through the use of the Sulha.
4.9.1 The legal basis of tribal reform in civil conflicts
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The general rule in Jordan and Palestine is that there are no limitations or restrictions on
the choice of parties to use alternative methods to resolve issues. Therefore, the parties are free to
have their conflict resolved before a tribal court. Usually, the state court looks at civil or
commercial conflicts based on the choice of the parties. If the plaintiff and defendant select a
tribal judge to resolve an issue, the decision will be binding on the parties. Both Jordan and
Palestine have their own arbitration law code that allows parties to choose arbitration as a
method of resolving civil and commercial conflicts. Enforcing the arbitration award occurs
through the regular courts.1196 The Sulha’s decision could be treated by the court in the same way
as any arbitration award in civil matters.
4.9.2 The legal basis of tribal reform in criminal matters
As is well known, the philosophy of criminal law is to protect societies as a whole and to
help guide the guilty back onto the right path. The Sulha has similar goals, as it strives to protect
its own subcommunities, defend the rights of the victim, and discipline the perpetrator. Because
of the complexity of Jordanian society, the Jordanian legal system deals with the Sulha in one of
two ways. First, it uses the outcome of the Sulha as a mitigation of the criminal charges. Second,
the Sulha provides a reason for waiving the charges in certain crimes. 1197
As a general principle, the state is the only entity that investigates and rules on criminal
matters. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the tribal court does not cover criminal cases. 1198 However,
legislators in both Jordan and Palestine have adopted forgiveness principles to mitigate or waive
certain charges, which indirectly affect criminal charges. Likewise, it is customary for the
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judiciary in both countries to refer people to the Sulha in order to relieve pressure on the courts
and reduce the number of prisoners in prisons.1199 In fact, no article in the penal code of either
Jordan1200 or Palestine states that the Sulha prevents a case from being heard in the courts. While
nothing in the penal code indicates that the Sulha is a reason to mitigate charges, in practice, the
Sulha is treated as equivalent to the waiving of personal rights; thus, it becomes an official
document that is attached to the case file after the judge confirms that the victim or his or her
guardian has waived his or her personal right.
Consequently, in practice, when a wrong action occurs, the public prosecution treats the
case differently if the Sulha process is under way. The action of the prosecutor will depend on
the nature of the case and the criminal law. Also, in Jordan or Palestine, the prosecutor
prospector may stop the proceedings if he or she deems there is a lack of importance. This may
occur for cases of defamation and slander and cases involving the waiving of the complainant’s
personal rights (al-haq al-shakhsi). 1201 Article 52 states: “The clemency of the injured party shall
halt the legal action and the execution of the penalties which are not final, provided that the
initiation of the legal action is based on a personal complaint by the injured party.”1202
According to the provision of this article, in the case of forgiveness, the court or public
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prosecution may drop charges against the defendant. Hence, the Sulha holds the place of
forgiveness.1203
Another circumstance in which the judge or the discretionary authorities’ prosecutor may
mitigate the charges is based on the Sulha and the forgiveness of the victim’s family. The
discretionary authorities will evaluate the case based on the circumstances of the crime and the
outcome of the Sulha. In one of the highest layers of the Jordanian judiciary system, the Court of
Cassation, the Sulha is one of the Court’s reasons for mitigation. Therefore, the judge has the
authority to analyze the case and the surrounding factors of the incident and mitigate or suspend
the charges, or waive the case altogether if it involves minor violations. 1204 In all circumstances,
judges often have discretion to consider whether to accept the Sulha based on their examination
of each case according to its circumstances.
4.10

Enforcement of the Sulha
This section discusses the implementation of the Sulha’s decision in the context of two

important frameworks: the legal framework and the social framework. Regarding the legal
framework, the parties of the Sulha are understood to have concluded a contract between them to
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resolve a dispute and to agree to accept settlement through the Sulha. The Sulha’s decision thus
becomes binding and is considered by the court to be a condition for full reconciliation or a
mitigation of the sentence. The social framework is the implementation of the Sulha’s decision
by means of social pressure. Such pressure is produced organically in the community because of
people’s commitment to their community’s customs and traditions that require respect for the
decision of reconciliation, which is socially binding.
4.10.1 Legal enforcement of the Sulha
Legal Jurists agree that the disputing parties involved in a Sulha must agree to
reconciliation as a condition for the authenticity of the peace. In order for the parties to reach
“Sulh”, they will have a verbal contract that enforces the Jaha’s or the judge’s decision. The
Jaha will hold concentrated discussions during the “Atwa” or “hudna”1205 phase, the purpose of
which is to convince the parties to accept the Sulha process. The consent of the victim’s family
to use the Sulha is the first step toward enforcing the decision of the Jaha committee.
Most of the time, the Sulha process is a cross between arbitration and mediation. The
Jaha employs the Tafwid authorization and various other tools to reach the verdict, which is
binding, just as an arbitral finding would be. However, the Jaha maintains lengthy and patient
discussions with the disputing families until mutual agreement is reached. 1206 According to
Jabbour, once the Jaha reaches its judgment and determines the amount of ‘Blood Money’
(Diya) to be paid, it is too late to change the verdict. 1207 The Sulha, along with its enforcement
mechanisms, may seem informal, but this does not make it any less binding. Failure to accept the
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verdict would harm the respect and honor of the entire community and the clans involved in the
dispute. The threat of shame in tribal communities is substantial. 1208
Discretion is an essential element in maintaining the cooperation of the persons whom the
Jaha seeks to interview. However, because the Sulha often takes place alongside a related formal
legal proceeding, this conﬁdentiality is tested in situations in which Jaha members are
summoned to the formal state court to testify about a Sulha agreement they have obtained. This
usually happens when the state prosecutes the alleged offender. In such a case, the defense asks a
Jaha member to testify on behalf of the accused about a Sulha agreement that may have been
reached while the court was in session; this amounts to an adjudication between the state and the
alleged perpetrator in a case that required a Sulha to begin with. The accepted convention (not
law) is that the Jaha members may testify only about the Sulha agreement, but not about the
Sulha process or about any deliberations or testimonies they may have heard. A Jaha member
may agree to testify about the “positive” (non-incriminating, pro-reconciliation) aspects of the
testimonies and deliberations.1209 However, complications may arise if a judge asks to see the
Sulha agreement prior to the court making its decision (detention, verdict, or punishment). The
submitted Sulha agreements may contain potentially harmful (to the defendant) information,
such as tacit admission of culpability and other evidence that may inﬂuence the court’s
decision.1210 Tsafrir writes that “in the eyes of the court, the Sulha may express the accused’s
admission of having committed those deeds . . . Furthermore, the Sulha agreement presented to
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the court sometimes contains details of the injury caused by the accused”. 1211 To mitigate against
such eventualities, Sulha agreements tend to be very brief (half a page in many cases) and
contain mostly ritual language about “unfortunate events.” 1212
4.10.2 Social implementation of the Sulha
The mechanism of social implementation of the Sulha is characterized by Arab customs
and habits as influenced by some Islamic principles. Hence, before discussing the method of
execution, we should first discuss whether recourse by the parties to a Sulha is compulsory or
optional. The compulsory Sulha occurs when the parties are compelled to accept the Atwa, which
usually occurs in major conflicts, such as cases of murder and honor crimes. 1213 On the other
hand, the optional Sulha, in which the parties agree to use a Sulha by their own choice, usually
occurs in small cases such as social disputes; One of the parties violates the heritage of the
village by acts inconsistent with established customs and traditions, for example, expel the guest
from home without important reason.1214 In short, conciliation is compulsory or optional
depending on the nature of the dispute; therefore, the implementation of the judgment will be
different depending on the nature of the dispute and its subject matter.
First, in the Sulha that people reach according to their voluntary agreement, both parties
go to the judge (Sheikh) that they have agreed upon.1215 The judge must be someone who is both
distinguished and respected. Both parties pay the Sulha fees to the Sheikh, Rizket Al Kadi, which
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is around $100 each.1216 The Sheikh may not take any fees, and his services are essentially
donated for social purposes.1217
There is a difference between material disputes and moral controversies. 1218In a material
dispute, such as one in which money is involved, each party pays the judge his fees. When he
resolves the dispute, the party that is found guilty pays the fees for the judge, including any
judgmental amount awarded to the other parties, while the victim takes his fees back. 1219 In
moral controversies related to a person’s moral reputation, the extent of moral damage is
estimated by the judge, who issues his decision when the estimation of the damage has been
proven. For example, in cases of humiliation, degradation, verbal abuse, or customary assault,
the value of the compensation awarded will be determined based on the extent of the damages to
the person and his or her family.1220 At times, the location of the damage will be taken into
account, as estimated by the judge. The judge may also look into whether a crowd was present at
the time of the criminal act, which would increase the judge’s estimation of the harm that was
done. Other factors the judge may consider include how well known the perpetrator is; the
perpetrator’s level of education and political and social status; and how much respect he or she
has in the community.1221
In cases of major conflicts and crimes, such as murder or honor crimes, the situation is
relatively different. First, in such cases, the Sulha is mandatory for both parties. Second, as soon
as the authorities are informed of the crime or the murder, the Administrative Governor issues an
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order to direct the families of the two parties to the Sulha. Third, the Jaha will issue a Hudna and
stop any further violence until the issue is resolved. The enforcement mechanism in this case will
fall socially on the perpetrator, his or her family, and their sponsor Kafel Al Waffa. The person
who committed the crime (for example, murder) will be responsible along with his or her
sponsor Kafel Al waffa, if he or she does not obey the outcome of the Sulha.1222 If the request of
the Jaha is unacceptable and impossible to enforce, then the Jaha may go to another elder to
reevaluate the decision. If the parties are still not satisfied with the decision, both families will
select three judges to provide a final solution, which both parties will have to respect.
In case of rape, the rapist will be immediately considered guilty by the Jaha, and along
with court criminal charges, there will be personal charges against the rapist that will be lodged
on behalf of the victim and her family through the Sulha.1223 In such cases, the raped woman will
be asked if she would agree to marry the man who raped her. If she accepts, she will be given her
full dowry and marital rights, and her father and family will be monetarily compensated. 1224 If
the victim is impregnated by the rape, the child will be given his father’s name, and in that case,
the victim’s father may request more compensation. 1225 The compensation is typically calculated
in terms of camels (in this particular instance, it is usually 100 camels), which are valued today
at around 20,000 Jordanian Dinar total. 1226 There is another type of compensation given to the
victim and her family, which is social compensation that helps to restore dignity and
consideration to the victim’s family; this is known as Tabyeed Wijih.1227 The goal of the social
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compensation is to restore the family’s reputation and dignity, and the victim’s father is the one
who decides what the compensation will be.
These situations become worse when the victim refuses to marry the rapist. In this case,
the punishment of the rapist is decided by the father of the victim. There is a well-known case in
Jordan called Abu Helou.1228 It concerns a girl who was the victim of a rape and whose father
requested that the rapist’s body be covered in oil and rolled over the ground. Whatever part of his
body became covered in dirt had to be cut off, and this was eventually done. 1229
In cases of adultery, when two people are involved in an extra-marital relationship, which
is considered illegal in Palestine and Jordan, the father may disown his daughter and request for
the man to marry his daughter. The father may also request social compensation, because in
these cases, the man is considered to be bear more guilt than the woman, and therefore his family
is held responsible. 1230
The above text that appears word for word in appendix A (the interview), is that a
problem?
In tribal law and custom, the so-called proven crime is treated quite differently, which
means that the crime is fixed on the perpetrator and is fully recognized by him and by everyone.
In such a case, the accused does not have the right to defend himself or to present evidence, but
must acquiesce in any sentence imposed against him. This is termed (mbalem ma ytkalem مﺒﻠﻢ ﻻ
 ) يتكﻠﻢBecause the crime is a scandal, it is recognized publicly and any evidence against the
perpetrator cannot be challenged.1231 For the purpose of achieving justice and ensuring the
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success of the Sulha, the perpetrator must remain silent and leave his fate to the mercy and
pardon of the victim’s family. This "silence" helps the Jaha achieve reconciliation during the
period of the Atwa. It also helps to calm the victim’s family and bring them closer to forgiveness.
One of the most critical parts of the Sulha award enforcement is the Jalwah.1232 This is, in
a sense, a form of tribal deportation, which removes the culprit and his or her family from the
vicinity of the victim and the victim’s family, and it typically applies in cases of deliberate
killing and honor crimes. It is rooted in a Bedouin tradition that the relatives of the criminal are
often evacuated according to clan customs, and this is enforced in accordance with the law by the
administrative governor and the state security authorities. The Jalwah is applied in crimes of
blood or honor, and usually involves the evacuation of the perpetrator’s relatives, to the level of
the second cousins. In some cases, in which the tribe of the victim’s family is large and socially
strong in the region, they may become very aggressive and request that the entire family of the
offender be banished from the area. As noted earlier, such punishment is not suitable in modern
society.1233 Many leaders, administrators, and academics in Jordan have spoken out against the
practice of Jalwah, and some voices are requesting to at least minimize the number of family
members who are required to leave town when an incident like this takes place. 1234
However, tribal law offers a practical solution for the Jalwah, something called (Baear
Alnoum)بعير النوم, which basically means that the family of the perpetrator can return to their
homes with some conditions. They must wait for one week after the crime was committed and
the Atwa must be accepted. Second, the victim’s family must agree to this and accept the fact
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that the other family will return. Third, the perpetrator’s family must pay around 2000 JD for
each family that will return as compensation to the victim’s family. 1235
In conclusion, there certainly is a way to enforce the Sulha’s decisions through social
means, meaning that the community will have to respect them. the way to enforce Sulha has been
a recurrent issue throughout generations in both application and practice, the government of
Jordan respects this mechanism of enforcement to a certain extent and allows space for the
enforcement socially.
4.11 Conclusion
Tribal reconciliation in Arab and Islamic societies, particularly in Jordan and Palestine,
has played a major role in achieving community peace and in using traditional mechanisms to
resolve conflicts within the Arab society. In Palestine, the Israeli occupation forces have tried to
destroy the Palestinian infrastructure and social, political, and judicial structure. Thus, due to the
lack of a state in the modern sense, the only option for the Palestinian people has been to
preserve their legacy and culture by means of the tribal judiciary that is supported by Islamic
thought and reference. Even the presence of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, which tried to
impose a regular judiciary system on the state, could not abolish the role of the tribal judiciary
and its practices in Palestinian society.1236
The situation is very similar in Jordan in terms of Arab societies striving to maintain the
tribal peace system. The state of Jordan, established after the end of British occupation, did not
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resist or prevent the system of tribal justice, because the government realized the importance of
its role in maintaining community peace across the entire state.
A rule that must be understood is that the Sulha is not part of the state legal systems in
Jordan, Palestine, or any Middle Eastern country. It has no mediation or arbitration law to
regulate it. However, the formal legal system in the Middle East and in Jordan in particular has
begun to move from completely ignoring the Sulha in its proceedings to attempting to
incorporate it into state judicial processes indirectly.
In fact, the main Sulha “subject matter jurisdictions” are conflicts based on murder and
honor. However, there are many examples of the Sulha being used in cases that include, but are
not limited to, car accidents that cause personal injury or vehicle damage, most types of
domestic conflicts, disputes over lands or properties, financial conflicts, many types of family
disputes, many types of employment disputes, the breach of a commercial or civil contract,
disagreements between neighbors, and trespassing. 1237
This chapter demonstrates the strong impact and efficiency of the Sulha, which is a tool
used to resolve conflicts and to rehabilitate and preserve the honor of the victim’s family, and, in
doing so, to preserve the cohesion of society by installing peacemaking tools within it. 1238 This is
all contingent on the pivotal social role of the prestige of the Jaha committee members.1239
This chapter provides an overview of the few studies available that touch on the success
rates of different Sulha practices. Despite the scarcity of research that has been done on this
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subject to date, the few articles that are available on this issue paint a generally positive picture
of the Sulha’s potential for resolving disputes.
However, Sulha practices are suited only for convergent, homogeneous ethnic
communities that share the values of honor and respect for specific tribal traditions. When
societies are heterogeneous and the conflict in question supersedes the level of family or tribal
groups, a Sulha most likely would not be effective. In other words, when disputing parties do not
share the same values, accepting the results of a Sulha will be difficult and perhaps impossible.
This chapter presents a new vision of the uses of the Sulha as a model for conflict
resolution in Jordan and Palestine. It is among the first studies to take this approach and to
comprehensively collect and examine Sulha practices as a form of ethnic arbitration that has
compulsory elements in both its legal and social aspects. In addition, this research provides a
useful review of the legal status of Sulha practices in Palestine, Jordan, and the Middle East as a
whole.
As noted, tribal reconciliation is similar to arbitration, but it differs in certain details.
Also, the Sulha cannot be implemented and practiced equally in Jordanian and Palestinian
societies. Due to its importance in tribal societies, we propose its preservation, with certain
modifications that meet the requirements of Jordanian and Palestinian societies and allow it to
coexist effectively with the concept of modern arbitration. Accordingly, this chapter makes the
following recommendations:
1. Moving from inherited laws to writing them into adopted laws. The codification and
systematization of the provisions of tribal reconciliation in a specific article that may
serve as a guide for similar cases is required. Sulha judgments will differ depending on
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the parties’ tribes and their strengths, weaknesses, the nature and complexity of the
conflicts; however, a written collection of Sulha case studies would be important to have.
2. Alleviating or eliminating some of the provisions of the tribal reconciliation process,
especially those that threaten human rights, the most notable example being the Jalwah
that is enforced upon the offender’s entire family.
3. specifying the role and jurisdiction of subject matter experts in the tribal judiciary, or
including this role in arbitration law.
4. Treating the Sheikhs as arbitrators are treated in terms of conditions and dismissal, along
with adding certain conditions that are appropriate for Sulha cases that require the social
competence of a Sheikh.
5. Treating the award decisions of the Sheikhs the same as arbitrators’ awards are treated,
with respect to their execution by the regular courts; this would make the outcomes easier
to enforce under the supervision of the state authorities.
6. As noted in the discussion of the environmental Sulha, it is important to consult people
with experience in the specific subject matter involved and make them part of the Jaha.
For example, if a dispute is a matter of engineering, the Sheikh who oversees the Sulha,
or one of the Jaha members, should be an impartial engineer.

Chapter Five: Toward Community Arbitration
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Arbitration preserves community autonomy
5.3 Religious commitment and social power in enforcing awards
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5.4 Toward community arbitration
5.5 The future of community arbitration
5.6 Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
This chapter provides conclusions that summarize the foregoing chapters, toward the
overall goal of presenting a view of arbitration as an expression of community autonomy. This
research emphasizes how shared communal religious beliefs and a commitment to preserving
social harmony are factors that organically support the enforcement of arbitral awards among
Arab communities. The practice and experience of arbitration in a community helps to preserve
its autonomy. The use of arbitration as a form of self-regulation in normative communities has a
long history among the Arab tribal groups, and its forms and practices will continue to evolve.
5.2 Arbitration preserves community autonomy
This thesis has argued that “arbitration is an expression of party autonomy.” 1240 In
situations of conflict in a community, disputing parties turn to the arbitral process as a resolution
mechanism, because it preserves their privacy and familial rights. To encourage the use of
arbitration to resolve disputes, many state governments have adopted international instruments
and legislation that support arbitration. 1241 A community’s autonomy promotes arbitration and
allows disputing parties from the same community to resolve their issues inside the community
structure, yet still under the auspices of the state and its laws.
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Under the New York Convention, and many states’ national laws, parties to a dispute
enjoy freedom of choice and agreement regarding the arbitration procedures; for example, the
parties are called upon to choose and agree upon the location in which the arbitration
proceedings will take place, the selection of arbitrators, and the confidentiality and nature of the
proceedings.1242 It is essential that arbitration gives the parties the right to agree on the manner
and form of all aspects of the dispute settlement.1243 In the field of community arbitration, any
group that has its own arbitration method has the right to organize it in a way that suits their
gathering.
The widespread application of the principle of party autonomy and the autonomy of
groups gives the right to determine the nature of their conflict resolution mechanisms. This
allows the parties to choose the means of resolving disputes that are appropriate for them and
thus exclude the prevailing application in the responsible government institutions and the
applicable judicial procedures. 1244 All of this aims to build mechanisms aimed at maintaining the
basic societal, ethnic and religious relationship of members of the same society. One of the most
important benefits for all of this, is the positive reflection on the state and its social fabric as a
whole to maintain it and provide it with political and economic immunity.
Community members chose to resolve conflicts with others in this community through a
mechanism of their choice and determination. Therefore, many societies intentionally and
knowledgeable use arbitration, such as trade associations, trade unions and religious groups. So
basically, the parties agree to arbitrate in these contexts because they want to exercise full
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independence and resolve disputes as they wanted, and the goal is to make sure that the
resolution of these disputes has not disrupted or damaged their basic relationships. 1245 In terms of
arbitration agreements are expressions of party autonomy and freedom of association, so the
modern state has a binding legal effect on the expressions of “party autonomy and freedom of
association through arbitration agreements.” 1246 Indeed, when one considers the jurisdictions that
have been most hostile over the years to arbitration, they have been the jurisdictions that have
been most hostile towards other types of freedoms and, in particular, the freedom of private
parties to associate with one another.
5.3 Religious commitment and social power as way to enforce the award:
Religious commitment and social power to impose a new type of mechanisms for the
implementation of the arbitration award and considered it binding. Usually the only to enforce
ordinary arbitration is through the national court. But, is possible to consider religious
commitment and social power a way to enforce the award.
The important Social order, social controls and rules in community. Individual behavior
within community is subjugated by rules. 1247 Therefore, rules are the essential factors when it
comes to establishing stable community relations. 1248 The mutual interactions and relationships
among community members reflect the maintenance of these rules. Community members’
behavior that is regulated as such is called “social behavior,” and maintaining social order is
connected to legal pluralism. Members regulate their own behavior in accordance with their
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community’s laws and norms, and they are also able to settle their conflicts by way of
arbitration. In addition, the community members who are most experienced with the
community’s rules and laws preside over the arbitration processes to ensure a fair outcome.
Arbitration is an expression of community autonomy, and this autonomy drives the disputing
parties’ choices of which laws they wish to apply to their arbitration process.
A newly studied aspect of arbitration is how community arbitration can be viewed as
being as final and binding as any other form of arbitration; this paper also argues that awards
produced by such arbitration are readily enforced domestically. Communities are unique in that
they are held together by certain social forces that organically enforce community values. These
forces—such as religious enforcement in a religious community, or social enforcement in an
ethnic community—can help to support arbitration proceedings and enforce arbitral awards.
5.4 Toward community arbitration
Community arbitration is an expressly traditional instrument that provides a final and
binding resolution of a dispute among members of the same community, or between a
community member and an outsider, using an arbitration mechanism that is based on that
community’s normative and/or religious principles. The “community” element of the concept of
community arbitration is critical, in that it will be the laws of that community that are applied;
thus, a review of the meaning of “community” is important here.
Broadly speaking, the definitions that one finds in the scholarship agree that a community
is a group of people who share certain common intangible and tangible characteristics. These
could be land, culture, language, faith, or ethnicity. This is the understanding of community that
this research employs; this paper specifically does not designate a randomly selected group of
people who happen to live on the same land as a “community.”
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There is no single definition of the term “arbitration.” Perhaps this beneficial, as it leaves
room for the practices and understanding of arbitration to develop and modernize over time.
Most definitions assume a sophisticated public understanding and outline the basic legal methods
of arbitration. Some national laws provide their own definition of arbitration agreements. 1249 The
important point to recognize is that arbitration is a dynamic dispute resolution instrument that
varies among communities all across the world according to national and international laws. 1250
For example, in the United States, arbitration agreements are imposed by the dominant party and
reflect that party’s positional advantage. When a U.S. court enforces arbitration agreements that
identify one party as dominant, it will often ignore the “unilateral and adhesive character” 1251 of
the arbitration itself.
Arbitration is a valuable social tool, because it is a private mechanism that disputing
parties may use to resolve a conflict; these parties control the resolution process, and the
agreement they reach is confidential to them and written by them. 1252 The parties have the full
capacity in deciding the method, structure, scheme and any possible specifics of the
arbitration.1253 However, the method, scheme, applicable law and procedure differs and takes
shape based on the nature of the characteristics of the conflict. 1254
One of most important features of arbitration is its flexibility in terms of procedure. 1255
Parties are free to select their own procedure according to the norms of their ethnicity or religion.
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Parties who belong to the same religious, cultural, or legal system have the opportunity to
determine the most appropriate way to resolve their disputes. Thus, a community’s arbitration
process can apply to many different kinds of disputes among the members of the community.
As noted above, this paper sheds new light on community arbitration by arguing that it
can be as final and binding as any other form of arbitration, and that it is easy to enforce
domestically. Communities are unique in that they share common norms—religious norms in a
religious community, or social norms in an ethnic community. The awareness and observance of
these norms bind the community members together organically, and also bind them to their
communal processes, such as an arbitration proceeding. This eases the enforcement of an arbitral
award.
Examples of religious arbitration among religious communities that offer self-dispute
resolution are well known in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Members of certain religious
societies are at times obligated to use religious arbitration; otherwise, they would be subject to
religious and cultural penalties.1256 For example, among communities of the Jewish faith, if an
individual chooses to resort to a secular court to resolve a problem, a Beth Din may issue a seruv,
which is a manuscript stating that the individual must be shunned for choosing to present his or
her issue to a secular court.1257 Further, members may be forced into arbitration through a variety
of communal or other events, such as the possibility of being disowned or excommunicated. 1258
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Arbitration in a Beth Din is subject to the directives of Jewish law, as well as to the choices made
by both parties regarding the legal provisions of Jewish law. Litigants that come before a BDA
are required to sign a binding arbitration contract between themselves, and the awards are
recognized by secular courts in the United States. Similarly, the Sulha process is a case study of
ethnic arbitration, and national courts will recognize a Jaha’s decision. The unique and new
concept presented in this research is that of social enforcement; again, by virtue of observing the
norms that bind it together, a community has its own organic mechanisms to enforce an arbitral
(in this case, the Jaha’s) decision.
In most cases, the community arbitration award is final; however, it may be subject to
judicial review at a state level. Consider Clause 23 of the Islamic Procedural Rules that deals
with appeals. It states that “No appeal shall be made against any decisions of the Tribunal.” 1259 In
England, arbitration awards are enforceable under British law and subject to judicial review. 1260
For the Sulha, the Jaha decisions are final and binding and recognized by Jordanian law and the
Palestinian authority.
5.5 The Future of Community arbitration
All types of communities that have been discussed in this thesis, especially the religious
and ethnic groups, seek out the heritage of the “Old Country.” For example, in the U.S., with its
“melting pot” society, some groups have attempted to segregate themselves, and to resist
blending or merging their cultural heritage and customs into American society as a whole. Many
types of religious communities in major cities wish to identify with a smaller community. 1261
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Ethnic groups similarly have worked to maintain small, ethnically homogeneous communities in
order to preserve their ethnic identity. One foundation that can help create a community
atmosphere is community arbitration. The arbitration mechanism serves the community’s needs
while at the same time helping to give shape and meaning to the community itself.
What is the future of community arbitration? Previous chapters have discussed in depth
the various concepts of community and the various types of religious and cultural arbitration.
This chapter asks the question of whether we, as a society and legal community, really need
community arbitration.
As noted many times already in this chapter and throughout this research, one of the most
important aspects of arbitration is that the disputing parties have the ability to choose and agree
upon the arbitration clauses, as well as the right to control the nature of the arbitral procedure. 1262
The freedom to conclude contracts gives the arbitrating parties the right to enact their own laws
and establish their own procedural system; this gives the parties confidence in achieving justice,
and in the finality and fairness of that justice. 1263 The principle of freedom of contract gives the
parties or the community members a space in which to choose their litigation mechanism;
therefore, there should be no impediment to allowing community members to choose their
implementation mechanism as well, as long as the parties agree “that [the] stipulation is binding
and the decision is enforceable.”1264
Governments, corporations, and institutions should support the use of arbitration, as it
may help them to avoid instances of litigation.1265 Academics and universities should educate
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and teach people about community arbitration, and this may even open the door to a new field of
law and legal studies.
The need for community arbitration—whether religious or cultural—is increasing around
the world. In the U.S., for example, the instrument of community arbitration has encouraged
some groups of immigrants to strengthen their faith and beliefs. In a world characterized by
multiculturalism, community arbitration is one force that is contributing to “the dynamic nature
of religious development and ethnic group formation.” 1266 Indeed, some groups of people have
found American society to be fragmented; hence, many religious, racial and ethnic groups have
sought to return to their original traditions. 1267 These communities have the right to customize
the arbitration mechanism to best suit and resolve their own affairs: “state arbitration statutes
provide guidelines to groups wishing to form such institutions.”1268
Every community has its own standards of conduct and justice according to its religion or
customs.1269 When it comes to community arbitration, “foreign law or general community
standards of ethics and equity can be used as the basis of the [arbitral] decision.” 1270 Therefore,
the community arbitration board may resort to any means of redress that is satisfactory to the
members of the community when invoked. Arbitration dispute resolution mechanisms allow
cultural and religious groups to live according to their heritage and traditional practices and
thereby help to create a sense of community. 1271 In addition, arbitration allows people to avoid
the state’s civil courts, which is beneficial, given the high cost and often lengthy procedures of
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these courts, and also given that many people who are new to a certain country may be
unfamiliar with how that country’s state law conducts legal trials. 1272
Some argue that voluntary arbitration is not sufficient for cases that deal with many
thousands of dollars or with major corporate suits or negligence actions, and that community
arbitration is only useful for small claims. Thus, resorting to voluntary arbitration will not
successfully “relieve the overburdened courts” and that community arbitration is an “institution
that should just be there, for those who need it.” 1273 Community arbitration—including religious
arbitration and cultural arbitration—can be used for small cases, such as when a plaintiff seeks a
remedy in an Arab community. However, the researcher thinks that there is potential in the
future that community arbitration can also be used in very large cases in which a plaintiff seeks
millions of dollars; it can provide a solution to a society’s problems and thus help promote the
stability of the state as well.
The idea of arbitration is characterized by continuous development, which this research
attempts to promote by addressing the subject of community arbitration and suggesting that
arbitration could be successfully employed in many kinds of civil and even corporate
disputes.1274 Arbitration is no longer just an internal mechanism used by trade organizations to
resolve professional disputes. Indeed, the process of resolving disputes at the industry level has
become one that may be used for matters that occur entirely within the community or group, and
also for those that involve a community member and an outsider. This thesis emphasizes the
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importance of strengthening and growing the use of community arbitration among communities
around the world.
5.6 Conclusion
This research identifies the right for communities to arbitrate and discusses the extent and
limitations of the use of community arbitration as a self-regulating mechanism in a normative
society. The paper provides examples of this type of arbitration in the context of the rise of
multiculturism in most countries and jurisdictions.
This research is unique for two reasons. First, it considers and blends scholarship from
several different fields; the author used this multidisciplinary approach in order to fully grasp all
of the relevant strains of thought about arbitration. The combination of scholarship from several
different disciplines drove the main idea of this research: arbitration. The researcher linked
sociology, and specifically the concept of “community” and its legal status, with social theories,
legal philosophy, legal sociology, political science, and law in general, all as particularly related
to arbitration. This thesis notes that the important legal principle of legal pluralism at the state
level may complicate the concept of community self-governance (autonomy).
The second way in which this research could be considered unique is that it is a
comparative study that discusses two different methods of settling internal disputes in both and
religious and cultural communities. Linking these two methods is a new innovation in the area of
arbitration studies. This kind of comparative analysis necessitated understanding each of the
arbitration processes on its own and finding a new concept to describe the principle of the
enforceability of the arbitral awards; namely, the obligation of community members to enforce
them according to their organic regular observation of their religious or cultural norms.
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The researcher first introduces the concept of community from the perspective of several
different methodical aspects to conclude a comprehensive definition of “community” that is
suited to the requirements of the research. This paper comprises four chapters. Chapter Two
focuses on the community types and the definition of the term community. It discusses how
communities have their own principles of law inside a state structure characterized by legal
pluralism. It further discusses how arbitration promotes the idea of legal pluralism and also
conveys the idea of procedural legal pluralism. For this discussion, it was necessary to expand
the idea of legal pluralism and examine its acceptance at the state level.
Chapter Two moves on to frame the relationship between legal pluralism and autonomy
for the community as whole and for individuals by default. This chapter addresses the rise of
community arbitration—both religious and ethnic—in community groups around the world. The
author argues that community autonomy can enhance arbitration and strengthen its application,
and emphasizes that groups should be encouraged to adopt arbitration to resolve their members’
conflict as a way of differentiating themselves as unique versus the larger society/state. Such
differentiation may even lead to a group winning independence from that state.
The third chapter focuses on religious arbitration, as practiced in three core religions
(Christianity, Judaism, and Islam). The research notes many examples from around the world,
and in particular from the U.S, Canada, and England. The focus is more on the U.S when it
comes to the enforcement of religious arbitration, which is less established in the U.S. than it is
in England and Canada; this is especially true of Islamic arbitration, which is quite advanced in
England. The author urges the Muslim community in the U.S. to work on establishing and
growing the practice of Islamic arbitration in the U.S. to the same levels as it now occurs in
England.
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The fourth chapter focuses on ethnic arbitration, particularly the use of the Sulha in
Jordan and Palestine. There are many examples of ethnic arbitration from all around the world,
and some are quite different in their mechanisms from others, which makes it difficult to discuss
them all at once. However, the overall concept is the same, which is to resolve a community
issue based on that community’s cultural norms. Thus, this research used one form only—the
Sulha—as a case study/representative example of ethnic arbitration.
This fifth and final chapter presents conclusions and discusses the future of community
arbitration in general, with a focus on how community arbitration may be used and further
developed in the years to come
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Interview with Sheikh Salem Abu Athena Al-hjaya via phone, April 2019

Introduction
This interview was conducted in Arabic and translated to English by Rami Alhellu. The
interview was conducted freely; the interviewer posed a small number of wide-ranging
questions, and Sheikh Salem was free to respond to them at length. The interview was not
recorded, but the interviewer took notes while Sheikh Salem was talking. Sheikh Salem Abu
Athena Al-hjaya was selected by the King of Jordan in 1999 as a judge in southern Jordan. His
father before him had been selected to be a judge in 1994, and his grandfather Suleman Mutlaq
Abu had been selected before that, in 1936.
The interview
What is the definition of the Sulha?
I define it as a non-written (no written law code or case history) religious (Islamic) judiciary
Why do the people of Jordan use the Sulha?
A Sulha tribunal is considered by the people as a first step in adjudicating a dispute; something
like civilian justice. The Jordanian society is a tribal society, and the Sulha is part of the fabric of
that society. The Sulha is also used to avoid damaging the relationships between different clans
and between individual people within a specific clan.
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What is the Role that the Sulha plays in Jordanian society?
Tribal judiciary law plays a major role in the control of society and the preservation of rights, as
most of its principles are taken from Islamic law and agreed upon societal norms.
Are there people who are against the idea of the Sulha?
Some groups in Jordanian societies oppose the use of the Sulha, such as Chechnyans and
Circassians, but despite this opposition, the Sulha is still practiced in many Jordanian societies.
Do you think the Sulha is important, then?
Yes; for example, it aims to prevent a victim’s family from taking revenge in the case of murder.
How are Sheikhs or Mosleheen selected or appointed in Jordan?
A Sheikh is appointed in Jordan based on his family; it is an ancestral position, passed down
from father to son. In Jordan, the Sheikhs or Mosleheen who were appointed before the state of
Jordan was established remain appointed for life. I was selected as a Sheikh because my
grandfather was a Sheikh in 1936, even before Jordan was established as a state.
What is the difference between the Sulha and a regular court?
The goal of the Sulha is quite different from that of a regular court. Its role is to facilitate the
relationships within a community’s, and to maintain harmony and strength within that
community. In the Sulha, the tribal judge may rule on a conflict as part of his social
responsibilities as the family elder. For example, two parties from the same family may prefer to
use the Sulha instead of going to the regular court, because the process and result of the Sulha
will be more confidential, so the conflict will be confined only to the families involved.

294

The Extent and Limits of the Right to Arbitrate Among Religious
and Cultural Communities (Sulha as a case study)
Moreover, the tribal verdict usually provides more satisfaction to the parties than a court order
would, in terms of charges or resolutions. That is because the outcome of the process is in
accordance with the spirit of the culture and with Sharia law. The parties involved are more
likely to follow their own norms and traditions than the legal regulations of the country, due to
differences between the two laws (Islamic Sharia law and Jordanian law).
What is the law that you apply in the Sulha?
We apply (Islamic Sharia law). Islamic law prescribes certain penalties for wrongdoings. For
example, the amount of money (Diya) that will be awarded to a victim’s family will be
calculated according to Sharia methodology. As another example, when a woman is accused of
committing the crime of adultery, the Sheikh will rely on the provisions of Islamic evidentiary
law, which require four witnesses to the act, or confession from one of the parties to the act.
What do you think about Jalwa (the expulsion of an entire family from a clan for an individual’s
crime); is it fair to the parties involved?
The Jalwa laws need to be updated. However, despite the problems and the need for
modernization, Jalwa laws do have relevance. Also, not all family members are evicted. All but
the fourth grandfather must leave their homes, usually for the first week after the crime was
committed. They are typically permitted to return to their homes after Atwa. Tribal law offers a
practical solution for the Jalwa, which is something called (Baear Alnoum)بعير النوم, which
basically means that the family of perpetrator can return to their homes with certain conditions.
First, they have to wait until a week after the crime was committed and they have to accept the
Atwa. Second, the victim’s family must agree to this and accept the fact that the other family will
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return. Third, the perpetrator’s family must pay around 2000 JD for each family that will return,
as compensation to the victim’s family.
Is the Jalwa mandatory for the victim’s family?
Yes, it is necessary to advance reconciliation, which is essential, especially in extreme cases such
as murder. The victim’s family must accept the offer of Jalwa to prevent further bloodshed and
murder.
Will the judgments of the Sulha differ from case to case?
Sometimes; if the person who did wrong was a first-time offender, the Sulha may be easier and
go more quickly, because the victim’s family may be more willing to forgive the criminal.
Do you think the Sulha weakens the state’s security system or containment policy for the social
fabric of the tribal societies?
No, I don’t think that the Sulha is bad for the containment policy of the tribal societies’ social
fabric. The Sulha is an essential factor in preserving social stability. The presence of the Sulha
does not mean that state stands idly by; rather, the state works to control tribal security and
bloodshed by taking security precautions and organizing the Jalwa to contain the crisis.
Accordingly, the state stresses that it takes appropriate security actions at the time of the crisis
and deals with any attempts to bypass the law.
The tribal judiciary law plays a major role in the control of society and the preservation of
people’s rights. Most of its principles are taken from Islamic law and agreed upon norms. The
state court has less control in tribal societies, and some issues cannot be resolved by the state
police or courts. In fact, the state judges and police sometimes direct the people to the Sulha after
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a crime has been committed. The tribal judicial system can resolve conflicts in one session and
prevent further bloodshed.
How fast is the procedure of the Sulha?
It is usually fast, but in some complicated matters, or in the case of a long-term conflict between
two parties, the Sulha may continue for years.
How do the two parties in general agree to use the Sulha?
The compulsory Sulha occurs when the parties have no choice but to accept Atwa, which usually
happens in major conflicts, such as murder and honor crimes.
There is also the optional Sulha, which occurs when the parties agree to go to the Sulha as their
own choice. This usually happens in small cases such as social disputes; for example, perhaps
one of the parties infringes the heritage of the village Conciliation is compulsory or optional
depending on the nature of the dispute, and therefore the implementation of the judgment is
different depending on the nature of the dispute and its subject matter as well.
First, in a Sulha that people reach according to their own agreement, both parties come to the
judge (Sheikh) that they had agreed to consult.
Is there a fee for the Sulha?
Both parties pay the Sulha fees (Rizket Al Kadi, which is around $100 each) to the Sheikh. The
Sheikh may not take any fees and simply provide his service for social purposes. It is important
to mention that there is a difference between material disputes and moral controversies. In a
material dispute, one in which money is involved, each party pays the judge his fees. When he
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resolves the dispute, the one who is found guilty pays the fees for the judge, including the
judgmental amount to the other parties, while the victim takes his fees back. In moral
controversies related to a person’s reputation, the moral damage is estimated by the judge, who
issues his decision when the case is proven. For example, in case of humiliation, degradation,
verbal abuse, or customary assault, the value of compensation will be determined based on the
extent of the damages done to the person and his or her family. At times, the location of the
damage, which is estimated by the judge, will be taken into account.
How does the Sheikh evaluate emotional damages?
The judge may look into whether a crowd was present, which would make the harm worse. Other
factors the judge may consider include how well known the perpetrator, is along with factors
such as the degree of respect that the victim holds in his or her community, his or her level of
education, his or her political and social level, and his or her age.
Can you provide more examples of the use of the Sulha, and, is the Sulha binding?
In cases of rape, for example, the rapist will immediately be considered guilty by the Jaha, and
along with court criminal charges, there will be personal charges awarded to the victim and her
family through the Sulha. In such cases, the raped woman will be asked if she would agree to
marry the man who raped her. If she accepts, then she will be given her full dowry and marital
rights, while her father and family will be monetarily compensated. If the victim is impregnated
by the rape, the child will be given his father’s name, and in that case, the victim’s father may
request more compensation. The compensation is typically calculated by means of camels (in
this instance, it is usually 100 camels), which are valued today at around 20,000 Jordanian Dinar.
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So, the victim’s family receive a monetary value of a certain number of camels. There is another
type of compensation that is given to the victim and her family, which is a social compensation
that restores dignity and consideration to the victim’s family known as Tabyeed Wijih. The goal
of the social compensation is to restore the family’s reputation and dignity, since the victim’s
father is the one who decides what this compensation will be.
These situations are more difficult when the victim refuses to marry the rapist. In this case, the
punishment is decided by the father of the victim. There is a well-known case in Jordan that is
called Abu Helou. It concerned a girl who was the victim of a rape and whose father requested
for the rapist’s body to be covered in oil and rolled across the ground. Whatever part of his body
became covered with dirt had to be cut, which was eventually done.
In cases of adultery as another example, when two people are involved in an extra-marital
relationship, which is considered illegal in Palestine and Jordan, the father may disown his
daughter and request the man to marry her. The father may also request social compensation,
because in such cases, the man is considered to be more guilty than the woman, and therefore his
family is held responsible.
In tribal law and custom, the so-called proven crime is treated quite differently: A proven crime
is one that is fixed on the perpetrator and is fully recognized by him and by everyone. In such a
case, the accused does not have the right to defend himself or to present evidence; rather, he
must acquiesce to any sentence imposed against him. It called (mbalem ma ytkalem)مﺒﻠﻢ ﻻ يتكﻠﻢ
Such a crime is a scandal; its perpetrator cannot be challenged. For the purpose of achieving
justice and ensuring the success of the Sulha, the perpetrator must remain silent and leave his
fate to the mercy and pardon of the victim’s family. This "silence" helps the Jaha to achieve
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reconciliation during the period of the Atwa. It helps to calm the victim’s family and bring them
closer to forgiveness.
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